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	ABSTRACT 
Figures of Clarity: Three Poets’ Voyage toward an Intelligible Poetics 
Maria Doubrovskaia  
 
The 1910 polemic on the “crisis of Symbolism” began when the Symbolist poet 
Viacheslav Ivanov read a lecture entitled the “Precepts of Symbolism.” This lecture initiated a 
lively debate on the status of this prominent literary movement, to which many of the leading 
literary figures of the Silver Age contributed. Although the “crisis of Symbolism” has garnered a 
great deal of scholarly interest, an important aspect of this debate has remained unexplored. 
Ivanov’s lecture contained an attack on the notion of clarity, which he interpreted as the word’s 
“transparency” to reason. He argued that language is neither an adequate expression of thought, 
nor an accurate representation of “reality.” The lecture was itself a polemical response to a brief 
article written by Ivanov’s friend, Mikhail Kuzmin, and entitled “On Beautiful Clarity: Notes on 
Prose.” Published a few months before Ivanov’s lecture, this essay urged respect for the word, 
advocated such Classical values as precision, economy of means and clarity of expression.  
Both “On Beautiful Clarity” and the “Precepts of Symbolism” appeared at a time when 
pervasive loss of faith in the communicative power of language combined with the sense of 
social and cultural malaise led to a profound crisis that far exceeded the ranks of the Symbolists. 
Between 1910 and 1917, a number of Russian writers and thinkers proclaimed the word “dead” 
and offered programs for its revival. For Ivanov, clarity was an Enlightenment notion that he 
associated with rationalism and blamed for the ills of his age. For Kuzmin, however, clarity 
represented poetic rather than empirical meaningfulness and had little to do with the kind of 
empirical “transparency” that Ivanov had in mind. Both poets were after the same goal: a poetics 
	that would bridge the perceived divide between the word and “reality.” Even as Ivanov argued 
for a language of mystical obscurity in the hope that such an idiom would restore the mystery 
and meaning of which he believed his age was sapped, he replaced clarity with a kind of 
Symbolist intelligibility and so a clarity of his own.  
This dissertation examines Viacheslav Ivanov’s, Mikhail Kuzmin’s and Osip 
Mandelshtam’s distinct approaches to the concept of clarity as poetic sense, formulated by these 
poets independently as well as in response to each other. I argue that for all three poets the notion 
of clarity applies to the specific relationship between the poet and the word, between the image 
and the word, and between the semantic content and the sound within the word. Since for all 
three poets, clarity is associated not only with the poetic logos in general, but specifically with 
the heritage of European Classicism, the Classical ideal works its way into these relationships as 
the “image” of sense to which the poet must aspire. For each poet, poetic clarity is an explicit 
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Note on the translation and transliteration 
Throughout the dissertation, I use the Library of Congress transliteration system. In the body of 
the dissertation Russian names are written as they are commonly spelled in English. Genevieve 
Arlie translated from Russian into English in the first chapter, Kirsten Lodge in the second 





















On Beautiful Unclarity: an Introduction 
 
In Russia as in the West the year 1910 marked the time of great cultural upheaval. In 
Virginia Woolf’s famous essay on Modernist literature, “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” the 
author observed that “human character changed” “in or around” December of that year. She 
suggested that as a result, “all human relations” were transformed, and that “when human 
relations change, there is at the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature.”1 
Woolf’s essay, of course, focuses on the latter.  
The advent of Modernism was not quite as abrupt as Woolf suggests. Rather, it was the 
result of a complex, nearly pan-global process that took place over the course of the first decade 
of the twentieth century, now known as the “linguistic turn.” Vladimir Feshchenko’s monograph 
Laboratory of the Logos provides a thorough overview of international literature dedicated to 
this shift and outlines its origin in a “complete reevaluation of long-standing scientific and 
artistic traditions.”2 At the end of the first decade of the twentieth century these transformations 
were accompanied by a profound sense of crisis in society at large as well as on the level of the 
individual. Thomas Harrison’s study 1910: The Emancipation of Dissonance provides a vivid 
overview of the kind of new idiom that emerged as the result of this cultural process. The scholar 
believes that the year 1910 “signals the end of a Western, humanistic tradition” and “the 
termination of its guiding objective.” According to Harrison, the prevalent idiom of the period 																																																								1	Virginia Woolf, Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown (London: Hogarth Press, 1924), 2-3.	
2 Vladimir Feshchenko, Laboratoriia logosa: iazykovoi eksperiment v avangardnom tvorchestve 
(Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul’tur), 29. The author lists some of the major modernist projects 
that defined the “linguistic turn” of the first half of the 20th century: reconstruction of the Hebrew 
language, considered “dead” since the first century AD, “purification” of Turkish language, 
creation of literary Norwegian and Estonian languages, creation of artificial languages such as 
Esperanto, experimental literary movements in France, Great Britain, Russia and other countries, 
emergence of formalism in literature, structuralism in linguistics and ethnology, etc. 
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between 1908 and 1914 was predicated upon the contradiction between the drive for self-
realization and the inability to overcome the pervasive sense of “self-loss” that yielded this drive 
in the first place. Numerous iconic texts and artworks that date to this time probe the creative 
potential of discord between experience and language.3 One such text is Arnold Schoenberg’s 
Theory of Harmony (1911), in which the composer outlined the process whereby he broke with 
the rules of consonance and embraced the language of musical discord. Harrison observes that 
the entire Theory of Harmony is “presented as though it were nothing more than an internal 
conversation <…> Aiming only ‘to make things clear to himself,’ the artist pursues clarity in 
open confusion.”4 According to the scholar, in the years leading up to World War I the vacuum 
left by the disappearance of the overarching humanist “guiding objective” inspired artists to seek 
subjective, personal clarity amidst “dissonance.”  
In Russia the question of discord and clarity also emerged in the year 1910, where it was 
interpreted according to Russia’s specific historical and cultural situation. My disserttion, 
Figures of Clarity: Three Poets’ Voyage toward an Intelligible Poetics, examines the problem of 
clarity as it figured in the famous 1910 polemic on the “crisis of Symbolism.” Implicit in the 
European cultural discourse at this time, in Russia it became the subject of an extended 
																																																								3	Thomas Harrison, 1910: The Emancipation of Dissonance (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1996),1-17.  
According to Harrison, some of the artists, writers and thinkers who created seminal work in and 
around the year 1910 are Vasily Kandinsky, Egon Schiele, Rainer Maria Rilke, Georg Trakl, 
Carlo Michelstaedter, Georg Simmel and Ludwig Wittgenstein, to name only a few. At this time 
Sigmund Freud published his foundational Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Georg Lukács 
produced a collection of essays Soul and Form, in which he argued that “form” was the 
distortion of  “soul,” and Rudolf Steiner formulated the principles of theosophy in An Outline of 
Occult Science.	4	Harrison, 1910: The Emancipation of Dissonance, 18-19.  
The title of Harrison’s book derives from another text by Schoenberg: his 1926 essay “Opinion 
or Insight?” In this later text the composer addressed his earlier achievement, summed up in the 
Theory of Harmony, and described it as the “emancipation of dissonance.”	
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conversation between three poets. First among these poets is Viacheslav Ivanov, one of the 
leaders of the Symbolist movement, who in 1910 made the attempt to formulate a “supra-
rational” poetics by arguing against the notion of clarity as he understood it. The second poet is 
Mikhail Kuzmin, whose essay “On Beautiful Clarity” is seminal to my research. The essay 
preceded the polemic by two months, prompting a polemical response from Ivanov during the 
debate. Kuzmin stood apart from the literary movements of his time, yet his concept of clarity 
goes to the heart of the challenge of his epoch. The third is Osip Mandelshtam, whose 
contribution to the debate of 1910 was minimal, but who returned to the theme of clarity as it 
was interpreted during the “crisis” in his later writigings. I first examine the notion of clarity as it 
was discussed during the “crisis” itself and then discuss each poet’s individual approach to this 
idea in the years leading up the debate and after it was long over.  
During the “crisis of Symbolism” the theme of discord and clarity emerged as a reflection 
of the general atmosphere of the era as well as specific issues within the movement itself. In her 
classic History of Russian Symbolism, Avril Pyman describes the apocalyptic feel of the years 
between 1902-1910. As early as 1902 the country was rocked by a wave of revolts against land 
and factory owners. In 1904 the disastrous Russian-Japanese war began; in 1905 Russia’s defeat 
further demoralized the already discontented society. Government incompetency only 
exacerbated tensions. Oppressive legacy of positivist thought of the last third of the nineteenth 
century lingered, combined with a vague, as-yet unarticulated sense of an approaching 
catastrophe.5 In 1910 unrest and unease appear to have reached a momentary plateau: a moment 
of uneasy stillness before an even greater storm. One of the most prominent poets of this period, 
Alexander Blok painted a vivid picture of this year in the preface to his poem Retribution 																																																								5	Avril Pyman, Istoriia russkogo simvolizma (Moscow: Respublika, 1998), 227-250, 265-281, 
309.	
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[Vozmezdie] (1911-1919). Written after the revolution, the preface describes 1910 as the time of 
momentous endings and important beginnings. First and foremost, Blok remembers it as the year 
of the deaths of three iconic Russian artists. He writes that the death of the actor Vera 
Komissarzhevskaya signaled the end of the “lyric note” in theater. The “immense personal world 
of the artist” vanished with the Symbolist painter Mikhail Vrubel. The death of Lev Tolstoy 
represented the “death of human tenderness” and “wise humanness” itself.6 For Blok, at least, the 
“guiding objective” still present while these artists were alive, was now gone. He lists some of 
the events of that year and describes the general mood of the time. He remembers this mood as 
permeated by a kind of “music” that his poem strives to evoke and writes of the “mystical” 
inebriation that accompanied premonitions of war and the revolution during this period. He 
recalls the sudden popularity of aviation and airshows that often resulted in fatalities and French 
wrestling in vogue in the circuses of Moscow and St. Petersburg. He also mentions the rampant 
anti-Semitism unleashed by the murder of a Russian child and the subsequent Beilis trial in Kiev, 
and the murder of Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin. Blok’s recollections are disconcerting and 
filled with references to violence. He writes that, “the scent of smoke, metal and blood was 
already in the air.”7 A catastrophe appeared to have begun, yet its exact nature was still 
unknown. 
Blok was one of the most famous participants of the Symbolist movement, which by 
1910 had been central in Russian literary life for nearly two decades. The Symbolists comprised 
two groups: the “older” poets, such as Valery Briusov, Dmitri Merezhkovsky, Fyodor Sologub 
and Konstantin Balmont among others, began to publish as early as 1892 and formed a well-
																																																								6	Aleksandr Blok, Vozmezdie. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v dvadtsati tomakh, 20 vols. (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1999), 5:48.  Hereafter cited as PSS.	7	Ibid., 5:48.	
5 	
established literary movement by 1895. The “young” Symbolists, Blok, Andrei Bely and 
Viacheslav Ivanov, entered the literary arena only around the turn of the century, as the self-
proclaimed pupils of the religious philosopher Vladimir Solovyov.8 While the theme of the 
apocalypse was popular with both groups, they interpreted it differently.9 The “old” poets, 
especially Briusov as their leading figure, considered themselves decadents and aesthetes. They 
viewed their own decadence and the general state of perceived decline around them strictly in 
historical, social and aesthetic terms. Associating their version of Symbolism with its European 
counterpart, they believed their “decadence” to be a historically relevant, innovative approach to 
literature. Indeed, in Russia their movement was the first Modern poetic movement. Unlike 
them, the “young” Symbolists believed that their mission was essentially spiritual. In the preface 
to Retribution Blok mentioned the excitement with which these poets discussed the advent of a 
redemptive, mystical poetics that would reconcile fractured spheres of religion, art and history. 
Through the power of the poetic word, they consciously sought to catalyze a spiritual 
transformation in “human character” and “all relations.”  
The difference in these two groups’ views on the role and meaning of poetry eventually 
contributed to a debate on the issue of “crisis,” which Blok recalled in his preface as the most 																																																								8	Viacheslav Ivanov’s age—he was born in 1866— should have made him an “older” Symbolist, 
indeed, one of the “oldest,” but his views and the time he began to publish his writing allied him 
with Blok and Bely, both fourteen years his junior. 9	In his “Apocalypse in Russian Fiction,” David Bethea writes: “In terms of richness and breadth 
of apocalyptic literature, there is little to compare in the Russian context with the Symbolist 
period and with the theme of “last things” in the many novels, stories, poems, essays and 
philosophical causeries of Vladimir Solov’ev, Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, Vasilii Rozanov, Valerii 
Briusov, Maksimilian Voloshin, Aleksandr Blok, Andrey Belyi, and others.” David M. Bethea, 
“Apocalypse in Russian Fiction,” Issues in Russian Literature before 1917: Selected Papers on 
the Third World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, ed. J. Douglas Clayton 
(Columbus: Slavica, 1989), 176-195, 180.  
Some examples are Blok’s 1902 poem “Veru v solntse zaveta,” a famous Symbolist rendering of 
the apocalyptic theme. Blok, PSS, 1:95. Another example is Bely’s essay “Apokalipsis v russkoi 
poezii.” Andrei Belyi, “Apokalipsis v russkoi poezii,” Vesy 4 (April 1905): 11-28.  
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memorable literary event of the year 1910. This most memorable event in the ranks of a 
movement, central to the life of Russian letters at this time, formally focused on the issue of the 
poet’ social and philosophical mission. Just beneath the surface, however, lay the equally if not 
more pressing problem of “dissonance” and clarity. The debate commenced in March, after 
Viacheslav Ivanov delivered a lecture, later published under the title “The Precepts of 
Symbolism,” first in Moscow and then in St. Petersburg. It reverberated on the pages of St. 
Petersburg and Moscow journals for the duration of that year and even in 1911. Although 
according to Tomas Venclova, the lecture was a recapitulation of ideas that Ivanov already 
expressed elsewhere over the course of the decade, this time these ideas resonated differently.10 
Unlike in the previous years, Ivanov consciously tried to give direction to a movement that 
suddenly appeared to have none. His most immediate opponent and interlocutor was Valery 
Briusov, whom the “younger” Symbolists sought to “convert” to their interpretation of 
Symbolism throughout the 1900s.11 By 1910, Briusov had become disillusioned with the 
movement altogether. In his view, not only Symbolism, but Russian poetry in general entered an 
entropic state. Several weeks before the polemic began he wrote to Ivanov: “So far as I can 
judge, complete disintegration reigns. Former alliances and circles have all fallen apart. Former 
ruling ideas are worn out—and there are no new ones.”12 In practical terms, this stagnation and 
																																																								10	Tomas Venclova mentions specifically the following essays: “Poet i chern’,”(1904), “Kop’e 
Afiny,”(1904), “Simvolika esteticheskikh nachal,”(1905) “Krizis individualizma,”(1905), “O 
veselom remesle i umnom veselii,”(1907), “Dve stikhii v sovremennom simvolizme”(1908).  
Tomas Venclova, “Viacheslav Ivanov and the Crisis of Russian Symbolism,” Issues in Russian 
Literature before 1917: Selected Papers on the Third World Congress for Soviet and East 
European Studies, 205-209, 206. 	11	In the wake of Ivanov’s lecture the polemic comprised a great number of articles by nearly 
every important literary figure of the time, not only Briusov. I address some of the specifics of 
this exchange in my first chapter.		12	I quote the letter from Joan Delaney Grossman’s “Briusov’s Defense of Poetry.”  
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discord led, for example, to the closing of nearly all Symbolist publications, at a time when 
magazines were of great importance. In 1909 the Moscow Symbolist journal Vesy, over which 
Briusov presided, and Andrei Bely’s Zolotoe Runo ceased to exist. Briusov dismissed Bely’s 
new publishing endeavor, Musaget, as inconsequential and placed equally little faith in the 
important St. Petersburg publication Apollon. Not only was he convinced that Symbolism has 
run its course, but he saw no potential in the younger generation of poets, Symbolist or not.13 The 
sense of confusion and loss of direction appeared to be pervasive.  
In his lecture, Ivanov also addressed the problem, but unlike Briusov, he insisted on a 
solution. Describing the state of “dissonance” that had descended upon the Symbolists, he wrote: 
“One discerned cries of utter despair in the writings of Z.N. Gippius, Fyodor Sologub, Aleksandr 
Blok, Andrei Bely. Sun-like, free man became but a worm, crushed in the presence of chaos 
<…> The Paladin dreamt that his Beautiful Lady is a “cardboard bride.” The image of the 
beloved Bride took on the distinct appearance of a whore.”14 Ivanov defined chaos not only as a 
state of depletion of values and ideals, but also as the blurring of distinctions between opposites. 
For him, this was a tremendous source of inspiration. When the very bedrock of order—the 
juxtapositions upon which it rests—is undone, the poet embarks on an essentially religious 
mission. His transcendent vision also blurs distinctions between opposites. The Symbolist poet 
transcends contradiction so as to discern the absolute within the merely phenomenal, and 
overcomes “dissonance” not by imposing order on it, but by acknowledging it as a sacred 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Joan Delaney Grossman, “Briusov’s Defense of Poetry,” Issues in Russian Literature before 
1917: Selected Papers on the Third World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, 196-
204, 199. Briusov’s letter in published as “Perepiska s Viacheslavom Ivanovym (1903-1923),” in 
Literaturnoe nasledstvo 85, 525-525.	13	J.D. Grossman, 206.	14	V. Ivanov, “Zavety simvolizma,” Sobranie sochinenii, 4 vols, ed. D.V. Ivanov and O. 
Deschartes (Brussels: Foyer Oriental Chrétien, 1971-1987), 2:589-603. Hereafter SS. The lecture 
was published as an essay in Apollon 8 (May-June 1910): 5-20.	
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spiritual principle and developing an idiom that accommodates this knowledge. Ivanov blamed 
“individualism,” of which he accused European Symbolism as well as Briusov’s aestheticism 
and decadence, for the poet’s inability to pursue this mission. An “individualist,” entrapped by 
his limiting and arrogant self-reliance, could never supersede contradiction.   
In the “Precepts,” Ivanov references the concept of clarity in the context of his critique of 
“individualism.” Although he associates this concept with the general problem of aestheticism, 
which he believes to fall short of his program of mystical poetics, in this case his criticism is not 
directed specifically at Briusov, but at Mikhail Kuzmin, whose essay “On Beautiful Clarity: 
Notes on Prose” appeared in the fourth issue of Apollon in January 1910, just two months before 
Ivanov’s lecture. At this time Kuzmin was at the height of his fame as a poet and prose writer.  
Although he knew many of the Symbolists and was on friendly terms with Ivanov as well as 
Briusov, he was not a Symbolist himself. Indeed, he maintained and underscored his 
independence from any of the literary movements of his time. His brief article was a critique in 
its own right. Admonishing those, who, in his opinion, misused language and targeting especially 
some of the “young” Symbolists, the author proffered his understanding of what constitutes good 
style. The final statement of the essay is particularly relevant to the subject of clarity as it 
reemerges in Ivanov’s “Precepts.” Kuzmin wrote: “But the way of art is long, and life is short, 
and so I wonder—are not all these exhortations only good wishes for myself alone?”15 The focus 
on the self in the very last sentence contrasts with the body of the text, where Kuzmin addresses 
an audience and speak in general terms. This ending reminds the reader that the “rules” of good 
style are, ultimately, a subjective consideration. Evocative of Schonberg’s approach in his 1910 
																																																								15	The essay was first published in Apollon 4 (January 1910): 5-10. Here, I quote John 
Barnstead’s translation. M. Kuzmin and John A. Barnstead. “On Beautiful Clarity: Notes on 
Prose.” Russian Language Journal, vol. 40, no. 136/137, 1986, pp. 201–205. 
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Theory of Harmony, Kuzmin presented his ideas as if they were nothing more than “an internal 
conversation.” As he asserted that “beautiful clarity” is a matter of personal taste, he also 
preempted any attempt at a programmatic reading of his essay. Such a conclusion represented a 
rebuke to Ivanov’s proselytizing zeal. Yet the first-person narrator who states the self-reflexive 
nature of his statement in the final sentence of Kuzmin’s essay is hardly a frivolous individualist. 
He is “constructed” according to the Classical aesthetic code that the author espouses. In fact, in 
the body of the essay Kuzmin criticizes those authors, who idiosyncratically “distort” their 
narratives and language as their medium to the detriment of their texts’ communicability and 
aesthetic value. “On Beautiful Clarity” subtly poses the question as to who its narrator might be.  
Ivanov understood “clarity” as an assertion of “individualism” instead of its 
transcendence. He referred to it as: “the word’s adequacy, its sufficiency with respect to the 
demands of reason, the communicability of ‘beautiful clarity’ that could, if it wanted to, always 
achieve transparency, if it didn’t prefer to— dissemble.”16 Kuzmin’s subjective clarity (as well 
as Briusov’s decadent aestheticism) amounted to a “renunciation of habitual flights in the 
empyrean and supra-subjective perceptions—a capitulation in the face of the present “given” 
reality.” In poetry such a capitulation “leads to “beautiful clarity”: the lapidary craft that lovingly 
elevates all that is “beautiful” in this […] most literary of all worlds to the status of the “pearl of 
existence.” Ivanov believed to be living during a period of the Symbolist “antithesis”—a time, 
when poets experienced temptation to use their writing to further the depravity of the world 
rather than achieve ”transparency” and transcend it.17 He rebuked Briusov’s decadence as 
																																																								
16 Ivanov, SS 2:593.  
17 Avril Pyman describes the Symbolist “antithesis” as the apocalyptic years of 1904-1910. In the 
“Precepts” Ivanov obviously tries to set up a dialectic between the Symbolist “thesis”—a period 
of revelation and “transparency”: a new depth discovered by the Symbolists—followed by the 
10 	
dwelling on the ”dissonance” and Kuzmin’s “clarity” as capitulation before an illusion. Both 
represented surrender to temptation.  
For both Ivanov and Kuzmin, the concept of clarity drew together the notion of the 
subject, or the lyric “self,” and language. Ivanov’s rejection of “clarity” is, in effect a rejection of 
a specific historical definition of the relationship between these two concepts. Ivanov blamed the 
“death of the word”—a popular topic in the first half of the 1910s—on the hyper-rational 
“Western” mind.18 He was not the only one to associate this type of mentality with Humanism. 
After World War I and the 1917 revolution the “demise of Humanism” replaced the “death of the 
word” as the leitmotif of the time.19 But Ivanov and the “young” Symbolists anticipated the 
break-down of this specific paradigm of the “self” well in advance of these cataclysmic historical 
events. As Avril Pyman writes in her “Russian Symbolists and the Renaissance,” their version of 
Humanism had little to do with the original Italian movement, which they viewed through the 
lens of nineteenth-century positivism and materialism, Enlightenment rationalism and European 
Neoclassical movements.20 They condemned it as an expression of arrogant individualism and 
self-reliance, and blind faith in the superiority of the mind. “Clarity” as it figures in the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“antithesis,” and concluded by the anticipated “synthesis.” Avril Pyman, Istoriia russkogo 
simvolizma, 227-250, 265-281, 309.  18	Some of the famous texts on this subject are the Futurists’ “A Slap in the Face of Public 
Taste” (1912), Viktor Shklovsky’s “The Resurrection of the Word” (1914), Bely’s Na Perevale 
(probably 1917). As early as 1908 Rosanov describes the death of words in his Fallen Leaves in 
Izbrannoe (Munich: Neimanis, 1970) 87.	19	For example: Vyacheslav Ivanov’s “On the Crisis of Humanism”(1918), Aleksander Blok’s 
“On the Demise of Humanism” (1919), Osip Mandelshtam’s “Humanism and the Present” 
(1922), Nikolai Berdyaev’s treatise The Meaning of History (1923) discusses the topic at length, 
and Andrey Bely’s essays “Crisis of Life”, “Crisis of Thought” and “Crisis of Culture” displayed 
a variety of attitudes toward Humanism as a historical fact, yet unanimously identified this term 
with a historical period that has either come to an end or was undergoing a profound 
transformation.	20	Avril Pyman, “Russkie simvolisty i Vozrozhdenie,” Vestnik russkoi khristianskoi 
gumanitarnoi akademii 13 (2012) 79-94, 80.  	
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“Precepts” is therefore a signifier of rational intelligibility and “individualist” worldview that 
Ivanov sought to transcend.  
Ivanov’s “Precepts” failed to give Symbolism a viable program of action: Symbolism as 
a cohesive creative phenomenon ended in 1910. In the preface to Retribution, Blok observed that 
the poetic movements that swept in to replace it in the course of the next several years—
Acmeism, Ego-Futurism and Futurism— tendered their own versions of a “new man,” or as Blok 
phrased it, the “new Adam,” one that he deemed void of the “humanness.” Although most of the 
“young” Symbolists went on to create some of their most important works after the “crisis,” they 
did so independently of any movement.  
But the essay’s failure as a program of action was in itself an eloquent statement of the 
problem of the time. Ivanov’s attack on the notion of “clarity” in particular goes to the heart of 
the challenge to transform “self-loss” into “self-transcendence.” In Russian the word and the self 
converge in the word iasnost’. Like its English (clarity), French (clarté) and Latin (clarus) 
equivalents, iasnost’ derives from and is associated with vividness, brightness, illumination and 
light.21 In Russian, however, there is an additional association, unrelated to etymology, with the 
word “ia,” or the “self.”22 The three poets who became involved in an extended conversation on 
the subject of clarity reckoned with the disappearance of what Harrison calls the humanist 
“guiding objective” by formulating their individual versions of a “supra-subjective” poetics. But 
while Kuzmin and Mandelshtam acknowledged and valorized the subjective premise of this 
																																																								21	“clear, adj., adv., and n.” OED Online, Oxford University Press, June 2017, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/34078. Accessed 6 December 2017;  
Dal’, V.I. 1801-1872. Tolkovyi slovar zhivogovVelikorusskogo iazyka Vladimira Dalia. Tret’e 
ispravlennoe i znachitel’no dopolnennoe, 4 vols (St. Petersburg: M.O. Vol’f, 1903-1909) 1584.	22	Andrei Bely makes much of this association in his prose poem Glossolalia, addressed at length 
in the third chapter of this study.		
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effort, Ivanov attempted to voice a “spiritual” objectivity and mystical “knowing” beyond 
subjective intelligibility.  
My inquiry into these three poets’ distinct versions of clarity reveals that this notion 
pertains to their views on the origins of the poetic utterance as a “supra-subjective” phenomenon, 
and so three versions of a poetic “self.” I contend that Ivanov’s, Kuzmin’s and Mandelshtam’s 
understanding of clarity is predicated upon two fundamentally different perspectives on the 
purpose of language and origin of meaning. Contrary to Ivanov’s own statement against 
correspondence of the word to its meaning, he predicated his poetics on the notion of an 
objective truth to which the Symbolist idiom had to correspond. This stable “premise” of his 
writing represented “spiritual” objectivity, reached by means of mystical “knowing” beyond 
subjective intelligibility. The idiom that emerged from such insight was, in his words, 
“transparent” to contradiction. Yet in his poetics clarity and obscurity remained a mutually 
exclusive binary pair, indicating that Ivanov interpreted the term “clarity” conceptually, as a 
rational processes and a property of individualistic reason. In other words, Ivanov understood the 
word “clarity”—as well as the concept of “obscurity”—only in the way against which he argued. 
Conceptual definition preceded the experience of the word. 
Although Kuzmin’s and Mandelshtam’s writing is based on very different, often 
conflicting aesthetic principles, both poets viewed the word itself as the premise of a “supra-
subjective” poetics. The poetic logos did not correspond to preceding concepts, but rearticulated 
them and created new meaning. Since the word was not the product of meaning, but its catalyst, 
it was essentially metaphoric. Self-transcendence, therefore, occurred in self-representation. For 
this reason, rather than posit a mystery beyond experience and intellection, Kuzmin’s poetry 
draws attention to the concept of clarity as enigmatic in itself: the process of understanding is 
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difficult to address except metaphorically. The word “clarity,” etymologically and historically 
associated with light, suggests that to understand is to see and vice versa. Not only is clarity not 
superseded in poetry, but it appears to be its basic principle. The “clarity” of Mandelshtam’s 
poetry is more than enigmatic, since it presents itself even in those poems whose meaning seems 
to be entirely opaque. In his poetics, clarity, not obscurity, is the “transcendent” principle.  
 
The history of the distinction between these two views on clarity predates the “crisis of 
Symbolism” by centuries and pertains to the long-standing argument between philosophy and 
rhetoric.23 This history implicitly informed the discussion on the “crisis of Symbolism,” as well 
as Ivanov’s, Kuzmin’s and Mandelshtam’s individual interpretations of it, and determined some 
of its core questions. The argument concerned the purpose and origin of language. The Greek 
philosophers—most famously, Plato— held that thought was capable of attaining objective truths 
that resided beyond language, and that thought was therefore superior to rhetoric. Language had 
to serve thought in its search for indisputable truths. Conversely, rhetoricians believed that no 
truths were indisputable, and that the purpose of language was to sway minds. They argued that 
what appeared to be an “objective” truth today could appear false tomorrow: since the mind 
always operates within the framework of time and space, it is limited in its ability to know. 
Rhetoric accounted for this inevitable fluctuation of the “truth” by emphasizing the ability to 
convince the audience of a truth by means of language.24 The ability to use language effectively 
																																																								23	A number of the texts I address in this dissertation are prose. However, since it is prose written 
by poets and since it also either reflects on the subject of “supra-subjective” writing, I classify it 
as “poetic.”		24	The Italian philosopher Ernesto Grassi developed the idea of rhetoric as a philosophy in its 
own right. Most of his work pertains not only to classical antiquity but also its interpretation and 
elaboration by Italian Humanists, especially the Giambattista Vico as the last Humanist. Grassi 
argues that Cicero was the one to formulate the idea that: “the historical aspects of the realization 
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was considered a divine gift. In his “The Rhetorical Ideal of Antiquity and the Culture of the 
Renaissance,” Segei Averintsev describes these two opposing ways of thought as fundamental 
components of the culture of antiquity. He writes that both philosophy and rhetoric originated in 
one archaic discipline that still remained intact in the time of the Sophists and suggests that 
residual memory of this original unity motivated each discipline to compete with the other for 
the right to claim itself uniquely capable of reconciling the division between thought and the 
word.25  
The argument between the philosophers and the orators resurfaced time and again 
throughout history: in the Middle Ages, during the Italian Renaissance Humanist movement and 
in Modern times.26 Although each instance of its reemergence responded to specific historical 
circumstances and was important in its own right, its reappearance during the Renaissance has 
unique significance. During this time Classical rhetorical texts—especially Cicero—were 
rediscovered. Rhetoric gave rise to Classical philology and began to inform literature. It is 
likewise important that at this time the visual arts began to be associated with and interpreted as 
rhetoric. As concrete visual reality began to attract attention, and the image gained the status of 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
of the mind are never eternally valid, never absolutely “true,” because they always emerge within 
limited situations bound in space and time; i.e. they are probable and seem to be true <…> only 
within the confines of “here” and “now,” in which the needs and problems that confront human 
beings are met.” Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition (University 
Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980),10.  25	Sergei Averintsev, “Antichnyi ritoricheskii ideal i kul’tura Vozrozhdeniia,” Ritorika i istoki 
evropeiiskoi literaturnoi traditsii (Moscow: Shkola “Iazyki russkoi kul’tury,” 1996), 347-363, 
352. 	26 Ibid., A famous debate on this topic is the 15th century “Res-verbum Controversy” that 
culminated in the dispute between the “philosopher” Pico della Mirandola and the “orator” 
Ermolao Barbaro. 	
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the word, the “original” unity of thought and language became a topos that could be represented 
visually27   
During this extended controversy, both the philosophers and the rhetoricians contributed 
a great deal to each other’s disciplines. Clarity was one of the concepts that eventually became 
important in both “camps.” When in the first century A.D. the rhetorician Quintilian developed 
the concept of “clarity”—in Latin, perspicuitas—to identify the property of intelligibility, he was 
influenced by Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers.28 But whereas the Stoics as well as Aristotle 
applied the concept of clarity to “perceptual cognitive impressions,” Quintilian measured it by 
how clear speech seemed to the audience or how well it appealed logically to the 
understanding.29 For him, clarity as “cognitive grasp” was closely related to the concept of 
evidencia: the ability to envision the subject matter as an image in the mind’s eye. In the 17th 
century, the rhetorical technique of making the audience see clearly what is not present in 
actuality informed Rene Descartes’ philosophical doctrine of “clear and distinct ideas.”30 
Descartes other major contribution to the history of the term is the subject proper. In his 																																																								27 Ibid., 353-357. Averintsev provides several examples. He writes that the epithet “divino” was 
reserved in antiquity for the Caesar, the best orators and the best philosophers. Throughout 
antiquity and the Middle Ages the visual artist was relegated to the status of a craftsman no 
matter how great his achievements. During the Renaissance, however, Michelangelo becomes 
“divino,” and figures such as Leon Battista Alberti are respected for their ability to write, paint 
and design. Averintsev points out, however, that during antiquity there were some exceptional 
cases, when a prominent Sophist would be praised for his ability to make material objects (such 
as clothes). This was nearly unprecedented and occurred only within the ranks of the Sophists, 
i.e. those who traditionally did not separate thought and language. 	28	Stephen Gaukroger, “Descartes’ Early Doctrine of Clear and Distinct Ideas,” The Genealogy 
of Knowledge: Analytical Essays in the History of Philosophy and Science (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 1997), 138.		29	Gaukroger, 136-137; Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Trans. H. E. Butler. 
(London: W. Heinemann, 1920-22), 61-71.	30	Descartes studied rhetoric with the Jesuits at La Flèche. He was fascinated with the discipline 
and tried to incorporate it into his philosophy in his early work especially. In his mature period 
he turned away from it. Although he borrowed “clarity” from rhetoric, he applied it in the 
context of his philosophical method.	Gaukroger, 143-144.		
16 	
Meditations, for example, the thinker seeks the “objective” truth by dispelling his personal doubt 
instead of convincing an external audience. The question of how to attain certainty gave rise to a 
lucid philosophical method, yet lost none of its original appeal as a question. With Descartes, 
clarity became enigmatic.  
Descartes’ method inspired Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), who, according to Grassi, 
concluded the tradition of rhetoric as a philosophy in its own right. Marcel Danesi writes that 
while Vico admired Descartes in his youth, in his New Science he polemicized with the 
rationalist philosopher.31 While the polemic was a revival of the old controversy between the 
philosophers and the orators, the two thinkers shared the self-reflexive impulse. Vico’s 
alternative to the discipline of philosophy was a “new science” of the human mind. He argued 
that such a science had to develop from the study of human history, rather than philosophy.32 He 
posited that the mind is capable of knowing only what it has created and what is inherent in it. 
Philosophical, logical, mathematical and scientific “objective” truths, such as the laws of 
Euclidean geometry, “are not inherent in the universe. Rather, they constitute humanity’s 
cognitive strategy for organizing and rationalizing visual sensations.”33 As Vico looked for the 
origin of human consciousness within myths and etymologies of words, he developed a theory 
that metaphor underlies the mind’s ability to make conceptual meaning. He believed that the 
mind first transformed external stimuli into iconic signs and then made connections between 
them. Finally, by means of metaphor, it transformed “iconic deep structures of thought” into 
“surface cognitive form.” For Vico, this was not a one-time event, but a continuous cognitive 
process. He believed that the mind was constantly involved in “converting precepts into 																																																								31	Marcel Danesi, Vico, Metaphor, and the Origin of Language (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 17.		32	Ibid., 43.  
33 Ibid., 47. 
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concepts.”34 Although Vico never used the term “clarity” to describe this process, perhaps 
because it was so strongly associated with Descartes’ philosophy of certainty, his theory of 
metaphor is an interpretation of this notion within the parameters of rhetoric as a philosophy. As 
Vico determined that the unique characteristic of human reason was to think metaphorically, he 
was able to envision a rhetorical figure as an intrinsic structure of thought: a topos of the mind. 
Philosophical objectivity became only a construct of the mind’s innate creative drive. 
 
The history of the concept of clarity informs some of the basic issues that emerged in the 
conversation on this subject between Ivanov, Kuzmin and Mandelshtam. First among them is the 
fact that during the “dissonant” years of the “crisis of Symbolism,” the ancient problem of 
division between thought and language once again presented itself with great urgency. Ivanov’s 
“Precepts” stated the problem and offered a solution: a “supra-subjective” poetics that would 
heal this divide. The term “clarity” as it appears in my dissertation pertains to this notion of 
“supra-subjectivity.” I argue that although Ivanov objected to the principle of clarity as both 
philosophical and rhetorical intelligibility or “cognitive grasp,” in effect, his model of 
Symbolism was based on the premise of philosophical “objectivity.” While he promoted the 
poetics of “obscurity,” which conveyed mystical insight by constantly evoking its ineffability, he 
viewed language itself as meaningful only to the extent that it was based on an absolute mystical 
principle beyond itself. To overcome the self (and clarity as “cognitive grasp”) was to achieve a 
different, “supra-subjective” kind of intelligibility and a superior “clarity.”  
For Kuzmin and Mandelshtam, conversely, unity of thought and language could be 




is, however, vastly different. Kuzmin really did view art as, in Ivanov’s words, the “pearl of 
existence.” Poetry was a self-enclosed and self-sufficient sphere of “clarity”; and poetic language 
was a purely aesthetic phenomenon. As such, it included philosophy, ethics and spirituality. 
Mandelshtam’s poetics, however, was also a kind of civic discourse, inseparable from history. 
The poetic logos had to engage with the specifics of its “time and place.” For these poets, the 
realization of “supra-subjectivity” in their writing proceeded within the framework of aesthetics 
and in open dialog with history respectively.  
 Both the “philosophers” and the “rhetoricians” viewed their disciplines as deriving from 
an authentic, original language wherein thought and the word were not divided. For Ivanov, 
Kuzmin and Mandelshtam the term clarity pertains to the idea of an “original” language in 
several ways. First, it is associated with a specific historical tradition that initiates in Greek 
antiquity and reverberates throughout the history of the European Classical tradition. Roman 
antiquity, Italian Renaissance, especially its Tuscan variant, 17th century French Neoclassicism 
and Weimar Classicism all represent instances of clarity that reinterpreted the original Greek 
idea. 35 Furthermore, Ivanov’s “obscure” principle of intelligibility was based on the idea of 
“recollection” of the “original” myth. Notably, for all three poets the visual legacy of the Italian 
Renaissance represents the period when the concept of clarity found its equivalent in pictorial 																																																								
35 Of course, the Russian literary tradition was not any less important, clarity emerges as a 
signifier of the foreign. For example, while Alexander Pushkin’s poetry represented the 
quintessence of clarity for all three poets, it was “clear” in so far as it adapted the idea of clarity 
for the Russian language and in the context of the Russian literary tradition. Ivanov differs from 
the other two poets in that while “clarity” represented for him the legacy of a Western mentality, 
he based his alternative concept of poetic intelligibility on the poetics of the Russian Romantics, 
especially Fyodor Tyutchev. While he traced the “origin” of this line of thought to Greek 
antiquity, in his scholarly treatise, Dionysus and Pre-Dionysianism, he also claimed that 
Dionysus—the Greek deity and representation of his obscure original principle—was originally a 
Thracian and, therefore, a Slavic god. Nevertheless, most of his references to both the principle 
of an “obscure” clarity and the principle of rational intelligibility evoke European Classicism and 
Romanticism.  
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representation.36 Three kinds of clarity (in Ivanov’s case, both his own, “mystical” version and 
what he considered the illusory “intelligibility”) find their parallel especially in the depictions 
that demonstrate the art of perspective.37 For the three poets, these become emblematic of the 
inherent enigma of “clarity” as well as this concept as a signifier of a culturally “foreign” locus.  
Second, not only is the poetics of clarity an iteration of the “original” ideal, but it is also a 
primary “structure” that yields poetic meaning by defining the fundamental relationships 
between the poetic “self” and the poetic word, and between the image and the word. The latter 
relationship is also applicable to the relationship between the signified and the signifier, but 
among the three poets only Mandelshtam makes this idea explicit in his theoretical writing. 
While meaning can be construed in numerous ways, the poetics of Ivanov, Kuzmin and 
Mandelshtam is based on one such cardinal relationship that each of the poets understands as 
quintessentially “clear.” This relationship is metonymic for Ivanov, who represents himself as 
connected to the hypothetical, principal antecedent, and metaphoric for Kuzmin and 
Mandelshtam, who both, albeit in very different ways, represent themselves as transformed in the 
																																																								36	Mandelshtam’s description of “domestic Hellenism” in his essay “On the Nature of the Word” 
illustrates this idea. He writes of Hellenism as the “purposefulness” and “teleological warmth” of 
the objects that serve in our daily rituals. As he addresses the idea of culture, especially 
language, as a “home,” he implicitly likens words to earthenware. Beautiful and convincing as 
this comparison is, it would not have been possible for an ancient Greek. Such a metaphor is 
possible only after the era that elevated craft and visual art in general to the status of rhetoric and 
literature. Osip Mandel’shtam, “O prirode slova,” in A. Mets, and V.V. Ivanov, (eds), Polnoe 
sobranie sochinenii i pisem v trekh tomakh, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress-Pleiada, 2009), 2:64-81, 
68. Hereafter PSS.			37	The word “perspective” itself implies clarity. There is some discrepancy as to whether the 
word originates from the Latin verb “perspicere,” which means “to scrutinize, perceive” and 
derives from “perspicuous,” meaning “transparent, evident,” or whether it derives from 
prospicere means “to see before one, look ahead.” “Specio” in: Etymological Dictionary of 
Latin, edited by: Michiel de Vaan. Consulted online on 21/01/2018 
<http://dictionaries.brillonline.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/search#dictionary=latin&id=la155
8>  First published online: Octobe 2010.	 	
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logos, so that self-representation becomes a vehicle of “self-transcendence.” In this way the 
concept of clarity becomes self-reflexive as well as highly evocative of Vico’s notion of 
metaphor as a structure of thought.   
 Finally, the concept of “clarity” concerns the problem of inchoation as it emerged in the 
debates of 1910, as Ivanov, Kuzmin and Mandelshtam responded to each other, as well as 
considered this concept independently. My research into each poet’s relationship to the term 
begins during the first decade of the twentieth century, when it first appears in Ivanov’s diaries 
and Kuzmin’s letters and early prose works. The year 1910 represents a focal point of my study 
because at this time the notion of clarity became contentious and inspired public polemical 
statements from the parties involved. I also examine Kuzmin’s and Mandelshtam’s 
interpretations of this idea throughout the 1920s, after the major catastrophic events of the First 
World War, the 1917 revolution and the Civil War. While at this time the poets’ interpretations 
of clarity reflect the tendencies of the age, engaging the ideas of Formalism and the idiom of 
Expressionism, they also recall the year 1910 and the aesthetic of the Silver Age as a time of the 
original discussion about this concept. Finally, I discuss Mandelshtam’s return to this notion at 
the height of the age of terror, in the late 1930s, when the idea of clarity becomes an emblem of  
human spirit—the “humanness” that Blok, in his preface to Retribution believed to have departed 
with the death of Tolstoy.  
 In sum, the term clarity as it appears in this dissertation, signifies several ideas, all of 
which come into play in the discussions on this subject. Clarity is a criterion of intelligibility: 
“cognitive grasp” that may be associated with a clear statement, or the clarity of a perceived 
object. Clarity is also a particular relationship between the subject and the object, where the 
“subject” may be the narrator and the object may be the poetic logos, or the poet’s self-
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representation in the text. Clarity is also a specific relationship between the image and the word, 
and the signified and the signifier. Clarity represents the idea of origin as a topos: both as a 
cultural “locus” where meaning originates and a structure of thought that yields meaning. 
Finally, poetic clarity is a concept that resists specific, singular definition.  
The four chapters of my dissertation focus on Ivanov, Kuzmin and Mandelshtam’s 
respective approaches to the concept of clarity. In the first chapter of my dissertation, “The 
Origins of Clarity and Clarity as the Idea of Origins,” I provide some historical context of the 
1910 debates around the “crisis of Symbolsim” and discuss the role of the concept of clarity at it 
emerges during this time. I also address contemporary critical assessment of this concept as it 
appeared in Kuzmin’s essay “On Beautiful Clarity.” I then trace the development of Ivanov’s 
and Kuzmin’s views on clarity, specifically as it pertains to the concept of inchoation in their 
aesthetic philosophies. I then address the contribution of these philosophies to the notion of 
clarity as a “creative form” as it emerged in the second phase of the debate in 1912. Finally, I 
discuss Osip Mandelshtam’s only contribution to the conversation on clarity that took place 
during the “crisis of Symbolism.”  
In the second chapter, “The ‘Identity Poetics’ of Viacheslav Ivanov,” I argue that as the 
poet polemicizes against Kuzmin’s “Apollonian” clarity, he in effect proposes his own, alternate 
model of “clarity,” based on the idea of knowledge to which the subject is privy, and which the 
subject also represents. Addressing some of Ivanov’s early writings, his notes takes during his 
first trip to Rome, and some of his later, more well-known critical writings, I demonstrate that as 
he critiques the concept of clarity, this very concept is apparent in his method of the critique and 
embedded in his theurgist poetics.  
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In my third chapter, “The Clear Glass: Mikhail Kuzmin against St. Paul,” I demonstrate 
that Kuzmin first formulated his notion of clarity in polemic with St. Paul’s statement in his First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, that clarity is possible only in the afterlife. I argue that Kuzmin’s later 
Classical concept of clarity is based in his polemic with St. Paul. For the poet, clarity is the 
liberating realization that the relationship to the fact is more important than the fact itself. 
Ivanov’s notion of origins or Paul’s notion of the afterlife lose their power to determine the 
subject’s “reality.” The same idea applies to the relationship between the image and the word and 
the poet and the word. I demonstrate how this principle works in tandem with Kuzmin’s 
technique of stylization in the novella Wings, “Histoire édifiante de mes commencements,” and 
the poem “The New Hull,” among several others texts.   
In my fourth chapter, “Speech as ‘Epic Gesture’: Osip Mandelshtam’s Response to the 
Debate on Clarity,” I argue that Mandelshtam’s model of clarity goes beyond Ivanov’s theurgic 
paradigm and Kuzmin’s stylized clarté. Mandelshtam’s clarity pertains to his concept of memory 
as anamnesis. It is predicated upon the idea of loss of knowledge and its spontaneous  
reemergence as a collective, rather than an individual memory. I argue that Mandelshtam’s word 
is all-encompassing, able to recreate the other without appropriating it. This quality is the 
defining feature of his poetry as a history.	In this chapter I look at Mandelshtam’s critical essays 
“Word and Culture” and “On the Nature of the Word,” his “Lethean Poems,” “The Noise of 







Clarity, “Clarism” and the Crisis of Symbolism  
On March 17, 1910 the Symbolist poet, Viacheslav Ivanov, delivered a lecture entitled 
“The Precepts of Symbolism” [‘Zavety Simvolizma’] at the “Society for Free Aesthetics” 
[“Obschestvo Svobodnoi Estetiki”] in Moscow, and nine days later read it again for the members 
of the “Society for the Adherents of the Artistic Word” [“Obschestvo Revnitelei 
Khudozhestvennogo Slova”] in St. Petersburg.38 In the lecture Ivanov addressed an essential 
problem of his time, which he phrases in the following manner: “the word ceased to be 
commensurate with inner experience” [“slovo perestalo byt’ ravnosil’nym soderzhaniiu 
vnutrennego opyta”].39 Ivanov was by no means the only poet to observe a shift in man’s 
relationship with language. Ivanov’s interpretation of this pan-global phenomenon, however, was 
unique. In his view language could not convey “inner experience,” because it could not 
adequately express its mystical content. Ivanov believed that it was up to the select few to make 
the heroic effort to articulate the ineffable. He proposed that Russian Symbolism, in existence 
since the 1890s, could respond to this challenge because, as the poetry of a “dual vision,” it 
recognized both the empirical and the mystical spheres of existence and was capable of 
addressing both realities. Ivanov believed Symbolism to be a “recollection” of the primordial 
time when priests were poets who spoke a privileged language that bridged the phenomenal and 
the noumenal. He urged the Symbolists to form a new priesthood in order to reconcile poetry and 
religion.  
																																																								
38 O.A. Kuznetsova, “Diskussiia o sostoianii russkogo simvolizma v ‘Obshchestve revniteleii 
khudozhestvennogo slova,’” Russkaia literatura 1 (1990), 200-207. 39	V. Ivanov, “Zavety simvolizma,” SS, 2:589. 	
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The months-long polemic that ensued after Ivanov’s lecture constitutes the famous “crisis 
of Symbolism”: a schism in the ranks of this movement without any hint of a synthesis.40 The 
“older” Symbolists immediately rejected the idea of art as a religion. The “younger” Symbolists 
supported Ivanov, but without the conviction that accompanied their views in the preceding 
years. The argument transcended the ranks of the Symbolists, “old” or “young.” In a letter, dated 
just a few days before Ivanov delivered of the lecture in St. Petersburg, Briusov mentioned that 
the St. Petersburg “Clarists” Mikhail Kuzmin, Sergei Makovsky, and other poets, artists and 
intellectuals associated with Apollon—in whose office Ivanov presided over the “Society for the 
Adherents of the Artistic Word ” since autumn 1909—would likely also object to Ivanov’s 
ideas.41 Two days later Briusov returned to the same subject in another letter: “The ‘Clarists’ 
defend clarity: clarity of thought, style, images… I am with the ‘Clarists’ with all of my soul.”42 
In the July-August issue of Apollon, and so a month after Ivanov published “The Precepts of 
Symbolism,” Briusov retorted with “On ‘Slavish Speech’: in Defense of Poetry.” In this essay he 
remarked that Romanticism and Symbolism could not be interpreted independently of their 
historical context. He insisted on the autonomy of art from religion, and on its inherent value as 
itself. In September, Ivanov’s student, the young poet Nikolai Gumilev, recently back from his 
first voyage to Abyssinia and also present at Ivanov’s lecture in St. Petersburg, wrote to Briusov 
																																																								
40 Kuznetsova lists some of the essays that responded to Ivanov. These titles include: V. 
Briusov’s “On ‘Slavish Speech’: In Defense of Poetry” [“O rechi rabskoi: v zashchitu poezii”] in 
Apollon 9 (1910);  D. Merezhkovskii’s “Travesty and Tragedy” [“Balagan i tragediia”] in 
Russkoe Slovo 14 (1910); A. Belyi, “A Wreath or a Crown” [“Venok ili venets”] in Apollon 11 
(1910); S. Adrianov “Critical Notes” [“Kriticheskiie nabroski”] in Vestnik Evropy (October 
1910), etc. Kuznetsova, “Diskussiia o sostoianii russkogo simvolizma,” 200. Nikolai Gumilev’s 
“The Life of a Poem” [“Zhizn’ stikha”] in Apollon 7 (1910) surely also belongs in this list.  
41 Kuznetsova, “Diskussiia o sostoianii russkogo simvolizma,” 201. 
42 Nikolai Bogomolov and John Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin: iskusstvo, zhizn’, epokha (St. 
Petersburg: Vita Nova, 2007), 251.  
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that he has been “won over” by his essay, especially by its theoretical component.43 This letter 
adumbrated Gumilev’s future position toward Ivanov. His definitive split from Ivanov as his 
mentor took place the following year, on April 13, 1911, after Ivanov’s apparently 
inappropriately aggressive, nearly rude critique of his poem “Prodigal Son.”44 As a result, he left 
Ivanov’s salon in the company of several other poets, including Anna Akhmatova and Osip 
Mandelshtam and soon initiated his own literary movement, Acmeism.  
Mandelshtam, who met Ivanov in 1908, also considered him his mentor. During the 
polemic around the crisis of Symbolism he was studying in Germany, where he followed the 
unfolding debates “with great interest.”45 His letters to Ivanov from abroad convey genuine 
respect toward him as a teacher and poet.46 But upon Mandelshtam’s return to St. Petersburg in 
1911, he joined the “Poets’ Guild” [“Tsekh Poetov”], established by Gumilev and Sergei 
Gorodetsky as an alternative to Ivanov’s “Akademiia Stikha” in the fall of that year, and then 
became a core participant of Acmeism, which evolved from the Guild by the end of 1911.47 In 
spite of its relatively brief existence as an actual movement, Acmeism would challenge and, at 
least in the eyes of some, “overcome” Symbolism.48  
Although Ivanov’s “The Precepts of Symbolism” did not single-handedly precipitate the 
schism in the ranks of the Symbolists and cause the eventual creation of a new school of poetry 																																																								
43 Ibid., 251. 
44 Kuznetsova, “Diskussiia o sostoianii russkogo simvolizma,” 203.  
45Gregory Freidin, A Coat of Many Colors: Osip Mandelstam and his Mythologies of Self-
Presentation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 29. 
46 Ibid., 27-29.  
47 Justin Doherty, The Acmeist Movement in Russian Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
67-73.  Acmeism originated on February 18, 1912, at a meeting of the Poets’ Guild, but the 
“Guild” and the new poetic movement were not identical. Doherty writes: “Of over a dozen 
regular members of ‘Tsekh Poetov’, only Akhmatova, Mandel’shtam, Narbut, and Zenkevich 
decided to support the program” (72). 
48 Victor Zhirmunskii, “Preodolevshie simvolizm,” Antologiia akmeizma Ed. T.A. Bek. 
(Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1997), 211-241. 
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that succeeded his own, it brought preexisting differences in perspectives to the fore. In this 
context, Briusov’s enthusiasm for the “Clarists” is significant. It indicates that he believed they 
shared his own aesthetc position of “art for art’s sake.” It also suggests that he recognized the 
references to Kuzmin’s “On Beautiful Clarity” in Ivanov’s “Precepts.” Unlike the Symbolists, 
and later the Acmeists and the Futurists, the “Clarists” never formed a movement, and there are 
few references to them in the documents dating to this period. Apollon’s editor, Makovsky was 
certainly one of the most prominent “Clarists.” Kuzmin and his epigones, such as Sergei 
Auslender, the young writer Johannes von Guenther, and some veterans of Sergei Diagilev’s 
World of Art magazine, such as Alexandre Benois, and Mstislav Dobuzhinki were all associated 
with “Clarism” as a set of aesthetic principles. These were likely discussed in conversations not 
only in the office of Apollon, but in Ivanov’s salon at his famous Tower.   
The essay that articulates the “Clarist” position and in an unassuming and understated 
manner insinuates itself into the center of the polemic appears to address formal issues pertaining 
specifically to style. Although deliberately “secular” in tone, “On Beautiful Clarity” does begin 
with a retelling of the Biblical origin myth. Kuzmin’s thesis is that differentiation is in the nature 
of creation, and that this is evident in the creation myth, as well as given in individual 
experience, since the self emerges in relation to the objective world. Writing “clearly,” he 
suggests, imitates these two instances of origination.49 This concept is the foundation of 
Kuzmin’s critique of those who in his opinion fail as prose writers. With a dose of irony directed 
at the didactic tone of his own writing, the author implores them to observe the basic rules of 
logic, “natural” to the human mind, and demands that the form of a work cohere with its content. 
He openly defines his position as “Apollonian,” and situates the origin of this position in the 																																																								
49 M. Kuzmin, “O prekrasnoi iasnosti,” Proza i esseistika v trekh tomakh, 3 vols. (Moscow: 
Agraf, 1999-2000), 3:5-10. Hereafter referred to as PE. 
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“Romanic” countries, reiterating that it is based in “differentiation, organization, precision and 
harmony”  [“apollonicheskii vzgliad na iskusstvo: razdeliaiushchii, formiruiushchii, tochnyi i 
stroinyi ”]. Kuzmin’s “clarity” appears to derive from the “French” view that language should 
reflect the order of the universe, and that there is a rational connection between grammar, reason 
and the world at large.50 There is, however, an important difference between the Cartesian 
rationalism of Port Royal grammarians and Kuzmin’s point. He insists that “experiential” rather 
than “learned” grammar of one’s native tongue be respected. And although he obviously 
describes a kind of Classicism, many of the names he lists in support of his idea are not Classical 
in the traditional sense. For example, in addition to “Latin” authors from Apuleius to Anatole 
France, he lists the quintessentially Romantic E.T.A. Hoffman and Edgar Allan Poe as writers of 
“crystalline” prose.  
 
“On Beautiful Clarity” had a lasting effect on some of Ivanov’s opponents. Kuzmin’s 
poetics greatly influenced some of the Acmeists, and affected Acmeist theory as a whole.51 In the 
wake of the “crisis of Symbolism” their critical writing reflected the basic tenets of his 
“Clarism.” Gumilev’s “Symbolist Heritage and Acmeism”(1912) and Sergei Gorodetsky’s “On 
Some Tendencies in Contemporary Russian Poetry” (1913), for example, emphasize “Classical” 
notions of line, boundary and crystallization over the murkiness and vagueness of Symbolist 
																																																								50Sylvie Romanowski, “Descartes: From Science to Discourse.” Yale French Studies 49 (1973): 
96-109.		
51 In addition to the works already mentioned, Timenchik, Toporov and Tsiviian’s “Akhmatova 
and Kuzmin” is an in-depth examination of the relationship between the older poet and the 
Acmeists. R.D. Timenchik, V.N. Toporov, T.V. Tsiviian, “Akhmatova i Kuzmin.” Russian 
Literature 1-3 (1978): 213-305.   
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poetics..52 Viktor Zhirmunsky’s “Those Who Have Overcome Symbolism” (1916) designates 
Kuzmin as the forefather of Acmeist poetics. Zhirmunsky views Acmeism as Neoclassical and 
implies that Kuzmin’s “clarity” was an attribute of the style that is “emotionally poor, rationally 
self-possessed, but well-drawn and rich in visual impressions, lines, colors and forms.”53 The 
Acmeist position with respect to “clarté” did not differ significantly from Ivanov’s. Consistent 
with only some of Kuzmin’s statements in “On Beautiful Clarity,” the younger poets defined it 
as balance of form and content, clarity of contours, transparency of meaning, etc. As late as 1921 
Mandelshtam refers to the “clarism” of Tolstoy’s early prose as “transparency of form.”54  
Yet as the Acmeists adopted these principles into their own anti-Symbolist poetics, they 
also viewed this “classical” clarity as potentially limiting. In Gumilev’s critical essays on 
Kuzmin—“On Kuzmin’s Prose” in the fifth issue of Apollon in 1910 and “Alexander Blok and 
Mikhail Kuzmin” in the eighth issue of the magazine in 1912—the author discusses the poet as 
one of the foremost in Russian poetry and prose of the period, yet also likens Kuzmin’s style to a 
glass pane that separates the reader from the text, and hints at a certain artifice of his aesthetic. 
Similar criticism figures in Mandelshtam’s responses to Kuzmin, discussed in the third chapter 
of this study. The concept of “clarté” as a barrier echoes Ivanov’s view that some truth, 
concealed behind the veneer of the obvious, is waiting to be awakened by the poet who can 
speak its obscure idiom. The Acmeists, therefore, viewed “Clarism” as a kind of Apollonian 
“toolbox” that should be applied to their agenda to create a post-Symbolist poetics that would get 
at this “truth” in its own manner.  
 																																																								
52 Sergei Gorodetskii, “On Some Tendencies in Contemporary Russian Poetry,” Antologiia 
akmeizma, 202. 
53 Victor Zhirmunskii. “Preodolevshie simvolizm,” Antologiia akmeizma, 211-241.  54	Mandel’shtam, “O prirode slova,” PSS, 2:64-81. 	
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There is considerable disagreement among contemporary critics about the importance of 
“On Beautiful Clarity” to the poet himself as well as to his contemporaries. Bogomolov and 
Malmstad argue that its contribution to the events surrounding the “crisis of Symbolism” is 
exaggerated.55 They point out that the essay was written while Kuzmin was on excellent terms 
with Ivanov, and in fact resided at the Tower between 1909 and 1912. In his diaries Ivanov even 
claims that he was the one to baptize Kuzmin’s views as “Clarist.” On August 7, 1909 he writes: 
“I made up for Renouveau [Kuzmin’s nickname at the Tower] a project for a group I baptized as 
the ‘clarists’ (after ‘purists’) from ‘clarté’.”56 The scholars suggest that although Kuzmin may 
not have subscribed to Viacheslav Ivanov’s theories, his essay was hardly pivotal in the 
Symbolist polemic. They are particularly against the view that “On Beautiful Clarity” is a pre-
Acmeist manifesto. Indeed, Kuzmin’s “Clarism” emerges two years before Acmeism, a 
movement that he never quite acknowledged and appeared not to respect. Certainly, Kuzmin was 
not writing with Gumilev in mind. Bogomolov and Malmstad mention that Kuzmin never used 
the term “Clarism” after the polemic, nor did he ever republish the essay, and conclude that he 
did not attribute it too much importance.57 As they examine “On Beautiful Clarity” in the 
historical context of the “crisis of Symbolism,” they conclude that this context lent more 
historical weight to the text in the eyes of the subsequent generations than the author himself 
ever assigned to it.58  
The critics refer to a number of remarks on “clarity” and “Clarism” that emerged in the 
wake of Kuzmin’s essay. First among them were the aforementioned “Precepts of Symbolism” 
by Ivanov. A few weeks later Blok continued the discussion with his ‘On the Present Status of 																																																								
55 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 246-252.  
56 Ivanov, SS 2:784-785.  
57 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 251. 
58 Bogomolov and Malmstad, 249. 
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Russian Symbolism’ where he used the word “clarity” with a specifically Symbolist twist: to see 
“clearly” can only mean to see past phenomenal reality.59 Then, there were the aforementioned 
“clarist” declarations in “Symbolist Heritage and Acmeism” by Gumilev, “On Some Tendencies 
in Contemporary Russian Poetry” by Gorodetsky and “Those Who Have Overcome Symbolism” 
by Zhirmunsky. On the other side of the spectrum, in the Memoirs of Blok (1920-1921) Andrei 
Bely recalls “beautiful clarity” with outright indignation.60 None of these texts treat the concept 
as anything more than the idea of transparency of meaning, concrete imagery, and precise and 
nuanced expression of ideas, emotions and impressions. This “clarity” followed the poet all the 
way to his grave. Bogomolov and Malmstad quote one I. M. Basalaev, who describes a speech at 
Kuzmin’s funeral: “He [Vissarion Sayanov] spoke of the clarté in Kuzmin’s poetry, of the lofty 
sensibility of the poet, of the clarity and classicism in his poems.”61   
Bogomolov and Malmstad’s unwillingness to consider “On Beautiful Clarity” an 
important statement of the poet’s aesthetic position may itself be the result of abundant but 
superficial response of his contemporaries. Indeed, if Kuzmin never reprinted the essay, it could 
have been because he was either dissatisfied with the response it garnered, or because he felt it 
was too embroiled in the kind of debates that he preferred to avoid. While “On Beautiful Clarity” 
																																																								
59 Aleksandr Blok, “On the Present Status of Russian Symbolism,” in Ronald E. Peterson (ed.), 
The Russian Symbolists: An Anthology of Critical and Theoretical Writings (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 
1986), 157. 
60Andrei Belyi, Vospominaniia o Bloke (Moscow: Iz-vo Respublika, 1995) 40, 41, and especially 
105. Bely is unique in drawing a parallel between “beautiful clarity” and the apocalyptic realism 
of the Russian 1880s. He also makes a fascinating distinction between the meaning of the 
mind—rationality, or “rassudok”—and the meaning of the heart—a different kind of clarity. 
Poignantly, the latter is explicitly not Kuzmin’s “beautiful” clarity, and is based on an image, 
that “blossoms” as meaning of its own accord and independently of the mind’s 
conceptualizations. (105) 
61 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 502.  
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was not intended as a manifesto— the tone and posture of this genre would have been viscerally 
unacceptable to the poet—it is a mistake to downplay its significance.  
John Barnstead, conversely, argues that Kuzmin’s essay is highly polemical, that it places 
itself squarely in the middle of the debates around the “crisis of Symbolism,” and engages 
Ivanov’s ideas. In his study “Mikhail Kuzmin’s ‘On Beautiful Clarity’ and Viacheslav Ivanov: A 
Reconsideration” Barnstead outlines major points of contention between Ivanov and Kuzmin, 
and singles out specific concepts and images introduced by the former but reclaimed and 
reinterpreted by the latter.62 He observes that the poets resort to some of the same binary 
oppositions: order and chaos, land versus sea, Apollo versus Dionysus, and form and dissolution. 
The nature of the argument, he suggests, concerns a preference for one or the other aspect of the 
binary. Avril Pyman also mentions Kuzmin’s essay as an open and, in her opinion, shortsighted 
criticism of the “acrobatic syntax” of the prose of Bely and Remizov. Pyman interprets this essay 
as a declaration of the author’s alliance with Briusov against the “younger” Symbolists. She also 
believes that it reiterates ideas that were already circulating in print, discussed on Ivanov’s 
Tower, and at his “Academy” in the office of Apollon.63  
It is, indeed, highly probable that “On Beautiful Clarity” engages specific concepts 
articulated by Ivanov in his essays, and discussed in the lively debates in the artistic circles that 
met in his salon and at Apollon. Yet the essay is not limited to a critique of a few specific 
concepts, as Barnstead’s analysis might suggest, nor is it merely a summary of ideas already in 
																																																								
62 John A. Barnstead, “Mikhail Kuzmin’s ‘On Beautiful Clarity’ and Viacheslav Ivanov: A 
Reconsideration.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 24.1 (1982): 1-10. Barnstead demonstrates that 
Kuzmin’s essay responds to Ivanov’s “Predchuvstviia i predvestiia, “Novaia organicheskaia 
epokha i teatr budushchego,” “O veselom remesle i umnom veselii” “Borozdy i mezhi: o 
probleme teatra,” and “Ty esi.” Ivanov’s “Manera, litso i stil’” and his much later “Zavety 
simvolisma” in turn respond to Kuzmin’s ideas.    
63 Pyman, History of Russian Symbolism, 308-309.  
32 	
circulation during this period. Rather, it is one of several texts in which the author offers an 
insight into his very unique philosophy of writing.  
Addressing clarity proper, Kuzmin insists that it is an attribute of literary style. He 
elaborates that “clarity” is the effect of care with which the author handles language as an object 
much greater than his individual self. It emerges from the respect toward the “natural” laws of a 
given idiom. Kuzmin specifies that by “logic” he means the individual character of a language 
and not an imposed structure.64 But he also describes style as the unique imprint of the author’s 
persona on language as the medium. Finally, he addresses stylization as an expression of such 
keen interest in the style of another that the author reproduces it as exactly as possible in his own 
work. The aesthetic of “On Beautiful Clarity” is based in ethics: it is an invitation to pay 
attention to another. Among Kuzmin’s contemporaries only Gumilev seems to have observed 
this quality of the poet’s writing. In his article “On Kuzmin’s Prose” he writes that he, like 
Pushkin, pays careful attention to language as an object far greater than the individual, and lauds 
the “chastity” of such an approach. Kuzmin’s poetic “chastity” is also his “clarity” as the 
measure of distance between the self and an object.65  
Unlike Kuzmin, who writes on style, Ivanov approaches “clarity” as a problem of being. 
Ironically, as he insists that clarity disguises a truer reality, he echoes the progenitor of French 
“clarté.” Like Descartes, Ivanov seeks an immutable, infallible language of pure insight and 
certainty.66 Conversely, while Kuzmin’s “On Beautiful Clarity” is filled with allusions to 
“clarté”—Molière, Buffon and Anatole France appear in it alongside others—the author 
addresses the problem of the word. Yet Kuzmin’s is a poetic philosophy as well, and in this 
																																																								
64Kuzmin, “O prekrasnoi iasnosti,” PE 3:6.  65	Nikolai Gumilev, “O proze Kuzmina.” Apollon 5 (1910), 56.	 66	Romanowski, “Descartes: From Science to Discourse,” 100. 	
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sense Ivanov is right: his “clarity” does indeed dissemble. The pseudo-transparent quality of 
Kuzmin’s writing, likened by his contemporaries to a glass barrier, is an aspect of a metaphysics 
of superficiality, wherein in addition to serving as a stylistic quality and an ethical imperative, 
clarity plays the role of an aesthetic object—an “image”— in its own right.  
The argument about clarity evokes several important questions. As Ivanov rejects the 
principle of “French” intelligibility as the idea of correspondence between the sign and the 
referent, he advances the notion of an obscure, inarticulate poetics that evokes the invisible 
essence of being. Since such a poetics communicates like any other, its “obscure” clarity requires 
its own definition. It is also important to address the problem of Kuzmin’s “beautiful clarity” as 
dissembling, and uncover what, if anything, it conceals. Furthermore, it is imperative to consider 
the implications of clarity as the concept of ethical distance. Ivanov’s poetics of being and 
Kuzmin’s poetical metaphysics of superficiality require a careful investigation. Before answering 
these questions, however, these poets’ aesthetic and philosophical backgrounds must to be 
addressed in order to establish the full significance of the term “clarity” to the parties involved. 
The third subject of this dissertation, Mandelshtam, forges his own model of clarity based on the 
interplay of their distinct approaches.  
 
Romanticism and Ivanov’s Dionysian Theory 
The most obvious and most immediate context of Ivanov’s take on clarity is Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (1872). In this famous text Nietzsche 
advances his theory on the role of the Dionysian and Apollonian forces in classical tragedy. 
Apollo is the deity of clarity, distinctness, image and masculine individualism. He presides over 
the illusionistic dream world. Dionysus is the god of the life force, religious ecstasy, music and 
34 	
feminine unity of all. Nietzsche mentions “Apolline definiteness and clarity,” and “the Apolline 
appearances in which Dionysus objectifies himself.”67 Blending philology and philosophy, he 
associates the “Apolline” with the epic: “Homeric ‘naïvité’ can be understood only as the 
complete victory of Apolline illusion,” while tragedy is the sphere of Dionysus.68  
For Ivanov—as well as Bely—the encounter with Nietzsche’s philosophy in 1891 and 
1899 respectively, was a momentous event.69 In Russia the influence of the German philosopher 
was so ubiquitous in the last years of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century, 
that it became a posture.70 The World of Art writers and artists, for example, were known for 
their Nietzschean “individualism,” their subjectivist aesthetic grounded in the belief that art is the 
highest metaphysical pursuit.71 Prominent figures like Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Lev Shestov and 
Vasily Rosanov were only some of the “Nietzsche’s orphans” of the age.72 Bely and Ivanov were 
no exception. But while Ivanov’s entire career as a theorist, philosopher and poet could be 
viewed as a counterargument specifically to the ideas in The Birth of Tragedy, the philosopher’s 
concept of the “Apollonian” came to represent the “Classical” and “French” clarity that he set 
																																																								
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings. Ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronal 
Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46. Nietzsche is not the first to reference 
“Apollonian clarity” of the Greeks. In the modern age, Johann Winckelmann first articulated this 
idea. In Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture (1755) he 
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68 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 25.  
69 Pyman, History of Russian Symbolism, 220-224. 
70 Ibid., 108-109. 
71 E.V. Ermilova, Teoriia i obraznyi mir russkogo simvolizma (Moscow: Nauka, 1989) 123. 
72 “Nietzsche’s orphans” is the subject and title of a recently published study of Russian classical 
music in the pre-revolutionary period. Scriabin, whom I mention in my dissertation because of 
the essay his close friend Ivanov dedicated to him, and because of Mandelshtam’s response to 
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(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).  
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out to dismantle. Here, it is necessary to say a few words about Ivanov’s life prior to the “crisis 
of Symbolism.”  
Between 1886 and 1905 Ivanov lives abroad. A gifted twenty-year-old scholar of 
classical history, he moves to Berlin to study with the eminent historian Theodor Mommsen. 
Once there, he soon changes his focus from history to classical philology. As he works on a 
dissertation (in Latin) about Roman law, he is also attracted by the mysticism and religious 
philosophy of his day. At this time he reads Vladimir Solovyov, whose theurgic “Sophiology” 
and messianic philosophy of art proved to be a profound and lasting influence on him.73 When in 
1891 he encounters Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is through the prism of his classical studies and 
religious thought. In his autobiography, Ivanov writes that reading Nietzsche jolted him awake to 
his life’s purpose: to “overcome” the philosopher specifically in the sphere of religious thought.74  
Henceforth, Ivanov becomes exceedingly interested in the Dionysian cults. Eventually, 
he seeks to prove that the ancient deity is in reality an eternal spiritual force and a prefiguration 
of Christ, and so inscribe the divine within the framework of respectable classical study.75 Ivanov 
spends years between Rome, Athens, London, Paris, and Geneva. He divorces, remarries, 
maintains ties with Russia, but lives the life of a European scholar, and is versed in French, 
German, Italian, ancient Greek and Latin. In 1903 he visits Moscow to present the results of his 
																																																								
73 Solovyov’s theurgism believes the purpose of art is to transform humankind and society 
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research in a series of lectures entitled “The Hellenic Religion of the Suffering God,” published 
in 1904. In 1905, almost twenty years after his departure, he finally returns to the motherland, 
settles in St. Petersburg and for a lengthy period of time opens the doors of his Tower to the 
entire intellectual and creative milieu of the city. Ivanov does not stay in Russia forever, 
however. He flees the Revolution for Baku, where he defends his second dissertation in 1921, 
and eventually returns to his beloved Rome. His second dissertation—a revised and expanded 
version of his earlier research—appears in print in 1923 as Dionysus and Early Dionysianism.76 
Ivanov continues to work on this text for the rest of his life.  
Unlike Nietzsche, Ivanov interprets classical tragedy as a sacred action. For Nietzsche it 
is imperative to examine it as an aesthetic, rather than religious or moral phenomenon, and to 
interpret both the Dionysian and Apollonian states as expressions of nature’s creative powers. 
Dionysian ecstasy exposes the illusory nature of individuation, and allows to experience life, 
everlasting only as a totality, in spite of the inevitable destruction of the individual. Apollo 
represents the dream world of the illusory individual self. This state is also a conduit to the 
experience of the totality and wholeness of being, albeit through form, image and reflection. It is 
protective and salvific for the mind that cannot sustain the concept of its own destruction. Ivanov 
disagrees with a central tenet of Nietzsche’s philosophy: its irreverent, anti-religious stance. For 
him, Dionysian ecstasy is an insight into the sacred principle of existence and an awakening of 
the divine principle within the self. It is the means to surpass the Apollonian illusion. He even 
goes so far as to interpret Nietzsche’s final illness as the result of underestimating the nature of 
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the forces he himself discovered: an irreverence toward “Dionysus” and preference for 
“Apollo.”77   
Ivanov’s writing—both scholarly and literary—was profoundly influenced not only by 
Solovyov and Nietzsche, but also by German Romanticism. Philip Westbroek’s examination of 
Ivanov’s scholarship provides a thorough analysis of its Romantic foundations in a line of 
thinkers from Johann Herder to Georg Creuzer, Karl Otfried Müller, Friedrich Welcker, and 
others.78 Romantic authors such as Novalis and Tyutchev are a ubiquitous presence in his essays 
and poetry. Westbroek observes, that unlike Nietzsche, Ivanov wants to revive the Romantic 
quest for a synthetic, mystical worldview.79  
Curiously, while Ivanov never conceals his indebtedness to Nietzsche and Solovyov, he 
appears to ignore the prominent Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Yet, according to 
Westbroek, Ivanov’s Dionysian concept is very similar to Schelling’s. Both view “Dionysus” as 
a dialectic of the deity’s descent into the plurality of identities, death or passage through the self, 
and ascent, synthesis or return. Unlike Nietzsche, both Schelling and Ivanov do not perceive 
Socratic philosophy as destroying Dionysian religions, and both believe Christianity to be the 
new form of these religions. However, unlike Schelling, Ivanov understands the relationship 
between antiquity and Christianity as a continuity rather than an evolution.80  
Westbroek’s analysis focuses only on the texts where Schelling discusses Dionysus, but 
his observation could be applied more broadly to Schelling’s “identity philosophy,” as it is 
presented in his System of the Whole of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature in Particular 
(1804). Identity philosophy proposes that separation between the subject and the object is 																																																								
77 Westbroek, Dionysus and Dionysian Tragedy, 206-212. 
78 Ibid., 31-33. 
79 Ibid., 215-216.  
80 Ibid., 229-231, 252.  
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illusory. Instead, Schelling implies a metonymic relationship between them: being is the 
“subject” while the plurality of individual beings is its many predicates.81 This principle 
reverberates in Ivanov’s oeuvre: the relationship between Dionysus and Apollo is essentially its 
reiteration. The Apollonian “monad” is the “predicate” of the Dionysian being. The ecstatic 
“birth” of Dionysus within the individual actuates this relationship.  
Ivanov’s relationship with Romanticism is complex. In such programmatic essays as 
“Two Elements in Contemporary Symbolism” (1908) he critiques “idealism,” and advances the 
notion of the symbol as mimetically “corresponding” to “the real”—which as Westbroek points 
out, is for him analogous with the realm of Platonic Ideas. He insists on realism as the return to a 
coherent, concrete world that is not only knowable through “ecstasy” and “insight,” but is 
knowable absolutely, “objectively.” Symbolist realism, he states, is “the principle of fidelity to 
things as they are phenomenally and in their essence” [“printsip vernosti veshchiam , kakovy oni 
sut’ v iavlenii i v sushchestve svoem”].82 This aspect of his thought leads Westbroek to propose 
that as Ivanov seeks to “revise” Romanticism, and resurrect pre-Kantian metaphysics.83 But 
Ivanov’s insistence on knowing things “in their essence,” as the noumenon rather than the 
phenomenon, hinges on his understanding of Solovyov’s theurgism, Nietzsche’s veneration of 
the artist, and the poet’s personal ambitions, and creates a contradiction between theory and 
praxis.84 According to ‘Two Elements in Contemporary Symbolism,’ Symbolist Realism is the 
																																																								
81 In my discussions of metonymy and metaphor I follow Roman Jakobson’s famous 
juxtaposition between contiguity and substitution in “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types 
of Aphasic Disturbances” in Language in Literature (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press, 1987), 95-114. 
82 Ivanov, SS 2:539-541.  
83 Westbroek, Dionysus and Dionysian Tragedy, 273.  
84 Wachtel points out that Solov’ev understood theurgy as transformation of the world through 
art. Ivanov changes this idea to mean specifically the artist’s ability to have insight into the 
noumenal. Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 145. 
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idea of the symbol’s correspondence to the “realiora” as the “most real” aspect of a thing. A 
symbol is therefore mimetic or metaphoric. But his “theurgic insight” leads him to insist also on 
a vision of its metonymic connection to the invisible reality. For example, as he writes about 
grain and bread as sacramental, because “ears of wheat recall the wedding of Demeter and 
Dionysus,” instead of using the word  “sacrament”—in Russian, “prichastie,” from “chast’” or 
“part”— he emphasizes those who take part in it, and utilizes the participle “prichashchaias’” or 
“taking part in the sacrament,” and the nouns “prichastnik” and “prichastnitsa” – the male or 
female participants in this ritual. Ivanov’s use of this notion conveys two ideas at once: the 
metonymic character of his concept of symbol, and the esoteric, select nature of Symbolist 
Realism. The so-called “objective” reality hinges entirely on the privileged subjectivity of the 
theurgist, destroying any chance for the reader to perceive herself in the narrative as one of the 
“res.” Ivanov’s pre-Kantian metaphysics has the potential to be a purely solipsist one, while his 
critique of Romanticism is quintessentially Romantic. Ironically, in the same essay, “Two 
Elements of Contemporary Symbolism,” Ivanov references Pushkin as the true “classic” because 
his subjectivity prevails over the mystery of the object, and again offers Tyutchev as an example 
of the opposite approach.85 
In the “Precepts of Symbolism” Ivanov expressed a hopeful vision for the “Dionysian” 
processes in the poetry of his time. Quoting not only from Tyutchev and Novalis, but also 
Goethe, he attempts to adumbrate the “real” Classicism, based on scholarly research into the 
Dionysian cults. This system assigned the god of clarity a specific place. Apollo is the deity of 
illusory individual form, structure, organization, agreement, subordination, and ascent—from the 
multiplicity of forms, to a vision of the supreme Ideal Form. He is also a necessary limit to the 
																																																								
85 Ivanov, SS 2:557. 
40 	
Dionysian impulse of self-sacrificing descent and potentially infinite outpouring into being.86 
Clarity is both his attribute and his “action” or predicate. According to Ivanov, it creates the 
illusion of separation. He quotes from Tyutchev’s poem “Spring,” where in the last stanza the 
poet urges to put aside the subterfuge of personhood, and dive into the ocean of life as a totality. 
Poignantly, he chooses the verse where Tyutchev uses the words “ bud’ prichasten”— “be a part 
of,” “take part in,” or “commune with.” Ivanov then negatively contrasts this vision with the 
“duplicitous” clarity, that he believes stems from the Enlightenment views on the word’s 
adequacy to reason, and its communicability. He also associates “the views of the eighteenth 
century” with Pushkin’s aesthetic, thus juxtaposing the Russian Classic with the Russian 
Romantic.87 The word that believes itself to be adequate to reason does not function like the 
“symbol” in Ivanov’s understanding. It is not a sacrament of unity, but an instrument of division.  
 
Kuzmin’s Classical “Clarism” 
Kuzmin’s “Clarism” was informed by the aesthetic of the World of Art, an affiliation of 
creative, industrious and charismatic “decadents” that provided the atmosphere and the stimulus 
that had a deep and lasting effect on Kuzmin.88 The World of Art aesthetic entailed 
“retrospectivism”: a keen interest and revival of styles from a variety of historical periods; 
playfulness, and stylization as a kind of game; and an emphasis not only fine art, but craft as 
well. This is particularly important for Kuzmin, whose “On Beautiful Clarity” advocates a 
craftsman’s attitude toward writing. The World of Art consisted mostly of visual artists, art 
																																																								
86 Gasan Guseinov, “Proektsii ‘dionisiistva’ v biografii Viacheslava Ivanova.” Simvol 65 (Paris, 
2015), 430-470, 431.  
87 Ivanov, SS 2:593.  
88 Gennadii Shmakov, “Blok i Kuzmin.” Blokovskii sbornik II (Tartu: Tartuskii gosudarstvennyii 
universitet, 1972), 341-364, 349.  
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critics, and connoisseurs, the importance of image was for them uncontested.89 Their playfulness, 
taste for irony, and their treatment of art and craft as valuable in itself, without recourse to an 
external agenda, self-consciously recalled “Arzamas,” the nineteenth-century group of Russian 
poets that yielded the “school of harmonious precision.”90 Its most famous participant, Pushkin 
became the subject of such keen interest and inspiration for the World of Art that in 1899 they 
dedicated the entire 13-14th issue of their eponymous magazine to the poet, effectively 
inaugurating the revival of the “Pushkinian” aesthetic.91 Kuzmin’s “On Beautiful Clarity” 
reiterates the principles of clarity, attention to specific detail, vitality and irony that defined the 
“school of harmonious precision,” esteemed among his friends at the World of Art.  
The kind of “Pushkinian” Classicism that interested this group of artists as well as 
Kuzmin had little to do with Cartesian rationalism. As visual artists, architects, draftsmen, they 
were attracted first and foremost by the aesthetic of Pushkin’s era, alongside a plethora of other 
Classical and Neoclassical styles, such as that of the Versailles, Empire, Petrine Baroque, but 
also Japanese prints, Russian folk art and craft, etc. Research into a variety of aesthetic systems 
led to the formation of a stylized Neoclassicism that referenced its own lightheartedness, 
fragility, and evanescence. Pushkin represented a paradigm of the style toward which they 
aspired, not only for his wit, clarity, and economy of means, but also for his unique ability to 
reconcile ostensibly incompatible elements, registers and modalities of speech, to synthesize at 
will Classical and Romantic traditions in Europe and in Russia. The World of Art, defined by its 
																																																								
89 Magdalena Medarić, “Modern kak predavangardnyi stil’.” Russian Literature XXXVI (1994): 
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90 Gasparov, Poeticheskii iazyk Pushkina, 50-73. 
91 Pyman, History of Russian Symbolism, 109.  
42 	
eclecticism, valued the kind of Classicism that “does not exclude contradictions present in 
reality” but removes “the drama of incompatibility.”92  
In Kuzmin’s writing, “Pushkinian” clarity emerges as several specific ideas. It represents 
the notion of language as a living organism that captures and contains the fleeting historical 
moment.93 Such clarity is not abstract or idealist, quite to the contrary. When Pushkin availed 
himself of Boileau-Despréaux’s principle of clarity articulated in the “Art Poétique,” he viewed 
it through the lens of a new understanding of language as a complex, evolving “organism.”94  In 
wake of the Romantic reaction against Classicism and situated outside both traditions narrowly 
defined, he applied Boileau’s “clarté” to the needs of the era he inhabited.95 Pushkin’s “clarity” 
signifies perspicuity with respect to language as a concrete historical and social reality, an insight 
into its “character” and trajectory of historical development. To these aspects of “Pushkinian” 
clarity as the vitality of a language, Kuzmin adds a mystical dimension: a uniquely “Kuzminian” 
idea of writing as an alchemy.  
Both Pushkin and Boileau believed that to be more “lifelike” poetry had to become more 
like prose: in other words, it should embrace be rich in thoughts and “natural,” rather than 																																																								
92 Podgaetskaia, Izbrannye stat’i, 115.  
93 Long after the “crisis of Symbolism” Kuzmin addresses this concept in the poem 
“Pushkin”(1921), where he describes the poet as alive to a greater degree than anyone else. The 
poem begins: “On zhiv! U vsekh dusha netlenna,/ No on osobeeno zhivet!”  
M. A. Kuzmin, “Pushkin,” Sobranie stikhotvorenii, 3 vols. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
1978), 2:221-222. Hereafter referred to as SS.  
94 Pushkin’s lasting respect for Boileau and his approach to Boileau’s instruction is the subject of 
Boris Tomashevsky’s “Pushkin and Bualo.” B. Tomashevsky, “Pushkin i Bualo.” Pushkin v 
mirovoi literature (Leningrad: GIZ, 1926), 13-63. 95	But even in Boileau’s time his poem may have had a very different meaning than the one we 
ascribe it today. E.N. Kupriianova’s “On the Question of Classicism” argues convincingly that 
the roots of French Neoclassicism are in the philosophy of Francis Bacon rather than Cartesian 
Rationalism.  She demonstrates that Reason as Boileau understood it was inseparable from sense 
and experience. She proffers also that his “L’Art Poétique” was intended as an instructional 
manual rather than a dogmatic system. E. N. Kupriianova,“K voprosy o klassitsizme.” XVIII 
Vek: stat’i i materialy 4 (1959): 5-44.	
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ornate.96 Kuzmin likewise rejects the Symbolist idea of an elevated, unchanging, priestly idiom. 
He subtly reintroduces this concept in the title of his essay: “On Beautiful Clarity: Notes on 
Prose.” While he focuses on prose writers, the stylistic question of writing ornately but 
ineffectively (Bely, Remizov) versus clearly (Moliere, Pushkin, Poe, Hoffman) echoes Pushkin’s 
poetics and easily applies to his own. 
Finally, the question of “Pushkinian” clarity in Kuzmin’s work pertains to the notion of 
origin. Any Russian child knows that Pushkin is the “father” of Russian literature. But when 
Prosper Mérimée observed that, “Pushkin’s poetry blossoms as if of its own volition from the 
harshest prose,” he alluded to the idea that in its (deceptive) spontaneity and immediacy, 
Pushkin’s poetics is original not once, but in perpetuity.97 His poetry appears every time as if out 
of nowhere, seemingly unrelated to its immediate context. Such manifest originality 
automatically raises the question of the origin of a poetic utterance. In Kuzmin’s pantheon of 
lifelong favorite authors, Pushkin is not the only one who represents this concept. Another 
prominent example would be Goethe. Particularly relevant, however, is St. Francis of Assisi, the 
progenitor of the Italian literary tradition. While the culture of the early Italian Renaissance, 
including its rich legacy in the sphere of the visual arts, left a deep mark on Kuzmin’s 
worldview, the “Little Flowers” of St. Francis—sprouted from the prose of the late Middle 
Ages— and the saint’s poetry were particularly important.98 As Alessandro Vettori writes in his 
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“Meditations and Bafflements by Piotr the Hermit”: “A truly grandiose and noble conception of 
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Poets of Divine Love: Franciscan Mystical Poetry of the Thirteenth Century, as a poet, Francis 
was after the clarity of Adam’s speech prior to the fall.99 The saint’s teaching is a radical 
declaration of return to the original, ever-present Edenic nature. This view resonates with 
Kuzmin’s understanding of poetry as the original idiom. Although “On Beautiful Clarity” is 
stylized, and is deliberately worldly and ironic, it is after a similar idea.100 The origin myth with 
which the essay begins also tells the story of clarity as Kuzmin understands it. Drawing on 
sources, from St. Francis to Pushkin, from Goethe to Henri de Régnier and Anatole France, 
Kuzmin’s “chaste” poetics revives Classicism as the tradition of inchoation. 
 
Arguing about clarity Ivanov and Kuzmin suggested two distinct models of a beginning. 
Ivanov based his in Romantic philosophy, which he articulated using ornate syntax, archaisms, 
awkward neologisms and general opaqueness that consciously evoked Russian Baroque 
Classicism, among other poetic systems. Both he and Bely continue in the footsteps of the 
Russian Romantics—such as Vladimir Odoyevsky and Fyodor Tyutchev—who overlapped with 
Pushkin and succeeded his poetics of clarity.101 Boris Gasparov argues that, contrary to popular 
perception that Pushkin’s poetry instantly and definitively entered the pantheon of Russian 																																																																																																																																																																																		
the world always leads to the tenderness [umilennost’] of St. Francis, comic operas of Mozart 
and serene satires of France.”	99	Alessandro Vettori, Poets of Divine Love: Franciscan Mystical Poetry of the Thirteenth 
Century (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), xvii.	100 In the monograph Neoclassicism in Russian Architecture of the Early XX Century, Grigory 
Revzin writes that the World of Art appear to be unique in the history of art for developing a 
Neoclassical style from their experiments with stylization. Traditionally, stylization concludes a 
a given style. Kuzmin’s stylizations should be viewed in a similar vein, as approaches to a 
beginning. G. Revzin, Neoklassitsizm v russkoi arkhitekture nachala XX veka. (Moscow: 
Obshchestvo Istorikov Arkhitektury pri So’uze Arkhitektorov Rossii, 1992), 87. 
101 Ilya Serman writes about Ivanov’s poetic language as at times nearly indistinguishable from 
such eighteenth century authors as Derzhavin. I. Z. Serman, “Viacheslav Ivanov—nastavnik 
sovetskikh poetov.” Puti iskusstva: simvolizm i evropeiiskaia kKul’tura XX veka (Moscow: 
Vodolei Publishers, 2008), 358-379.  
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classics, the school of “beautiful clarity” fell out of fashion almost as soon as it appeared, in the 
second half of the 1820s. He observes that Kuzmin’s “Clarism” and Acmeist poetics were nearly 
the sole inheritors of its principles.102 Polemicizing with Ivanov, Kuzmin seeks to revive a nearly 
unprecedented aesthetic. Like Pushkin, who applied Boileau’s clarté to the historical moment he 
inhabited, Kuzmin applies this principle to the exigencies of his time. To this end, the World of 
Art emphasis on image, fascination with time as the evanescence of phenomena, and especially 
their interest in stylization became integral components of his concept of clarity as the vitality, 
historicity and apparent spontaneity of the poetic word. For Kuzmin, the poetic word originates 
in nothing but itself, and by virtue of this fact it holds the promise of Eden. Here, it is apt to 
recall Ivanov’s statement that Kuzmin’s “clarity” dissembles. This statement is intended to hint 
at Kuzmin’s belonging, against his own will, in Ivanov’s camp, or at least Ivanov’s insight into 
clarity as not quite itself. This is, indeed, the case: the word that originates in itself is not really 
mimetic. A poetics that proceeds from the word rather than from being does not imitate the 
referent, nor does it seek to affix itself to the invisible Ideal referent. Such a word emerges as its 
own reality, yet, for Kuzmin it is of vital importance that it pretends to imitate.   
 
It is ironic that the argument about clarity would bring to the fore such hermeneutic and 
communicative difficulties. Ivanov and Kuzmin understood the concept differently. For Ivanov it 
was an aspect of analytical thought. For him it represented a false grasp on reality. Yet he 
understood the concept itself in rational terms. But Kuzmin’s poetic clarity resists rational 
definition, and must be alluded to, illustrated by examples, or be understood in action, as an 
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aspect of Pushkin’s or Francis’ poetry. It is clear, however, that for both poets this concept 
signified a return to origins.103  
The polemic about clarity resumed in 1912, now with the participation of Andrei Bely. 
This time, as the Symbolists persevered in their attack on Kuzmin, they offered their own version 
of mystical, obscure intelligibility. Rather than speak in the abstract, they introduced the figure 
of the archetypal poet, Orpheus, as the ideal theurgist in command of the original Symbolist 
idiom. The entry of this figure into their writing as a character in his own right rendered their 
version of mystical “clarity” experiential and immediately related to the relationship between not 
only the self and the word, but the word and image as well. Rather than define or redefine his 
concept of clarity, Kuzmin defended himself by attacking stylistic and theoretical flaws of his 
opponents’ writing. But several months prior to the reemergence of the polemic, he had revisited 
clarity in an essay on the subject of one of his favorite operas, Orpheus and Eurydice by 
Christoph Gluck. In it, he also discussed clarity as the relationship between image and sound. 
The three distinctly different versions of these relationships that emerge from these texts 
represent three models of clarity as a creative form. In the early 1920s, when Mandelshtam— 
who in 1912 is still a year away from publishing his first volume of poetry—proffered his own 
version of clarity, he drew on both the polemic of 1910 and 1912. 	
 
Clarity as Creative Form: Three Visions of Orpheus  
The polemic on clarity resumed in January, 1912, when the Moscow Symbolist journal 
Works and Days [Trudy i dni] published Mikhail Kuzmin’s review of Ivanov’s new book of 
poetry, Cor ardens, and Andrei Bely’s brief essay “Of Cranes and Chickadees” [“O zhuravliakh i 																																																								
103 Michael Wachtel writes: “Indeed, the Symbolists return to an earlier, platonic and time-
honored definition of “originality”—as a return to origins.” Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 211.  
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sinitsakh”]. In his review Kuzmin praised Ivanov’s poetry in a somewhat forced, at times almost 
sycophantic manner, but was also carefully critical of its ambiguities and muddled, oversaturated 
prosody. In the last paragraph, he politely but assertively defined it as Apollonian and clear, 
rather than Dionysian and chaotic. The editors of the magazine, Andrei Bely and Emilii Metner, 
took issue with the last paragraph, and removed it without the author’s permission. Adding insult 
to injury, Bely’s “Of Cranes and Chickadees,” a brief article that concluded the magazine, 
contained an overt attack on Kuzmin. Writing under the pseudonym “Cunctator,” Bely argued 
that as a marker of cultural evolution, “clarity” is an unstable concept: what is clear today 
becomes obscure tomorrow, while “new speech—is always inarticulate.”104 Kuzmin may have 
especially resented the comparison of those who seek clarity in writing to a police precinct “with 
the appearance of a new civilian police force comes a new zone of clarity [“poiavliaetsia 
dobrovol’naia politsiia, voznikaet novyi uchastok iasnosti”]. Kuzmin was deeply offended and 
published a response to the editors of Works and Days on the pages of Apollon. In it he reiterated 
his position on clarity, stating that an artist’s religious aspirations should not intrude into the 
sphere of art theory, that such theory cannot be based on one’s subjective impressions, 
intimations, and intuition, and that as a representative of the “precinct of clarity,” he upholds the 
principles of precision and insists that Symbolism originated in France in the 1880s, making it 
historically inaccurate to trace its origins to Dante and Goethe.105 As Nikolai Bogomolov 
observes, Kuzmin responded not only to the immediate situation, but referred to Ivanov’s 
“Precepts of Symbolism” as well.106 He addressed the issues of critical method and origin of 
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poetic speech, both raised in “On Beautiful Clarity,” but applied them specifically the Symbolist 
idiom. Two years after the publication of “On Beautiful Clarity” and Ivanov’s lectures in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, the exchange between Kuzmin and the Symbolists pertained to the 
problem of clarity, affirming its pertinence to the debates of this time.107   
Works and Days was a direct consequence of the polemic around the “crisis of 
Symbolism,” intended as an outlet not only for the poetry, but also for the theoretical and critical 
writings of the “young” Symbolists.108 The same issue that featured Kuzmin’s review and Bely’s 
“Of Cranes and Chickadees,” also contained two short articles, both entitled “Orpheus” 
[“Orfei”]. Their immediate purpose was to present an eponymous series of translated works by 
European mystics, such as Meister Eckhart and Jakob Böhme. The larger goal, however, was to 
introduce a new idiom that would bridge the disciplines of poetry, philosophy and religion. As 
the name of the series and of the poets’ essays attests, the idea was to revive the original, 
archetypal word interpreted as the “realist symbol.”  
In his “Orpheus” Ivanov rephrases his earlier statements from “The Precepts of 
Symbolism”: mystical thought is communicable only when it is inarticulate.109 The Orphic idiom 
that he describes combines the incompatible: Eurydice, equated with Psyche and Vladimir 
Solovyov’s Sofia—the feminine aspect of Dionysus— and the rational, masculine element, 
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108 Ibid., 139. 
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where the former is obscure, and the latter is “clear.”110 Ivanov proceeds to explain how 
language accommodates contradiction. Since collective “craving for supra-sensorial knowledge” 
[“golod sverkhchuvstvennogo poznaniia”] cannot be satisfied by a “clear” idiom, mystical 
thought should not “sacrifice its depth.” But it should sacrifice it to a certain extent. This 
measure of intelligibility is “clarity” as “actualization” [“iasnost’ est’ osushchestvlenie”], which 
he likens to a sacrifice with Christological overtones. Mystical thought—but also the Symbol 
itself— is like a dark path, at the end of which Orpheus glimpses “a certain light” [“nekii svet”]. 
The “dark path,” presumably, is the clarity of meaning, while the “certain light” is the obscurity 
of mystical content. In the concluding paragraph he evokes traditional Orphic imagery, referring 
to Orpheus as the “sun of the dark depths” and the “night sun.”111 This image represents the 
obscure clarity of “supra-sensorial” knowledge: language that abides by contradiction.  
Three years later, in an essay written on the death of the composer Alexander Scriabin, 
“Scriabin’s View on Art” [“Vzgliad Skriabina na iskusstvo”], Ivanov returns to the theme of 
Orpheus to interpret the orphic gaze as the artist’s unwarranted and destructive awareness of the 
mystery that enters the world through his art. Sacrificial actualization within an accessible 
system of signification—the Apollonian form— necessarily implies forgetting of the sacred 
content: a kind of death into life.112 When the artist becomes conscious of the sacred significance 
of his own work, he fails as a theurgist.  
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While these ideas suggest that innuendo, omission and allusion are the antidotes to 
clarity, they also hint that the author is in command matter, and just do avoidance of addressing 
it directly. Ivanov describes coming into full knowledge of the “original” principle, of finding it 
“within,” “in the depths,” or “at the end of the path,” and then forgetting it to a “certain extent.” 
Such careful measurements of the mystical suggest that Ivanov might struggle against his own 
understanding of language as an essentially rational medium capable of total expression. The 
Symbol comprises a representation of the mystery, such as the Orphic night sun, and exegetical 
commentary to it as the “clear” discourse of actualization.   
Bely also describes Orpheus as a symbolic representation of Apollonian and Dionysian 
forces, where the latter is infinitely more important and explicitly identified with Christ. He 
describes the profound cultural crisis of his age as resulting from losing sight of the singular 
“Dyonisian” principle that sustains any given culture. Only a synthesis of philosophy, literature 
and religion can redeem this breach.113 As Bely describes the kind of synthesizing “Orphic” 
Symbolist language that might catalyze change, he also puts this idiom to active use:  
Orpheus appears, one could say, as the mask of our consciousness—a 
consciousness of truth rejected by modernity; and that truth is our catacomb, but 
at that catacomb’s entrance, which joins us too with the world, is the mask of 
Orpheus.114 
 																																																																																																																																																																																		
to behold the beloved shade, and so would not have lost her […] As artists approached the 
mountain tops of theurgy, the mystery of their path revealed itself before their eyes. Then were 
they struck by the resurrected memory of the One, whom Orpheus called Eurydice: with awe and 
enamored longing they turned their gaze backward, into the abyss of nonbeing, whence Life 
Beauty rose, led by them out of darkness—and the magical power abandoned them, and they 
stayed on this side of the theurgic threshold.”  
113 Andrei Belyi,“Orfei.” Trudy i dni 1 (1912): 63-68. Bely writes: “The beginning of any culture 
is in the involuntary, spontaneous creativity of a nation, discovering its way through images of 
its creativity; in this sense culture begins with revelation; it is based on religious truth; this truth 
is imprinted in the past in one or another historical form [...] the moment of revelation is replaced 
by moments of awareness of the directly discoverable [...]” 
114 Ibid., 66.  
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The passage can be read as a single Orphic Symbol. The Orphic word—the mask of Orpheus—
represents a certain truth, rejected by the historical moment, but still embedded in consciousness. 
The word that expresses this concealed truth—as the single ontological principle mentioned 
earlier in the essay—is both the “catacomb” of the truth and its connection with the profane 
“world.” Bely’s wording is remarkable. Orpheus is: a mask of our awareness, an awareness of a 
truth, a truth that is a catacomb, a catacomb with the mask of Orpheus presiding over the 
threshold. The circular relay race of significations, whereby the name Orpheus appears at the 
beginning and the end of the sentence like bookends, and coincides with the idea of depth or the 
“catacombs” and exteriority as the mask and the threshold, conveys the idea that the poet turns 
around to behold himself. The orphic symbol consciously signifies itself: the signifier and 
signified are one and the same, albeit within different parameters.115 The sentence also 
demonstrates the mise en abyme effect of this mystical tautology. Orpheus represents “x” within 
which, like a seed, there is an image of Orpheus, which represents “x” on a different scale.  
Bely interprets the function of this tautological symbol in the context of the Apollo—
Dionysus relationship: 
On the surface of the scholarly/philosophical and aesthetic life of the present the 
persistent labor of comprehending the variously branched pathways of culture is 
being accomplished; but we believe that in the depths of the human spirit the 
revelation of covert symbolism is being accomplished; we believe that the 
comprehension of the very highest symbols of creativity will fulfill these symbols 
as real symbolism. In this sense not only is Apollon Musagete restricted by 
Orpheus as his final limit, but he himself, fulfilled by Orpheus, begins breathing 
and living in him: the petrified mask of art dissolves; and its cold marble receives 
																																																								
115 Vladimir Feshchenko describes this phenomenon thus: “Bely’s concept of the symbol 
assumes that the visible conceals the invisible, but that the visible also directs thought so that it 
may discovery the invisible by way of imitation. ” Feshchenko references Charles Peirce, who 
defined an icon as a sign where the signifier and signified resemble each other. Feshchenko, 
Laboratoriia logosa, 183.  
52 	
movement: for even the stones of graven images can be set in motion by Orpheus. 
116 
 
The passage elaborates on the concepts of depth and exteriority. Bely hopes that the superficial 
language of his time will obtain depth by virtue of the hidden work of the symbol concealed 
within. As the implicit works its way to the surface, the superficial obtains depth. The principle 
that resides in the “catacomb” of spirit is also the “limit,” or the edge beyond which the 
“petrified mask” of Apollo transforms into the visage of a living being. Bely’s concept of the 
symbol is covertly subversive, and acts in accordance with the task that the poet gives it. The 
concomitance of depth and surface creates the image of an impossible space, and in fact uses 
spatial thinking to subvert itself. The tautological symbol is the visible agent of the invisible. The 
obscure symbol strives to connect illusory phenomenal reality with the original principle.117  
The Symbolist language of ascendance to the prototype is based in metonymy: a part that 
represents the whole, and leads to it.118 Ivanov’s dark “path” with a “certain light” at its end and 
Bely’s tautological symbol connect the Dionysian as the source of knowledge and the 
Apollonian as its actualization in the world. As the symbol subverts the “superficial” and 																																																								
 116 Belyi, “Orfei,” 66.  
117 For Ivanov and Bely, the primacy and spiritual superiority of music as well as poetry resides 
in its invisible, temporal aspect. In “Symbolism as World View” [“Simvolizm kak 
miroponimanie”] (1904) Bely argues that time is the “genus” within which the “species,” “inner 
feelings,” and spatial forms are perceived and organized. It has primacy and is more potent. This 
is the reason images can be musical but not vice versa: for example one may think of a sculpture 
as containing the “spirit of music” while music cannot contain “the spirit of sculpture.” For this 
reason Bely elevates music to the status of ultimate symbol, as most meaningful and most 
polyvalent, void of limiting signification. He writes that “only those who are myopic in spiritual 
questions seek clarity from a symbol.” [“tol’ko blizorukie v voprosakh dukha ishchut iasnosti v 
simvolakh”] For Kuzmin, music can have clarity like any other art form or idea. Moreover, he 
does not fetishize its temporal quality; to the contrary, he praises it at its most “still.”  
118 Oleg Lekmanov observes: “Although the symbolists felt they dwelled in two parallel worlds 
at once—“here” and “there,” their “here” easily intersected with “there,” breaking the laws of 
Euclidian geometry.” O.A. Lekmanov, “Stikhotvorenie Mandel’sthama ‘Kazino’ kak manifest i 
nekrolog.” Kniga ob akmeizme i drugie raboty (Tomsk: Vodoleii, 2000), 465. This intersection 
was crucial to their concept of the symbol.   
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insinuates the “profound,” it claims knowledge and insight, even if these are inexplicable. Bely’s 
wording not only illustrates its metonymic nature vividly, but activates its “supra-rational” 
potential. Ivanov, conversely, uses figurative language to illustrate his idea, utilizing the 
paradoxical image of a “night sun” for this purpose. He elaborates that Orpheus is the origin of 
order in chaos, and the origin of chaos within the order. Even contradiction abides in connection: 
paradox is contiguity.  
In Ivanov and Bely’s articles Orpheus embodies the Symbolist idiom of “supra-sensorial” 
knowledge. He represents language that undermines visible and palpable experience, and directs 
the reader toward the invisible, intangible “music” of the universe. Bely actively subverts image, 
while Ivanov instructs on the importance of subversion. The Symbolists’ Orphic word derives 
directly from “source” or the “origin.” It is a metonymy, which Bely interprets as an 
iconographic emblem, whereby the signifier and the signified—the origin and the text, the 
speaker and the word, and the sound and the image— are identical but manifested within 
different planes of existence. Ivanov understands it as a path that allows to course between two 
realms. For both poets, the “clarity” of image, space, intelligibility is both an obstacle to 
overcome, and a necessary source of tension.  
Intentionally or inadvertently, these two essays and Bely’s overtly anti-Kuzminian “Of 
Cranes and Chickadees” cast Kuzmin as an anti-Orpheus. Yet several months prior to Ivanov and 
Bely’s publications in Works and Days, Kuzmin wrote of clarity in terms that invalidate the 
Symbolist understanding of his idea. Orpheus figures in his essay as well, albeit as the hero of 
Gluck’s famous opera, rather than a theurgist. Surprisingly for a text about music, image plays a 
role of primary importance.  
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“Orpheus and Eurydice of Chevalier Gluck” [“Orfeii i Evridika Kavalera Gl’uka”] was 
originally published in the tenth issue of Apollon in 1911, the year that Vsevolod Meyerhold first 
staged the opera. The production ran through 1913, was restaged several times in 1919, and 
again in 1920-1921, when Mandelshtam saw it.119 In 1922 Kuzmin published a collection of his 
critical writings, Conventions [Uslovnosti], which included his essay on the opera, immediately 
followed by another, very brief article on the same subject, entitled “The Theater of Motionless 
Action” [“Teatr nepodvizhnogo deistviia”]. Like most of Kuzmin’s critical writings, these essays 
examine the work of art in terms of its historical background and formal qualities. But since they 
address Gluck’s masterpiece as a paradigm of clarity, they are also a metatextual elucidation of 
this concept.   
Kuzmin begins with a lengthy quote from Gluck, wherein the composer explains how he 
achieved the “beautiful simplicity” of his music, and proceeds to demonstrate how little this 
explanation reflects Gluck’s actual achievement. The composer conceals the truly innovative 
characteristics of his work, making a series of misleading statements regarding its origins and the 
“devices” used: 
All his transformative activities took place in addition to and even against his 
principled statements, for what had been asserted in them had long been 
accomplished in practice, perhaps even more fanatically and therefore less 
artisticly.120  
 
Like Kuzmin’s “dissembling clarity,” “beautiful simplicity” goes hand-in-hand with deliberate 
prevarication. Aware of the gap between his masterpiece and the exigencies of his time, the artist 
smuggles it contraband. But while personal allegiances to a particular school of thought distort 																																																								
119 Nataliia Khmeliova, “Raiiskoe viden’e.” Nashe nasledie 66 (2003): 88-98.   
120 Kuzmin, “‘Orfei i Evridika’ kavalera Gl’iuka,” PE 3: 543-549, 545. Kuzmin’s use of the 
word “device” [“priem”] possibly references Shklovsky’s “Art as a Device,” first published in 
1917 and reprinted in 1919. 
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the vision of the contemporaries’, in time the truth is revealed: “distance so smoothes the detailed 
differences, because of which art wars are ignited… [“otdalenie tak sglazhivaet detal’nye 
razlichiia, iz-za kotorykh vozgoraiutsia khudozhestvennye voiny…”]121 Contrary to Bely’s 
contemptuous remarks in “Of Cranes and Chickadees,” Kuzmin does not equate clarity with the 
fleeting idiom of the present. In fact, the poets share the view that time eventually overturns 
conventional axioms, and often proves faulty the criteria by which contemporaries judge each 
other’s success.  
Kuzmin locates the real origins of Orpheus and Eurydice in the Italian musical tradition. 
He calls it Gluck’s “most Italian opera,” and associates Italian influence with  “non-rationality”: 
“Of course he [Gluck] broadened French opera, introducing into it the musical and non-rational 
emotionalism of the Italians” [“konechno, on rasshiril frantsuzskuiu operu, vnesia v nee patetizm 
muzykal’nyi i neratsional’nyi ital’iantsev”].122 Not only does Kuzmin reveal that clarity emerges 
out of a “non-rational emotionalism,” but also that for him the “Italian” integrity, and a “silvery, 
hazy simplicity” of the music has a spiritual meaning. Its “liturgical” and “Virgilian” immobility 
gives the impression of an “arrestingly still image and lament” [“plenitel’no zastyvshei kartiny i 
placha”].123  
Kuzmin’s second essay on Orpheus and Eurydice, “The Theater of Motionless Action,” 
elaborates on the paradoxical notion of “still” music as ritualistic. He writes that the opera is so 
minimal and schematic, that it would be monotonous and nearly dull, if not for its solemnity, and 
its ritualistic, “circle dance” quality. The music reveals its profound meaning and an inner 
																																																								
121In the second chapter of this study I discuss Kuzmin’s reflection in his 1934 diary that he 
prefers myopia to spectacles for the same reason.  
122 Kuzmin, “Orfei i Evridika,” PE 3:545. 
123 Kuzmin, “‘Orfei i Evridika,’” PE 3:546, 547. 
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dynamism when viewed as an aspect of a liturgical performance.124 Its originality resides in its 
relationship to religious Italian music, especially the oratorio. The description of Orpheus and 
Eurydice as a “still image,” and as “motionless” and “liturgical” suggests a meditation on the 
music as an image in its own right. The author does not describe Golovin’s famous decorations, 
Fokin’s choreography, or the experience of synesthesia as an active visualization of the music. 
The clarity of the sound is an image with no content other than itself. The mechanism of 
intelligibility, therefore, is metaphoric: the music would not be “clear” if it did not evoke an 
image of itself. As a structure that compares and differentiates, metaphor brings together 
Orpheus and Eurydice, sound and image, the artist and his means of expression, to the same 
degree that it keeps them apart.  
The essays on Gluck’s opera address clarity as the quality of aesthetic intelligibility 
enabled by a binary structure: music is “whole” when it is like an image. Unlike the Symbolists, 
who valued the idea of connection and identity with the “original principal,” Kuzmin emphasizes 
separation and difference as a key feature of the creative process. This concept is prominent also 
in “On Beautiful Clarity,” where the origin myth is recounted in the following manner: “the 
world first emerged from a condition of chaos, upon which blew the separating spirit of God” 
[“mir vpervye vyshel iz sostoianiia khaosa, nad kotorym veial razdeliaushchii Dukh Bozhii”]. 
The sentence that describes origination, elides its cause: the world emerges spontaneously, as if 
of its own volition, and as the result of differentiation. The poetics that proceeds from the word 
rather than from being—is based in metaphor as the figure of speech that represents the 
contrasting ideas of wholeness and unity, and division and separation. Just as sound and image—
																																																								
124 Kuzmin, “Teatr nepodvizhnogo deiistviia,” PE 3:549-550. 
57 	
Orpheus and Eurydice—are a couple that must always be apart, so the word must be apart from 
the world in order to become the world.   
Clarity as the state of creativity or an aspect of aesthetic experience overrides the 
question of origin, but does not nullify it. Kuzmin writes that several elements of Gluck’s opera: 
“fuse into one whole to such an extent that one no longer thinks of the historical origins of this 
silvery hazy and blissful music,” yet he dedicates a lot of thought to the precise nature of these 
very origins. It is important for several reasons that he locates them in Italy, and defines them as 
“non-rational.” First, this is a polemical response to Ivanov and Bely, whose perception of clarity 
as the “French” clarté Kuzmin seeks to dismiss. The French writers mentioned in “On Beautiful 
Clarity” belong to the tradition of the same “Italian” clarity.  Second, it emphasizes the 
connection between clarity and vision. Renaissance Italy is the origin of clarity not only because 
the specific historical sources that may have inspired Gluck were Italian, but because of the 
powerful association between the Italian Renaissance and visual culture. There is an obvious 
connection between the “Italian” and the “Pushkinian” clarity. Indeed, the aforementioned 
French authors, Goethe, and such writers of antiquity as Apuleius, whom Kuzmin loved, could 
also exemplify it. Any writing that evokes an image of an “original” wholeness and aliveness is 
“clear,” but its symbolic historical birthplace is Italy as the birthplace of a “ritualistic,” “non-
rational” vision.  
Ivanov’ and Bely’s respective models of clarity as the fundamental, “original” 
relationship between the poet and the word, and Kuzmin’s discussion of Gluck’s music as such a 
model, address not only the specific relationship between the artist and his means of expression, 
but also between the “image”— or meaning— and sound. For the Symbolists image, is an 
obstacle between the theurgist and the “origin.” The effort to overcome this obstacle, yet not 
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succumb to the ultimately destructive appeal of Dionysian “music” as the ultimate source of all, 
contributes to the creative tension in their work. Their underlying claim, however, is knowledge 
of both realities and the ability to navigate between them. Their “Orphic” word is, therefore, 
essentially metonymic, based in contiguity. Kuzmin, conversely, dismisses the idea that origins 
are synonymous with causation, and approaches the relationship between sound and image as 
complementary, dialogic and simultaneous. He does, however, look to the Italian Renaissance as 
the prototype of this relationship. His “Orphic” word is essentially metaphoric and based in the 
paradoxical simultaneity of identity and difference.   
 
Osip Mandelshtam and the Clarity of Origin 
The third subject of my dissertation, Osip Mandelshtam, was twenty-five years younger 
than Ivanov, and twenty years younger than Kuzmin. Born in 1891 in a Jewish family in 
Warsaw, he spent his childhood and youth first in the imperial environs of St. Petersburg, in 
Pavlovsk, and then in the city itself. He studied in the progressive and prestigious Tenishev 
School that accepted Jews as well as aristocrats like the Nabokovs. In 1907-1908 he lived in 
France and traveled in Italy before entering Heidelberg University to study Romance languages 
and Renaissance art. As aforementioned, in 1910 he was in Germany, but paid great attention to 
the polemic on the “crisis of Symbolism” from afar. His eventual decision to leave his mentor 
and join Gumilev’s “Poets’ Guild,” and then, together with Gumilev, Sergei Gorodetskii, Anna 
Akhamtova, Mikhail Zenkevich and Vladimir Narbut, to embark upon the Acmeist project, was a 
pledge of allegiance to a different aesthetic philosophy. Mandelshtam’s programmatic poems as 
“The Casino”(1912), “The Notre Dame”(1912), and “The Admiralty”(1913), or the essay  “The 
Morning of Acmeism” (1912) assert the value and beauty of clear, logical, “Apollonian” thought. 
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Mandelshtam tends to veer away from juxtaposing the “Apollonian” and the “Dionysian,” never 
resorting to these specific terms. In “The Notre Dame,” for example, Mandelshtam writes about 
the “rational chasm” of the “gothic soul” [“dushi goticheskoi rassudochnaia propast’”].125 Ivanov 
would consider such “Apollonizing” of the “Dionysian” sacrilegious. Yet, while at this time 
Mandelshtam openly polemicizes with Ivanov and Symbolism in general, scholars such as John 
Malmstad believe that he retains respect for his mentor for the rest of his life.126   
Classical culture—refracted through the lens of French Neoclassicism—prevails in the 
poet’s first book of poetry, Stone (1913), as well as his second one, Tristia (1922). Kuzmin may 
not have had as profound and lasting an effect on Mandelshtam as he did, for example, on 
Akhmatova, but there is no doubt, that especially Tristia (1922), a collection of poems that 
Kuzmin named, experiment with his idiom. As aforementioned, the Acmeists, as a self-
consciously Neoclassical, neo-Parnassian movement, referred to him as their teacher. Kuzmin’s 
“elevation to stardom” coincided with the period when Mandelshtam began to write poetry as a 
teenager, and it stands to reason that he would have paid close attention to his work starting in 
those years.127 Kuzmin lived with Ivanov when Mandelshtam began to appear at the Tower, and 
was involved at Apollon, a magazine that played an important role for Mandelshtam and the rest 
of the Acmeists. For a period of time Kuzmin was also close with Gumilev, and frequented his 
“Poets’ Guild.” In sum, he was consistently present in the same circles as the younger poet.  
In 1910, while in Germany, the young poet paid enough attention to the literary events 
unfolding in Moscow and St. Petersburg to respond to them poetically. His very first publication 
																																																								125	Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:58, 62, 66; 2:22-26. 	
126 John E. Malmstad, “Mandel’shtam’s ‘Silentium’: A Poet’s Response to Ivanov” in Robert 
Louis  Jackson and Lowry Nelson, Jr. (eds.), Vyacheslav Ivanov: Poet, Critic and Philosopher 
(New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1986), 236-252.  
127 Freidin, A Coat of Many Colors, 293.  
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appeared in 1910, in the same July-August issue of Apollon, where Briusov published his retort 
to the “young” Symbolists, entitled “On Slavish Speech.” The polemic around the crisis of 
Symbolism was in full swing, and as John Malmstad demonstrates, one of Mandelshtam’s poems 
among those published, “Silentium,” also responds to Ivanov’s “Precepts of Symbolism.” An 
ekphrastic reference to Sandro Botticelli’s “The Birth of Venus,” the poem expresses the desire 
to return to primordial silence before an unnamed “she” is born. Malmstad believes that the 
poem’s tension comes from the awareness that this desire is unattainable and that a return to an 
“indestructible bond” with existence is not possible. He argues that this represents a major 
departure from Ivanov’s theories.  
While the poem never addresses “clarity” directly, it evokes the issue at the heart of the 
polemic: the origin, and the original word. Anxiety about the irreversible destruction of the 
original, universal bond is a prominent theme in Mandelshtam’s first collection of poetry. In his 
second book, Tristia, the longing for lost primordial unity transforms into the longing for a 
strange “meaningless” and “blissful” word. Yet Mandelshtam’s oeuvre also contains a different 
kind of sentiment toward origins. In the autobiographical The Noise of Time (1925), he uses 
distinctly Symbolist vocabulary, when he contrasts St. Petersburg with the life within his Jewish 
family. St. Petersburg is a “dream,” and a “splendid veil over the abyss,” threatened by the 
destructive, ritualistic, “uterine” “Judaic chaos” that the narrator “has always fled.” He writes 
that the “origin” is not the home, describes the unfathomable, “wild” sound of the Hebrew names 
of the Jewish holidays, and in another place in the text mentions his father’s awkward, stilted use 
of the Russian idiom.128 Mandelshtam’s relationship to the notion of origin is therefore twofold. 
He rejects his “Dionysian”—but also Jewish—birthright as alienating and foreign, and he longs 
																																																								
128 Mandel’shtam, Shum vremeni, PSS 2:213, 223. 	
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for the obviously foreign—the Classical—as his true origin. Mandelshtam’s Classicism in this 
context is not only the sum of all types of European Classicism, but also its Romantic 
counterpart.  
Gregory Freidin observes that Mandelshtam’s ambition to become a “Russian” poet 
mirrored Russia’s—or at least St. Petersburg’s— ambition to become “European,” and so 
become something that presumably it was not.129 It is all the more true, then, that Mandelshtam’s 
“Silentium” expresses a longing for the original, universal bond as the other other. If in The 
Noise of Time the narrator’s native Judaism is an uncomfortable fit, while the Apollonian dream 
of St. Petersburg, and the Russian language feel like home, then the silent word in “Silentium” is 
neither Dionysus nor Apollo, but a third deity, one that is more real than the dream-like 
Petersburg.130  
In Mandelshtam’s “Silentium” Venus appears before her birth—for the reader she is 
“born” as a specific image, although the poem clearly addresses the instance before her birth. 
Words appear to grasp silence: she is meaning prior to articulation, or perhaps even meaning 
before meaning. But since she is an origin that does not yet exist, one must give birth to it. 
Indeed, one emerges from what one creates: the origin is the progeny, but both are equally 
strange to the speaker, who therefore “originates” in the unknown.    
Mandelshtam’s “original” word represents continuity based in separation: a word that is 
original and remembered at once. Unlike Ivanov, who intended Symbolism to be a “recollection” 
of the primary, hierophantic idiom invested with mystical meaning, Mandelshtam understands 
memory as spontaneous, and so as preceded by an interruption. Interruption as an emblem of the 
loss of knowledge becomes its own rhetorical place—a topos.   																																																								
129 Freidin, A Coat of Many Colors, 22. 
130 More on Mandelshtam’s relationship to the idea of origin: Ibid., 50, 54.  
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In Mandelshtam’s poetics this concept of memory applies also to the relationship 
between the poet and his interlocutor, as well as the structure of the word itself. The speaker 
addresses the next poet, the interlocutor, who will have the task of interpreting his address 
through the prism of cultural memory. In this context, “clarity” is the constant that persists in 
poetic language in spite of the transformations that are inevitable in the interpretative act. 
Similarly, the image and the word, as well as the semantic and phonetic components within the 
word relate to each other as a continuum and discrete elements at once. This approach transforms 
the aesthetic function described by Kuzmin in the essays on Orpheus and Eurydice, whereby 
music is perceived as an “image” in its own right, into a dynamic function of making meaning. 
To allot the unknown its rightful place within the text, to “voice” this other, and moreover to 
conceive of this relationship as genealogical, is to enact the “Dionysian” word that is both 
subject and predicate, being and action at the same time. Such poetics is in possession of a 
“clarism” of the impossible and the obscure.  
For Mandelshtam poetic language itself reflects this concept of stability as existing only 
within the process of transformation. He rejects the notion of an ideal, permanent and exclusive 
idiom. Moreover, he associates the vernacular with the speech act. Polemicizing with the 
Symbolists in an essay entitled “Vulgata” (1922-1923), Mandelsham evokes the history of the 
Russian language, and references the “feud between the Russian worldly, spoken idiom and the 
written idiom of the monks” [“bor’ba russkoii, t.e. mirskoii bespis’mennoi rechi <…> s 
pis’mennoi rech’u monakhov”].131 The bookish writing of the Byzantine monks, associated here 
with Ivanov, is in his view vastly inferior to the living word. For Mandelshtam, the trajectory of 
Russian literature unfolds along the path of secularization, away from the ritualistic language, 
																																																								
131 Mandel’shtam, “Vulgata,” PSS 2:140-143. The italics are mine. 
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and away from the page. While his “vulgate” is often “priestly” in its own right, it is always 
evocative of speech.  
Love of enunciation combined with the perception of the poetic word as inherently 
polyphonic, contributes to what I term the “epic” intentionality of Mandelshtam’s work. 
Commenting on Mandelshtam’s inclination toward the epic, Freidin situates it in the context of 
the Symbolist experiments with this genre: “Mandelshtam’s tendency to start ab ovo may be 
traced to the epic framing of the lyric made so effective by the “trilogy” of Aleksandr Blok. This 
new generic convention placed a great value on the notion of ‘origins’—as an instance 
prefiguring the poet’s eventual fate <…>”132 Mandelshtam, however, does not introduce the epic 
using a compositional device, such as a narrative “framing” of the lyric, but as the word’s 
intention to remember. Since for the poet memory supersedes biography and is communal and 
historical, the word becomes a record of the many within the one. In the 1910 essay “François 
Villon” (rewritten in 1927) Mandelshtam describes the poetic word thus: “The lyric poet is 
naturally bi-gendered, capable of endless splitting for the sake of internal dialog” [“Liricheskii 
poet po prirode svoei— dvupoloe suchshestvo, sposobnoe k beschislennym raschshepleniiam vo 
imia vnutrennego dialoga.”]133 But the word is more than dialogic: it is a dynamic polyphony. 
Therefore, as Mandelshtam polemicizes on clarity with his teachers, his response purposefully 
also becomes a record of the polemic on clarity. As Mandelshtam’s “clear word” incorporates, 
assimilates and even personifies their writing, it ultimately serves as a symbol of the collective 
																																																								
132 Freidin, A Coat of Many Colors, 40, 296-297. Freidin mentions Said’s Beginnings: Intention 
and Method, where the author describes a beginning as “transitive” or “intransitive.” Freidin 
suggests that the concept of an “intransitive” beginning suits the Acmeists, who were interested 
in the notion of origin, while the Futurists pursued a  “transitive” beginning as they strove toward 
building a new world. Transitivity understood as a relationship to the world as object, and as the 
idea of continuity was no less important for the Acmeists than for the Futurists.  133	Mandel’shtam, “Françoi Villon,” PSS, 2:13-21, 17.	
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poetic effort to forge a new model of humanism , one that would represent an alternative to the 
“Enlightenment” paradigm rejected by Ivanov in 1910. For all three poets this model is based on 











































The “Identity Poetics” of Viacheslav Ivanov134 
 
 
Clarity or Obscurity? Critical Deliberations about Ivanov’s Poetics 
 
Ivanov’s poetry invited allegations of obscurity from the start. For example, in 1909 Osip 
Mandelshtam wrote to Ivanov: “Simply put, you are the most incomprehensible, the darkest poet 
of our time…” [“Vy—samyi neponiatnyi, samyi temnyi, v obydennom slovoupotreblenii, poet 
nashego vremeni…”]135 Valery Briusov and Aleksandr Blok numbered among authoritative 
voices who agreed with this assessment.136  But in more recent criticism to discuss Ivanov’s 
“clarity” is to argue against the notion that his writing is too opaque. Among modern scholars 
Sergei Averintsev wrote several essays defending Ivanov’s “clarity.” In “Symbolic 
Systematization in the Poetry of Viacheslav Ivanov”  [“Sistemnost’ simvolov v poezii 
Viacheslava Ivanova”], he suggests that a system of symbols with a very stable and clear 
meaning subtends Ivanov’s poetry.  Though complex, the relationship among these symbols can 
be diagramed. This type of poetry is highly rational, suggests the scholar, but is poetry 
nonetheless. Averintsev concludes his essay thus: “Viacheslav Ivanov’s poetry, so often found to 																																																								
134 Sergei Averinstev proffers the term “identity poetics” as a reference to Schelling’s “identity 
philosophy.” Averintsev explains that by “identity” [tozhdestvo] of Ivanov’s poetics, he means 
the strict correspondence between the poet’s worldview, the structure of his symbols, and the 
“texture” of his poems. Sergei Averintsev, “Poeziia Viacheslava Ivanova,” Voprosy literatury 8 
(1975): 145-192, here 167. 
135 O. Mandel’shtam, Sobranie sochinenii v chetyriekh tomakh, 4 vols. (Moscow: Art-Business-
Center,1999), 4:14. 
136 On Ivanov as difficult and opaque see Valery Briusov, Sobranie sochinenii v semi tomakh, 7 
vols., (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia Literatura, 1973), 6:88-109, and Aleksandr Blok, Sobranie 
sochinenii v deviati tomakh, 9 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962), vol. 7. On Ivanov as a 
representative of the tradition of “difficulty” see Ilya Serman, “Vyacheslav Ivanov and Russian 
Poetry of the Eighteenth Century.”Vyacheslav Ivanov: Poet, Critic and Philosopher (New 
Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1986),190-208; Pamela Davidson, “The 
Legacy of Difficulty in the Russian Poetic Tradition: Contemporary Critical Responses to 
Ivanov’s “Cor Ardens.” Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 35, # ½, (Jan.-Jun., 1994): 249-267.   
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be dark, in fact proves to be uncommonly clear—a poetry of distinct contours and hard, starkly 
revealing sense.”137 In another essay, “Viacheslav Ivanov’s Poetry” [“Poeziia Viacheslava 
Ivanova”], Averintsev asserts that while Ivanov often praised Dionysian chaos as the source of 
creativity, he was a remarkably lucid thinker and writer: “As a source of poetic motivation… 
Ivanov’s cult of chaos appears to be an apparent nuisance.” He suggests that the definitive 
feature of this poet’s masterworks is disciplined logic—in other words, clarity. Moreover, 
Ivanov’s writing is rich in visual imagery that is very clearly defined by its sharp edges and 
smooth textures, such as precious stones and crystal. Averintsev points out that even the weather 
in Ivanov’s poems is usually crystalline. On a typical day in an Ivanov poem the skies are clear, 
there is a gentle breeze, the temperature is comfortable, while at night the sky is illuminated with 
bright stars. This “heraldic” rationalism derives from the sharp delineation of each object from 
its surroundings and its function as “a semantic figure of itself.” Ivanov’s relationship to words 
parallels his relationship to images: each word is distinct from the other, with clear contours and 
a clear and stable meaning.138    
The question of whether Ivanov’s poetry is truly “clear” or “obscure” is a vexing one. In 
1912, joining the clarity-obscurity debate and arguing against Kuzmin, Bely writes: “We see a 
new ‘horizon’ emerge, one that does not correspond with other ‘horizons’ that we ourselves have 
created. It therefore seems to us to represent chaos and confusion, for the novel word is always 
inarticulate. …What yesterday seemed all too clear, even offensively clear…today appears 
suspiciously vague…”139 Bely makes an important point: to determine whether something is 
clear or obscure, it is first necessary to establish the nature of the criteria themselves. He posits 
																																																								
137 S. Averintsev, Poety. (Moscow: Yazyki russkoi kul’tury, 1996), 165-187, 187.   
138 Averintsev, “Poeziia Viacheslava Ivanova,” 166. 
139 Andrei Belyi, “Zhuravli i sinitsy.” Trudy i dni 1 (1912): 82-84. 
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that “new words” can appear inarticulate at first because they require a “new kind of vision” that 
lags behind the creation itself. With respect to a work of art, clarity is momentary and may be 
lost as time passes. Clarity, in his view, is contingent on history and the standards of the moment. 
And yet the debate over Ivanov’s poetry has persisted for over a century, suggesting that at least 
in this case the lack of consensus has resisted the passage of time. It is, therefore, safe to 
conclude that the question regarding the actual “clarity” or “obscurity” of Ivanov’s poetics is not 
well formed, and that it would be more productive to determine why such diametrical opposition 
has arisen.    
Clarity was an important and problematic theme for Ivanov. It was he, and not Kuzmin, 
who introduced it as a concept in the Symbolist lexicon well before the 1910 “crisis of 
Symbolism.” Ivanov employed it in his essays and in his poetry as a sort of philosophical 
contronym, at times a distinctly positive and at others an equally negative term. It is all the more 
important to trace Ivanov’s thoughts on the term to its origins predating his own theories. 
 
Clarity: A Prehistory 
A future Symbolist teacher of Dionysian poetics, but then a sixteen-year-old high school 
student and debutant poet, Viacheslav Ivanov, wrote a poem in 1882 entitled “Clarity” [Iasnost'].  
As an adult, he must have considered this poem important and quite successful, because he 
included it in his 1904 book of poetry Transparence [Prozrachnost']. 
 
Clarity 
To V. S. Kalabin 
 
Clear today in heart, in light 
With tender soul I harken 
To nature's songs in accordant hello    
To pinewood studies and whispres , 
Iasnost' 
Vl. S. Kalabinu 
 
Iasno segodnia na serdtse, na svete! 
Pesniam prirody v soglasnom privete 
Vnemliu ia chutkoi dushoi: 
Vnemliu razdum'iu i shepotu bora, 
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The wordless voices of heavenly eyes 
The splash of the robin's egg river. 
 
Restless, morose, like eternal meditations, 
Old Sphinxes fall silent and asleep;   
Choirs of enchanting reverie advance; 
I have no joys, no tears of my own.  
 
Gentle heart of strange joys, 
Strange sorrows. Limpid 
Trustful eyes openly met 
With distant magic imaginings; 
The heart, with come-hither dreams. 
Rechi bezmolvnoi nebesnogo vzora, 
Plesku reki goluboi. 
 
Smolkli, usnuli, trevozhny, ugromy, 
Starye sfinksy—vechnye dumy; 
Dvizhutsia khory plenitel'nykh grez; 
Net svoei radosti, net svoikh slez. 
 
Radosti chuzhdoi, chuzhdoi pechali 
Serdtse poslushno. Iasny, 
Vzoram doverchivym v'iave predstali 
Voobrazhen'ia volshebnye dali, 
Serdtse maniashchie sny. 
 
The setting and mood of this poem resemble a late Romantic landscape in the spirit of authors 
such as Aleksei Tolstoi and Afanasy Fet. Common rhymes (svet-privet, grez-slez) and metaphors 
(the nature that “sings songs,” the sky that has a “gaze,” the forest that “whispers”)—tread the 
terrain of their epigones.140 The word “dal’” [dal'] which will play a key role in the Symbolist 
lexicon, migrated here likewise from the Romantic vocabulary, especially in reference to the 
internal, rather than the natural landscape, to imagination and dreams.141 Romanticism surfaces 
in the very idea that the poet’s surroundings reflect his subjective emotional world and that this 
subjective emotional world reflects the theme of the poem in turn. Fet’s comment that he wrote 
as though: “the poetic idea has come to him… inspired by a single event or an impression,” 
could apply to the first stanza of this poem.142    
																																																								
140 On the importance of Romantic influence on early Ivanov see Svetlana Titarenko, “Faust 
nashego veka”: mifopoetika Viacheslava Ivanova (Saint-Petersburg: “Petropolis,” 2012), 25.  
Titarenko demonstrates that while Symbolist writers such as V. Briusov were deeply influenced 
by French Symbolism, Ivanov was much more in the sway of the both European and Russian 
Neoromantic movements.  
141 On “dal'” in Symbolist vocabulary see Michael Wachtel, Russian Symbolism and Literary 
Tradition (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 153; Joan Delaney 
Grossman, “Briusov’s Defense of Poetry,” Issues in Russian Literature Before 1917 (Columbus, 
OH: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 1989), 199.  
142 Lidiia Ginzburg, O lirike (Moscow: Intrada, 1997), 79.  
69 	
  The Romantic influence evident in this poem fed directly into Ivanov’s theurgic 
philosophy. A response to the Idealist philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Romanticism engendered a 
voice that was by definition partial, and that sought to overcome its own subjectivity.143 Ivanov’s 
future theurgism pursued a similar goal and proposed a solution to it. Ivanov wanted to propel 
poetry beyond Romantic sensibility, and beyond art.144 He attempted to forge a point of view 
beyond subjective and therefore partial and time-imbued Romanticism toward an objective, 
universal order available to the theurgic poet by way of a visionary gift. Such a poet would 
describe the movement from realia, or visible phenomena, to realiora, the nouminal absolute, as 
though it had already happened.145 The early poem “Clarity” encapsulates Ivanov’s Romantic 
“debts” and foreshadows his quest to resolve the contradiction inherent in Romanticism by 
moving beyond subjectivity. The concept of “clarity” plays a pivotal role in this endeavor.  
In the poem, clarity is the state of equipoise between the subject and the object. The first 
line of the poem “Clear today in heart, in light” [“iasno segodnia na serdtse na svete! ”] 
establishes a correspondence between self and “other,” in this case, a brightly lit landscape. On 
the subject of such correspondence, Michael Wachtel notes that “in general the Symbolists 
prized the facility for seeing or creating—similarities.”146 But as the subject observes his 
beautiful surroundings, and as his thoughts cease and disappear, he dissolves into the scene. The 																																																								
143 Ginzburg, O lirike, 90, 121.  
144 Michael Wachtel provides an illuminating overview of the Symbolists’ relationship with 
Romanticism, focusing specifically on Ivanov and his preference for Novalis over Goethe. The 
latter “limited” the artist by distinguishing between disciplines, and spheres of human interest in 
general, such as religion and art for example. The former was viewed as the precursor of 
Symbolism, because by seeking to dissolve boundaries, he adumbrated the concept of 
“zhiznetvorchestvo,” or the artist as a “total” creator, not distinguishable from “the person.” 
Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 118-127.  
145 V. Ivanov, “Dve stikhii v sovremennom simvolizme,” Sobranie sochinenii, 4 vols, ed. D.V. 
Ivanov and O. Deschartes (Brussels: Foyer Oriental Chrétien, 1971-1987), 2:536-561. Hereafter 
SS. 
146 Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 211.  
70 	
speaker renounces the very concept of owning one’s emotions: “Without their joy, without their 
tears” [“net svoei radosti, net svoikh slez”]. Instead of “one’s joy,” there is “joy”; instead of 
“one’s tears,” “tears”; instead of “one’s gaze,” “gaze.” In Ivanov’s mature work grammatical 
objects—here joy, tears and gaze—often acquire such agency that they become grammatical 
subjects independent from the speaker. In “Clarity,” the body and the mind of the speaker 
dissolve into the universe, as equalized symbolic concepts. The “Sphinx,” therefore, is a symbol 
of independent and menacing thought in general. “The heart,” no longer a metonymic 
representation of the poet’s emotions—symbolizes love, three times symbolically evoked.   
Nevertheless, the non-subjective subject must speak. To create a language that would 
supersede the merely personal and represent what Vladimir Markov called “the language of the 
gods” Ivanov looked to literature that preceded modern subjectivity.147 As he sought “to invent 
the new and gain the very old,” he attempted a universal rather than individual voice via archaic 
style.148  In the context of the Russian literary tradition the poetic idiom of such eighteenth 
century authors such as Lomonosov proved most fitting for the project. Ilya Serman notes that 
among the Silver Age poets it was Ivanov who “made the decisive turn to the poetics of the 
XVIII century.”149 A turn toward the grandiloquent style of the eighteenth century and its 
universal voice enabled Ivanov to resolve the inherent conflict of the Romantic movement: a 
complicated and overall negative attitude toward eighteenth century poetics. 150 In his essay 
																																																								
147 Vladimir Markov, “Vyacheslav Ivanov the Poet.” Vyacheslav Ivanov: Poet, Critic and 
Philosopher (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1986), 49-59.  
148 Viacheslav Ivanov, “Poet i chern’.” Po zvezdam (Saint-Petersburg: ORY, 1909), 33-42, 40-
41.  On the subject of Ivanov’s archaicsms see Efim Etkind, “V’uchnoe zhivotnoe kul’tury: ob 
arkhaicheskom stile Viacheslava Ivanova.” Tam vnutri (Saint-Petersburg: Iz-vo “Maksima”, 
1996), 135-148.  
149 Ilya Serman, “Viacheslav Ivanov-nastavnik russkikh poetov.” Puti iskusstva (Moscow: 
Vodoleii Publishers, 2008), 359.  
150 Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 182.  
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“Vyacheslav Ivanov and Russian poetry of the XVIII century,” Serman argues that Ivanov’s 
“faithfulness to the forgotten spirit of a language closest of all in type to that of the ancient 
languages” is “but an almost literal repetition of Lomonosov’s […] words from his “Introduction 
on the Use of Church Books,” where Lomonosov declares that Old Church Slavonic contains the 
“beauty, richness, majesty, and power of the Hellenic language.”151 It is with respect to the 
tradition of Lomonosov’s and Derzhavin’s “difficult” poetics, that Sergei Averintsev calls 
Ivanov’s images “clear” “heraldic emblems.”152 In “Clarity,” the tendency toward archaisms is 
not yet pronounced, Ivanov not yet having made his “decisive turn” toward the poetics of the 
eighteenth century. The poem presages the voice that will speak in his mature works without yet 
speaking in it. But even here, as the speaker renounces the distinction between self and other, his 
Joy, Tears and Gaze become emblems in the spirit of Baroque Classicism, beside other emblems, 
such as Forest, River or Sky. The voice of the speaker is not yet abstracted, but describes the 
process whereby the specific becomes the universal.   
Scholars who have written on the subject of Ivanov’s “archaism” fail to acknowledge that 
in reverting to the universal aesthetic of the eighteenth century, Ivanov rejected perhaps its most 
important tenet, namely, the concept of reason. The eighteenth-century poet may have believed, 
as did Sumarokov, that the poetic word should express an idea with precision and clarity, or he 
may have written in a grandiloquent language heavy with tropes, as did Lomonosov, but 
disagreements regarding poetic style always ultimately concerned reason.153 In the post-Kantian, 
and then post-Nietzschean world, rationalism and its most important postulate—that the world is 																																																								
151 Ilya Serman, “Vyacheslav Ivanov and Russian Poetry of the Eighteenth Century.”  Yale 
Russian and East-European Publications 8 (year? Pages?); Vyacheslav Ivanov: Poet, Critic and 
Philosopher (New Haven, 1986), 203.  
152 Averintsev, “Poeziia Viacheslava Ivanova,” 166. 
153 Lev Pumpianskii, “K istorii russkogo klassitsizma.” Sobranie trudov po istorii russkoi 
literatury (Moscow: Iazyki russkoii kul’tury, 2000), 30-157.  
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reasonable and as such, knowable—had lost its currency. Therefore, as Ivanov attempted to 
surpass Romantic partiality, he moved toward the position of universality while rejecting its 
conceptual foundation. Paradoxically, he sought his own, private universalism: a partial 
objectivity.   
The last stanza of “Clarity” contains its most important idea and one of the seminal 
concepts of Ivanov’s future Symbolism. The speaker had lost his subjectivity by the second 
stanza. Thus, when he states: “Trustful eyes openly met/With distant magic imaginings” 
[“vzoram doverchivym v’iave predstali/ voobrazhen’ia volshebnye dali,”] the gaze beholding the 
external equivalent of a dreamscape or vision is no longer quite the subject’s own. The absence 
of any possessive pronoun to modify “gazes” creates an ambiguity as to the identity of the seer, 
rendering him more “universal.” Whoever he is, he recognizes his surroundings as something 
that he has already seen. With respect to vision the speaker’s experience echoes Ivanov’s attitude 
toward language:  the locus amoenus is a dream manifested in reality; the new word is the 
recaptured and resurrected “ancient word.”  
Ivanov’s “clarity,” then, is the remembrance of the original image and the recognition 
that the manifested reality has been seen before. But since in his later poetry the speaker will 
occupy an exceedingly “universal” theurgic position, this concept will become increasingly 
problematic. For Ivanov, who, as mentioned above, rejected the conceptual idiomatic 
underpinnings that yielded his own poetics, the relationship between the subject and the object in 
his work rested solely on the subject’s visionary faculty. It described a system grounded in 
nothing but itself. In “Clarity” it is already unclear if, while establishing a correspondence 
between the inner vision and the exterior “reality,” the visionary overcame his partiality and 
beheld before him what he saw in a dream, or if the solipsist dreamed up a world wherein he is 
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the ubiquitous self. If the setting wherein the poet finds himself is a realized dream, is it not a 
world that starts and ends with the self, i.e. a solipsist world?   
Ivanov’s poetics are “clear” not only because, as Averintsev observes, his landscapes are 
brightly lit and his images sharply defined, but because in his work the murky Romantic 
subjectivity yields to the luminous fields of articulation. His “clarity” begins as an ideological 
correspondence, free of the discord between the internal knowledge and exterior appearance. It 
describes an external manifestation (iavlenie) of what he already knows inwardly, in the external 
world. It also communicates the idea of totality, whereby “otherness” vanishes. As the speaker 
loses his subjectivity, it becomes unclear what remains beyond the self. Ivanov’s world implies a 
total externalization of the self, which signals, paradoxically, its consumption and an 
internalization. This is precisely what renders Ivanov’s “clarity” obscure: without “one” there 
cannot be an “other,” and without this distinction meaning cannot exist.  
In “Clarity” the speaker’s attitude toward his subject is patently affirmative. In the 
following decade this attitude changes; Ivanov’s first collection of verse, Pilot Stars [Kormchie 
zvezdy] (1903), his second one, Transparence (1904), and his essays from the turn of the century 
onward convey a more complicated attitude toward this topic. Kuzmin, who entered the literary 
arena only a few years after Ivanov, was undoubtedly familiar with Ivanov’s body of work from 
Pilot Stars onward.154 “On Beautiful Clarity” referenced Ivanov’s ideas on clarity that appeared 
in various publications between 1903 and 1910, during a period when the poet vociferously 
rejected the concept, at least in its incarnation as the French “clarté”. There was, however, a 
																																																								
154 Kuzmin’s entry into the St. Petersburg literary circles dates to October 1905, when he first 
reads his novella Wings in Alfred Nurok’s salon “Evenings of Contemporary Music.” It is 
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transitional period in Ivanov’s evolution as a writer and thinker. While information available 
about this time in his life is scarce, there is sufficient evidence that “clarity” became an active, 
operative idea in his development.    
 
Clarity and Classical Scholarship 
“Myth as an Objective Reality” 
The years between 1886 and the turn of the new century bracketed Ivanov’s 
apprenticeship as a scholar. In 1886 he left Russia for Berlin, to study ancient Roman history 
with Theodor Mommsen. Ivanov embraced his work. His correspondence with friend and fellow 
historian I.M. Grevs attests to the fact that he was a dedicated and gifted scholar of antiquity, a 
focus motivated by a rather negative attitude toward his own day.155 In 1888 he wrote to his 
friend A.M. Dmitrevsky: “In actuality, often diving in thought into the past, at times into the 
future, besides which, many thoughts altogether abstract, I deeply, though often unconsciously, 
hate the present day, which carries the newspaper café-chantant nickname ‘Fin de Siècle.’ After 
the ecstasies of Plato, this hybrid mixture sickens the classicist.”156 Bombast notwithstanding, the 
excerpt communicates a symptomatic idea: Ivanov rejects his own historical moment on the 
grounds of being a Classicist. Moreover, the superficial hybrid of contemporary culture that he 
so disdains seems dressed in the Parisian fashion of a Fin de Siècle flâneur and café-chantant 
regular. To the decadent Frenchman who represents Ivanov’s day he juxtaposes—himself: the 
unfashionable scholar of the authentic and the Classical.157 In his view, the contrast between 
																																																								
155 G. M. Bongard-Levin, N.V. Kotrelev, and E.V. Liapustina, eds., Istoriia i poeziia perepiska 
I.M. Grevsa i Viach. Ivanova (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006).  
156 Titarenko.“Faust nashego veka”, 84.   
157 Ibid., 48. 
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antiquity and the culture he dismissed was the contrast between the robust source and the 
decadent outcome, the profound and the superficial, the coherent and the fragmented.   
Ivanov hadn’t yet visited France or Italy when he wrote to Dmitrevsky. The letter 
implicitly attacked an idea of France rather than the place itself. In 1888 Rome was likewise only 
an idea, but one he obviously favored. It represented coherence and authenticity, and as such it 
was the opposite of what he had resented in the culture of his time. Unity, singularity, a 
universal, paradigmatic home: this was what Ivanov sought and saw as the opposite of the 
fractured reality of his day.158 Rome, where Ivanov arrived for the first time in 1892 and then 
stayed until 1895, saw his transformation from historian into poet. But in both scholarship and 
art he was motivated by the same desire. In 1917 the fifty-one-year-old Ivanov looked back on 
the time of his apprenticeship: “I was a historian […] through history I dreamed of single-
handedly overcoming society’s problems and finding a path to social activity.”159 To recover the 
lost classical ideal, the one that Rome embodied, was a mission of social imperative. Ivanov’s 
literary efforts were a means to the same end, suggesting that on some level he never truly 
distinguished between the two occupations.  His background was, after all, in philology, and as 
																																																								
158 Pertinently for Ivanov, Rome and Paris as mutually exclusive appeared in Gogol’s story 
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Ivanov wrote to I.M. Grevs: “Philology is namely the science of ‘Classical antiquity’ in its full 
extent: as such, it knows no other method, no other viewing angle, than the historical.”160 This 
“historical” approach to language inspired Vladimir Solovyov’s remark that on reading Ivanov’s 
poetry, one immediately notes the author is a philologist.161 The common goal of both the 
historian and the poet was to recover the Classical ideal lodged in the obscure depths of 
antiquity, in the hope of infusing the present with its spirit.162  
Ivanov the poet shared an agenda with Ivanov the scholar: to return to origins by means 
of the Classics.163 As he eventually sought to revive ancient Greek poetic meters and recycle the 
poetic idiom of Russian Classicism with its abstract vocabulary—to embrace opaque language as 
“authentic” and prophetic— he also had in mind a specific geographical route that quite literally 
led to the “origins” of Western civilization as the place of revelation.164 A conceptual return to 
origins corresponded with a physical return to Rome, the city he revisited many times the last 
decade of the 19th century, where he lived again in 1913 and returned in 1924 until his death in 
1949.165 In later times Ivanov compared his lyric hero to epic characters adrift in a fantastical 
universe, such as Aeneas or Odysseus.166 He would write: “The poet wants to be solitary and 
																																																								
160 G. M. Bongard-Levin et al., eds., Istoriia i poeziia, 83.  Nikolai Bogomolov considers this 
admission, which dates to 1894, to be of critical importance in understanding Ivanov as a poet. 
N. A. Bogomolov, “Viacheslav Ivanov mezhdu Rimom i Gretsiei.” Sopriazhenie dalekovatykh  
(Moscow: INTRADA, 2011), 19. 
161 S. Averintsev, “Viacheslav Ivanovich Ivanov.” Simvol 53-54 (2008), 10.  
162 Ilia Serman, “Viacheslav Ivanov—nastavnik sovetskikh poetov.” Paths in Art: Symbolism 
and European Culture in the 20th Century (Moscow: Vodolei Publishers, 2008), 358- 379, 361.  
163 Michael Wachtel writes on the importance of “origins” for the Symbolists in general and for 
Ivanov (and Belyi) specifically in Russian Symbolism, 210. 
164 Lena Silard, “‘Orfei rasterzannyi’ i nasledie Orfizma.” Germetizm i germenevtika (St. 
Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Ivana Limbakha, 2002), 51; Averintsev, “Viacheslav Ivanovich Ivanov.” 
151.   
165 E. Takho-Godi and A. Shishkin, “Rim Viacheslava Ivanova” in A. Shishkin (ed.), Ave Roma. 
Rimskie Sonety (St. Petersburg: Kalamos, 2011), 68-84.  
166Titarenko, “Faust nashego veka”, 91-101.  
77 	
withdrawn, but his internal freedom is an internal need of restitution and inclusion in native 
verse. He invents the new and inherits the old. The hazy mirage of uncharted horizons draws him 
on: but, making a complete turn, he already approaches his native places.”167 Yet the oddly literal 
nature of his quest engenders a different type of iconography. Armed with a Baedeker travel 
guide, Goethe’s Italian Journey and Nietzsche’s Collected Works his hero resembles a myopic 
graduate student of history and philology who enthusiastically retraces the Grand Tour some half 
a century after it ceased to exist.168 Ivanov’s literary project was inscribed within the discipline 
of history: of “historia” in the original ancient Greek meaning of the term as an eyewitness 
account.169   
It was this effort to map the route to the hypothetical point of origins and then refashion 
the present according to this recovered authenticity that eventually inspired Andrei Bely’s 
characterization of Ivanov’s scholarly and literary methods as “a confluence of scientific myth 
with the scientific foundations of fantasy.”170 The domains of scholarship and fiction have 
distinct cartographies—yet Ivanov marked the coordinates of his project on both maps as if on 
one and the same. As a result, the attempted return to the hypothetical origin both inside and 
outside the domain of history could not but render reality fictitious and dress fiction in the garb 
of reality. This collapse problematized the reality-based practice of social action. After attending 
Ivanov’s lecture “On Two Elements in Contemporary Symbolism” in 1908 Bely wrote the poet 																																																								
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an impassioned letter wherein he addressed the effect of the confusion between fiction and 
reality.171 He accused Ivanov of hubris and hypocrisy: “You write and speak with such literary 
ease […] about how there exists an object of realistic creation, of fact rather than literature; 
speaking of this in literature, you pretend to the role of prophet: but there will be no prophets, nor 
can there be any now; it amounts to a kind of lie.”172 Only prophetic speech was capable of 
engendering reality. Ivanov’s language, it was implied, did not enjoy the stature necessary for 
such an endeavor; moreover, history denied such a possibility. Bely believed that to claim 
knowledge of trans-historical truth in literature is unethical. The effort of the Decadents to 
refashion life in accordance with aesthetic laws was not unlike the effort to refashion both art and 
life according to the laws of a posited objectivity: both ignored or strove to negate the forces of 
history.     
Ivanov premised his claim to authority on the ideas of insight and knowledge. While he 
implied that this knowledge was sacred in nature, in fact it was based entirely on scholarly 
research. Ironically, by virtue of being a scholar, he was necessarily aware that the discipline of 
history from its earliest days contained the notion of partiality and perspective and thus could not 
make claims to know objective truths. To insist on the objective nature of his findings was to 
undermine history by means of history. The solution to this tautological quest was the concept of 
myth, the dominant subject of his research and a concept he placed not only at the center of his 
theories, but his persona. “Myth as objective reality”—this was Blok’s summary thesis of 
																																																								
171 E.V. Glukhova, “Pis’mo Andreia Belogo k Viacheslavu Ivanovu o doklade ‘Dve stikhii v 
sovremennom simvolizme.’” Iz istorii simvolistskoii zhurnalistiki (Moscow: Nauka, 2007), 118-
126.  
172 Ibid., 124. 
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Ivanov’s 1908 lecture in Saint Petersburg.173 Ivanov viewed myth as an alchemist views the 
philosopher’s stone. This precious, immutable substance—produced by history via poetic 
alchemy, the juncture of history, religion and literature—trumped the notion of a subjective 
perspective. 
 From the late 1880s and throughout the 1890s the poet became increasingly fascinated by 
ancient Dionysian cults. This timeline suggests that this interest emerged in tandem with his 
attraction to Rome and his physical relocation to this city. Several years after his arrival in Italy 
he gave up the original topic of his dissertation to concentrate entirely on the Dionysian 
mysteries, even going to Athens to research the ancient cults on site for the duration of 1901. 
This research eventually culminated in Dionysus and Pre-Dionysianism [Dionis i 
pradionisiistvo], defended as a dissertation only in 1921 and published as a book in 1923.   
Ivanov was more than dedicated to his subject. Its role as a cornerstone of his persona is 
evident for instance in his marginalia on Aleksandre Benois’ 1909 article “Awaiting the Hymn to 
Apollo” [“V ozhidanii gimna Apollonu”]. The article appeared on page five of the first issue of 
Sergei Makovsky’s magazine Apollon, and served as a manifesto for the writers and artists 
gathered under the aegis of this magazine. Ivanov’s comment is especially significant in that it 
echoes Bely’s objections to his own 1908 lecture.   
Inadvertently corroborating Bely’s statement that the time of prophets had passed, Benois 
wrote that while the contemporary age was a “long night” of chaos and utter dissolution, it would 
soon end. A genuinely religious aesthetic would glue together the scattered shards of spirituality, 
artistic creation and everyday life. Benois introduced the dichotomy of Dionysus and Apollo, 
using the former deity to symbolize the age of chaos and spiritual death and the latter to exalt 																																																								
173 A. Blok, Zapisnye knizhki: 1901-1920. Sobranie sochinenii v vos’mi tomakh, 8 vols. 
(Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literature, 1965), 8:104.  The italics are mine.  
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form, order and future peace. He associated Dionysus with Christ, juxtaposing them both to a 
joyous, beautiful God, whose followers would profess a truly Classical aesthetic. He also 
claimed that the late eighteenth-century French Classicism was unable to create a viable 
Apollonian ideal. Pedantic and dull, it failed to understand the vibrant nature of Classicism and 
studied the Greek originals by systematically copying them. In conclusion Benois writes:  
We need to believe and pray. And how not believe, if only to let arise in your soul the 
whole image of him who since the very first days of creation has led the holy roundelays 
of beauty? What on earth resembles Him? Perhaps He’s only fantasy and figment? 
Perhaps He doesn’t actually exist, doesn’t actually demand the holy sacrifice of the poet? 
Perhaps the great clairvoyant Pushkin only jested, spoke literary phrases, but didn’t 
believe?... He didn’t forsake humanity in these many centuries of universal oblivion. 
Neither did we forget Him, but simply didn’t recognize him, took Him for another, for 
such was our need. A need to illuminate the depths of the human heart and flower them 
with beauty. A need for holy sacrifice to summon Francis of Assisi and Saint 
Teresa…masses and masses of sacrificial minds and souls. And now, completing the 
whole cycle, it’s time once again to remember the body. We need to prepare it to shine 
with beauty, but moreover to initiate its devotions unto Him who demands devotions unto 
Himself.174 
 
Beside the introductory words “We need to believe and pray”  [“Nuzhno poverit’ i molit’sia”] 
Ivanov writes this peeved commentary:  
Who? With what? Is Dionysus a condition in God; Apollo, his form? But where is God? 
And like Annensky, Benois goes on about religion, yes religion—but which? I don’t want 
burning altars before Néant and liturgical roundelays around empty space. Principally 
better would be to practice simply and specially…art for art’s sake. I hate esurient 
impotence in rebus divinis…Religion is religion! Art is art! I love art for art’s sake (it’s 
already secretly religious—but secretly_. I appeal to religious creation, if religion exists. 
Art as the express surrogate of religion—I disdain it and don’t believe in it.175 
 
In Benois’s liberal interpretation of the ancient Greek pantheon Ivanov perceived a threat to his 
own Classical knowledge. The specter of the “fin-de-siècle” flâneur had once again reared its 
detestable head. In his essay Benois encroached upon Ivanov’s sphere of expertise, exposing 
French Neoclassicism as a fake, comparing Dionysus and Jesus and drawing the irritating 																																																								
174 Aleksandr Benois, “V ozhidanii gimna Apollonu.” Apollon 1 (1909): 5-11. 
175 V. Ivanov, “Perepiska s Makovskim.” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 10 (1994): 137-164, 154.  
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conclusion that the Apollo-Dionysus dynamic was its exact inverse.176 Benois posited the 
relationship of the two gods as a duality, and history as an altered age of Dionysus and Apollo.  
In the latter god he saw the cardinal expression of divinity: order as a manifest universal 
principle, a precondition of both being and art. In his understanding neo-classicism embodied 
this principle as an inherent, organic virtue, a pervasive joie de vivre. If this weren’t enough, the 
idea that sacred language was transparent rather than obscure offended Ivanov’s sense of 
reverence for the hermetic mysteries and his sense of ownership of their secrets. Ivanov’s 
commentary reiterates Bely’s objection but bases it on a different premise: that art should not 
serve religion, that the two domains should remain separate if a given religion is false. Explicit in 
these words is the author’s self-righteous commitment to the Dionysus-Apollo dichotomy as a 
religion. The right to speak on matters whereof, according to Bely, one should keep silent was 
for Ivanov a matter of license—something he believed he had as a result of his travels, both 
physical and intellectual. But while his vexed commentary on Benois’s essay laid claim to 
spiritual authority, his envy was of a scholarly nature. Research was the cornerstone of his 
religious feeling: spiritual pursuits supported by his study of the myth of Dionysus and 
indivisible from a historian’s fervor. He promoted the notion of “insight” into the mystery of 
things, but his mysticism stemmed from his discoveries in the libraries of Berlin, Paris, Rome 
and Athens. His prophecies were all extensively footnoted.     
By 1909, with new directions in art again the subject of heated debate, and the “crisis of 
Symbolism” imminent, Ivanov was in danger of being sidelined. In the first issue of Apollon 
following Benois’ manifesto, Annensky’s essay “On Contemporary Lyricism,” criticized 
																																																								
176 V. Ivanov. Dionis i pradionisiistvo (Baku: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1923), 197-200.  In 
Part 4, Chapter X, Ivanov draws an extensive parallel between the Dionysian mysteries and the 
passion of Christ.  
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Ivanov’s poetry rather harshly. Myth, wrote Annensky, is by definition accessible to all, whereas 
Symbolism would have it borderline incomprehensible.177 Ivanov’s meticulous creation—his 
poetics of knowledge—was founded on the myth of Dionysus. This deity represented the 
unknown and the unknowable that would upend the edifice of nineteenth-century rationalism.  
Paradoxically, nineteenth-century rationalism in tandem with a kind of fictional science was the 
means whereby Ivanov obtained the unknowable. Where there should have been insight, there 
was only fiction; where there should have been fiction, there was a claim to knowledge. Thus 
was the  “objective reality” of Ivanov’s myth revealed as a scholar’s idiosyncratic fantasy. 
Ivanov’s journey toward Rome, his interest in the ancient Greek cults of Dionysus and 
his poetics of knowledge all date to the 1890s. The quest for “origin” sought a destination at once 
historical and beyond history: the unknowable yet objectively valid truth that myth represented. 
This destination was the hypothetical Archimedean fulcrum: the firm and immovable place of 
pure objectivity whence the poet hoped to “move the world.” The concept of “clarity” played an 
important role in this endeavor. The poem “Clarity” describes clarity as an aspect of the 
speaker’s internal world articulated at a specific locus within the external world. “Clarity” was 
likewise a state whereby an individual point of view became as if diffused throughout the visual 
field. The arbitrary individual thereby merged with the universal absolute. These romantic 
sensibilities were transformed from a state of mind to a method and then applied to historical 
time so as to distill mystical insight. The city of Rome came to represent the place of origins that 




177 Innokentii Annenskii, “O sovremennom lirizme.” Apollon 1 (1909): 12-42. 
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The Journey toward Clarity: 
Roman Antiquity  
Ivanov’s writings about Rome and Italy in general were a vivid expression of the idea of 
fulfillment.  As in “Clarity,” this fulfillment was inextricable from ascent to a supra-subjective 
vision and a more “objective” perception of the subject matter.178 At once a city of history and a 
city outside it, eternally center and periphery, no place could reflect Ivanov’s idea better than 
Rome. As an immutable image of the past, Rome was a cross-section of distinct cultural epochs 
that retained their historical specificity yet formed a comprehensive whole. It represented history 
without partaking of it. This situated Rome outside the realm of contemporary decadence and 
within the eternal classical ideal. Rome embodied “clarity” as it was projected onto history. 
Unsurprisingly, it became the place where Ivanov found his voice as a scholar of a fictional 
history and a poet of scholarly erudition.   
According to Ivanov’s “Autobiographical Letter” he approached Rome gradually, 
spending the better part of 1891 in the Paris Louvre, where he composed his dissertation on the 
ancient Roman societies of publicans—public contractors and tax collectors.179 As he wrote in 
his “Autobiographical Letter,” while in Paris he also read the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche 
brought with him from Berlin in several “little volumes”.180 Nietzsche had a profound and lasting 
influence on Ivanov. The latter’s eventual shift in focus from the study of ancient Roman 
revenue leasing to the Dionysian cults was largely motivated by a “deep and persistent need to 
overcome the philosopher specifically in the arena of religious thought.”181 Intellectual stumbling 
																																																								
178 Ivanov vehemently rejected subjectivity as limiting or inhibiting experience. See Wachtel, 
Russian Symbolism, 65.  
179 G. M. Bongard-Levin et al., eds., Istoriia i poeziia, 14. 
180 Ivanov, “Autobiographical Letter to S. A. Vengerov,” SS 2:20.  
181 Ibid., 20.  
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blocks the poet encountered included Nietzsche’s claim that “god” was a man-made concept and 
the philosopher’s apparent contempt for Christianity that juxtaposed it unfavorably with ancient 
Greek theology. Ivanov must have been especially disturbed by Nietzsche’s claim that language 
does not lead to the truth, and that a fact is, in a sense, fiction. He came to challenge the 
philosopher specifically on scholarly grounds and historical fact. He rejected the idea that ancient 
Greek and Roman religions and Christian civilizations were founded on mutually exclusive 
principles.182 To find their common origin was to disprove Nietzsche’s historical assumptions 
and thereby cast doubt on his philosophy.  
To set out for Rome was to set out in pursuit of factual knowledge that would bring the 
subject and object into balance by affirming objectivity. To find a place beyond subjective 
contingency meant, among other things, to defeat Nietzsche’s greater claim that fact is mere 
interpretation and language to some degree impotent. To accomplish this feat Ivanov availed 
himself of a concept in Nietzsche’s early philosophy, that Nietzsche himself retracted almost 
immediately upon articulating it. In The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music the 
philosopher wrote: “Only insofar as the genius, during the act of artistic procreation, merges 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Ivanov writes: “While in Athens, where I spent a year, I gave myself completely to the study of 
Dionysus. The focus of my studies was dictated by the urgent need to overcome Nietzsche in the 
sphere of religious consciousness.”  
182 Pamela Davidson remarks that because of the powerful legacy of the Renaissance, the 
Western world never conceived of antiquity from a religious standpoint, except occasionally 
negatively.  But in Russia, which derived its religious views from Byzantium and which never 
had a Renaissance in the western sense of the word, it was not uncommon to see antiquity 
through the prism of religion. To conceive of antiquity through the prism of Christianity, but also 
to conceive of Christianity through the prism of antiquity is precisely what Ivanov began to do as 
he approached Rome.  In this context, his references to “clarity” indicate the concept of a holistic 
vision: “clarity” represents insight into the union of contradictory elements.  
Pamela Davidson,“Afiny i Ierusalim: Dve veshchi nesovmestnye? Znachenie idei Viach. Ivanova 
dlia sovremennoi Rossii,” in K.Iu Lappo-Danilevskii and A.B. Shishkin (eds.), Viacheslav 
Ivanov: issledovaniia i materialy (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Pushkinskogo Doma, 2010), 65-
72; 65-66.  
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fully with that original artist of the world, does he know anything of the eternal essence of art; 
for in this condition he resembles, miraculously, that uncanny image of a fairy-tale which can 
turn its eyes around and look at itself; now he is at one and the same time subject and object, 
simultaneously poet, actor, and spectator.” 183 The artist, says Nietzsche, ecstatically unites with 
a greater “self,” thereby uniting the subject and object. This concept recalls an important aspect 
of Ivanov’s “clarity” as it was expressed in “Clarity,” wherein the subject who rises above his 
own subjectivity gains a selflessly or objectively “clear” vision beyond the individual, the partial 
and the perspectival.  
 Soon after writing The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche completely renounced the idea that 
the subject is capable of perceiving any sort of “essences.”184 While Nietzschean concepts such 
as the uncanny, the fairy tale, and artistic procreation through ecstatic union with the other 
migrated into Ivanov’s writings, epistemological doubt did not. In the words of Michael Wachtel, 
Ivanov always “firmly believed in an objective truth that could be perceived by gifted artists. He 
condemned subjectivity in art, which he felt distorted this fundamental truth.”185 Nietzsche’s 
notion that the subject overcomes itself and obtains some essential knowledge through union 
with “the original artist of the world”— a notion reminiscent of Ivanov’s intrinsic understanding 
of “clarity”—now became a method of historical enquiry into factual reality expressed in a 
poetic idiom.   
Traveling from Paris to Rome in 1892, Ivanov symbolically traveled from decadence to 
Classicism and from scholar to poet of knowledge. On the way, the Pont du Gard, a Roman 																																																								
183 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 33.  
184 Nietzsche speaks against his earlier views in such works as the 1874 essay “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life.” Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life,” Untimely Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 57-124.  
185 Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 65.  
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aqueduct near Nîmes in Provence, made an impression strong enough to inspire several textual 
“approaches” that Ivanov began either during the journey or soon upon his arrival in Rome, but 
left unfinished.186 These five fragments contain his initial efforts to reckon with Nietzsche on his 
own turf of classical history. In all five the speaker is a pilgrim, whose careful eye discerns in the 
outlines of the aqueduct the story of union between the Dionysian world and the Christian god.  
These drafts clearly reveal the mechanism whereby the artist-historian rises above the limits of 
his personal subjectivity to objective insight. This occurs through the narrator’s abandonment of 
the travelogue-like, descriptive, first-person narration in the first three segments for an  
“objective” and “insight”-oriented third-person voice in the last two.   
The focal point of the Pont du Gard texts is the arch. Not only does it represent ancient 
Rome in all its might, it represents the traveler’s insight into the past and the mechanism of this 
insight: the path from sight to insight and an image of Ivanov’s clarity. The pilgrim notices the 
aqueduct from afar. Evoking the tradition of such travelogues as the Italian Journey, he writes:  
From afar I espied the end goal of my promenade and twice rejoiced [because] because 
the sun already hung low and an early winter dusk might overtake my path. Where [in the 
distance] a fluvial valley signified two rows of hills to one side, they turned blue, bridged 
from one edge to the other [by six] about six large and magnificent arches. Peering about, 
the eye locates a long row of open-ended minor arches spanning the platform formed by 
lower archways. Appearing abruptly, this (distinct) (doubtless) impression (and part) of 
Rome, having indelibly marked (its) presence in an (heretofore enslaved) ecclesiastically 
subjugated country, triggers an agitation similar to what one experiences (suddenly 
hearing) in the moment when, unexpectedly, a distant, gaping roar (suddenly issues) 
heralds the presence of a lion. (F1)187  
 																																																								
186 N. V. Kotrelev and L.N. Ivanova, “Viacheslav Ivanov na Poroge Rima: 1892.” in Daniella 
Rizzi and A. Shishkin (eds.), Archivio Italo-Russo III Vjacheslav Ivanov- Testi Inediti Viacheslav 
Ivanov. (Salerno: Europa Orientalis, 2001), 7-25.   
The essay contains excerpts from Viacheslav Ivanov’s drafts, now at the Pushkinksii Dom 
archive IRLI in St. Petersburg.  
187 The document contains 5 fragments in chronological order. I cite them in the text as F1-F5. 
The parenthetic expressions are textual variants crossed out or placed in parenthesis by the 
author 
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The traveler’s subjective impressions and thoughts imbue this description of sublime encounter.  
He is a careful observer, focused on very act of beholding the object of his interest. The arch, a 
Roman architectural invention and an integral structural element of the aqueduct, especially 
invites comparison with the “gaping roar” of a lion as a symbol of the far-reaching might of the 
Roman Empire.   
The fragment continues in a similarly ekphrastic manner, describing a Poussin painting, 
complete with “two flocks of sheep” that “slowly advanced up a rocky slope,” and their 
accompanying “shepherds, draped picturesquely in their striped cloaks.” The passage ends here, 
but the second and third fragments are variations on it, the third being the most complete in its 
detailed description of the pilgrim’s departure at sunset. Variations of the verb “to see” (zavidet’, 
uvidet’, vidia, vsmatrivaias’, obozret’) and references to a “gaze” and to the “eye” occur 
frequently throughout the text. The object of this gaze, the aqueduct, is contemplated first from 
afar, then from a closer vantage point, from within, and finally once again from a distance. The 
fragments begin with “From afar I saw the end goal of my promenade” [“Izdaleka zavidel ia tsel’ 
moei progulki,”] (F1, 2) and continue by emphasizing the effort of looking: “Peering about, the 
eye locates a long row of open-ended minor arches” [“vsmatrivaias’, glaz otkryval skvoznoi riad 
malykh dug”], “coming up to the river I saw, could survey every structure” [“podoidia vplot’ k 
reke ia uvidel, mog obozret’ vse zdanie”] (F2) as well as the phenomenal reality of the object: 
“Appearing abruptly, this distinct doubtless impression of Rome” [“iavliaias’ vnezapno, eta 
iavstvennaia nesomnennaia pechat’ Rima…”] (F1). The plot of these passages concerns the 
relationship of the speaker’s gaze to the aqueduct. At the same time, a sense of mystery and 
unseen presence accompanies the visions. Turning to examine the structure, the pilgrim beholds 
a golden sky through the arches:  
88 	
The sun was setting behind the wreckage, the bright stones grew dark, and in the dark, 
and in the (dark?) carved vaults of the arches a heavenly gold shined (glinted) solemn(ly). 
The arches seemed to enclose a golden field like in Byzantine (churches) cathedrals; the 
imagination could willingly fill them with austere and (solemn?) images similar to 
mosaic countenances. (F3) 
 
Viewing the sunset through the aqueduct’s arches, the speaker is reminded of a Byzantine 
mosaic. Like a sacred Christian artwork at the intersection of nature and the Roman aqueduct, 
the entire scene is once again an ekphrastic description. In the pilgrim’s imagination, figures in 
the arches return his gaze like Byzantine icons. The paragraph is extensive commentary to an 
image.   
In addition to the diction that refers to vision and insists on the presence of what the 
speaker is beholding, there is also a diction of ambiguity and welcomed, evocative 
misperception, of un-clarity.  In the opening paragraph of the first fragment alone the object is 
described by means of such words and phrases as “manifesting” “a distinct impression,” “ 
indelibly marked presence,” apparent,” and “announces its presence” [iavliaias’, iavstvennaia 
pechat’, neizgladimo otmetivshego svoe prisutstvie, iavstvenno, vozveshchaet prisutstvie].  At 
the same time, throughout these first fragments Ivanov avails himself of the diction of 
imagination: “it seemed” [kazalos'], “the imagination could fill” [fantaziia mogla napolniat’].  In 
the concluding paragraph of the third fragment the traveler’s imagination again evokes images 
not present before his eyes:  
The more [...] the gray twilight deepened, shot through with lunar rays, the more 
violently the mistral gusted, the brighter the road seemed, flat like a tablecloth... I often 
erred at the turn, thinking, what’s this archway? The contours level off, but the 
imagination intensifies (word unclear). It seems legions travel this road. (F3) 
 
The Romans appear as imagined legions whose imperial might reached Provence once upon a 
time.  
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 The last two fragments differ markedly from the first three. I quote the fifth, and more 
complete, almost in its entirety:  
Abruptly the contemporary traveler is uniquely amazed by the view of the presenting 
Roman arcade. No lineaments of beauty, no poetry of remembrance could quicken the 
pulse more forcefully: for in these stone vaults there exists a particular sense, a particular 
petrified life as of distant sphinxes bearing (Libyan desert) desert sands. How expressive 
is the clear simplicity of these lines! The tranquil and thus triumphant power of human 
self-esteem never expressed itself more appreciably than in the Roman arch. Solid, easily 
withstanding the weight of millennia, it stands stoutly on two legs and, describing half its 
environs (all leading to a conciliatory whole), all embracing a conciliatory, harmonious 
(all) whole, it resists completing its circular path and only more forcefully insists on its 
immovable stance. Its simplicity and essence seemingly avow that an involuntary 
creation of nature is before us; but to our minds its clear logic returns it to the domain of 
the human spirit. We reckon with its grandeur. We remember its creators, and the 
nearness of Roman genius bewilders us. We imagine […] perceptive people […] The 
builders of these arches (strong-willed and muscled) with broad square heads on powerful 
necks (seemingly of the race of powerful carnivorous beasts, and, strangely, this 
pretension pits its powers of corporeal spirit and will against us, as would the lion of the 
kingly tiger…At a remove of centuries we sense the demoniac charm we, barbarians, 
experienced when colliding with them. They were so forward-looking and reasoned with 




Unlike the first three fragments, this one is written neither in the first-person nor  
the meditative style of a travelogue. In its very first lines it disregards the visual in favor of 
insight: the traveler rejects the sensual, he is impressed not by the beauty of the structure, nor 
what this beauty brings to his mind. Yet the paragraph still comprises a set of images and 
commentary to them, moreover, the images function as illustrations of the author’s concept.   
As in “Clarity” insight is gained by rising above a partial, subjective perspective. This 
abstract speaker explicates the meaning of the ancient monument. In this way insight attains the 
status of a truth independent from the observer whose sharp eye discerns in the depth of time. By 
moving from observation to insight instead of to evocation, Ivanov insists on the presence of the 
invisible and knowledge of its nature. Indeed, diction related to normal human vision gives way 
to diction of clairvoyance and superior, supra-sensual vision. Instead of “I see,” now “we see 
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into” [my prozrevaem].  Gone is the vocabulary of ambiguity, replaced by the vocabulary of 
knowledge. The speaker perceives the secret meaning concealed within the form. In the sharp 
contours of the aqueduct, he perceives the clarity and virility of its creators’ concept. The arch is 
a symbol of the type of reasoning that enabled Roman civilization to come into being and 
resolutely impress itself on history and in space. The “hawk-eyed” [zorkie] Romans have the 
power of foresight—the power to look into the future and build accordingly.  As such, the arch is 
an expression of the “calm and thus victorious power of human self-affirmation” [spokoinaia i, 
sledovatel’no, pobedonosnaia sila chelovecheskogo samoutverzhdeniia]. A particular brand of 
rational clarity is embedded in the very foundation of civilization. But the symbolic weight the 
speaker attributes to the Roman arch surpasses rational foresight. Suggesting a circular 
movement, it is ”all-embracing in its placatory, harmonious, all-encompassing unity” [vse 
obnimaiushchei v primiritel’nom, garmonicheskom (vse)edinstve]. The arch not only endures, it 
reconciles and harmonizes, symbolizing unity and synthesis.  
While claiming insight into the meaning of the structure, the speaker does not specify 
what elements it brings into synthetic union. But the Pont du Gard texts provide substantial 
evidence that between 1891 and 1892 Ivanov was preoccupied with the idea of unifying 
civilization and the divine, the East and the West, paganism and Christianity, Christ and 
Dionysus. The arches of the Pont du Gard also represent one of Ivanov’s favorite narratives: a 
neophyte’s spiritual ascent toward revelation and descent back to his journey’s origin.188 Finally, 
the “revelation” of the Roman aqueduct was Ivanov’s response to Nietzsche’s severing of 
Christianity from pagan antiquity. Indeed, the Romans in these fragments bear a conspicuous 
																																																								
188 The arch as a symbol of ascent and descent was destined to enter Ivanov’s vocabulary. See, 
for example, I. Koretskaia, “Ivanovskaia metafora arki.” Nad stranitsami russkoi poezii i prozy 
nachala veka (Moscow: Radix, 1995), 155-162.  
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resemblance to Nietzsche’s übermensch. The poet portrays them as a “powerful race” that is not 
quite human: work of art, perhaps sculptures with broad square heads atop powerful necks. They 
possess extraordinary willpower and physical strength, unafraid to kill or be killed (F5). In 
fragments 1 and 5 they are compared to great predatory animals: a tiger and a lion. In the second 
fragment the row of the aqueduct’s arches announces the presence of Rome the way “a roar” 
announces the presence of a lion, the open space of the arch evoking his “gaping roar” 
[ziiaiushchee rykanie].    
Ivanov thus depicts the creators of the Pont du Gard as a race of proto-historic, quasi-
mythic creatures, superior to mere mortals, yet decidedly outside the divine.  He envisioned them 
as fallen archaic deities at the very root of civilization. Powerful and charismatic, they are 
Promethean in their mission to civilize, Titanic in their raw, fearsome power. This association 
lends additional proof to several other images present in the text. In Greek mythology the Titans 
maul and devour the child-god Dionysus, who springs back to life from his heart, left 
unconsumed. This renders the image of a Byzantine mosaic (F2) logical in a way beyond any 
association of golden sky with golden mosaic.   
For Ivanov, there are several immediate reasons why Christian imagery could be 
“inscribed” within antiquity. The aqueduct was constructed during the first millennium CE, 
possibly overlapping with the life and death of Christ and the birth of Christianity. Ivanov may 
have thought of Rome and Constantinople as the two main constituents of the Roman Empire.  
He may have visited only some of the Romanesque monuments of Provence, where Nîmes is 
located. But while these are possible sources of this image, Ivanov was more likely attracted by 
the provocative tension between a Roman ruin and a Byzantine mosaic rather than by the natural 
evolution of one civilization into another. The Roman arch as the terrifying lacuna of a 
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predator’s maw invites association with a Byzantine dome insofar as Christ is a hypostasis of 
Dionysus, the resurrecting god of antiquity. Just as the Titans devoured Dionysus, so did the 
Romans consume the world of the Greeks, and Byzantium become a repository of the wisdom of 
antiquity and the pyx whence Christ returned to the world. For the pilgrim, the Roman arch 
showed Christianity to be a reiteration of the same divine principle first articulated in the ancient 
Dionysian mysteries. It thus symbolized profound unity where Nietzsche saw a profound rift.  
In the decade that followed Ivanov’s arrival in Rome, the arch as a symbol of synthetic 
union between historically antagonistic forces reappeared in his poems.  Ivanov’s first collection 
of verse, Pilot Stars was published in 1903, but contained poems written as early as the late 
1880's. Two of these poems, most likely written in the 1890s, once again reflect on the encounter 
between history and the sacred, and Rome’s role in this encounter.  The poems, entitled 
“Coliseum” [“Kolizei”] and “In the Coliseum” [“V Kolizee”] enact Ivanov’s ideas of the arch as 
part of a stage set. However, the founding of civilization and history in the Pont du Gard texts 
takes center stage while the future deity of Christian incarnation looks on, reversing the situation: 
now central is the crucifixion of Christ and the persecution of Christian martyrs as a historical 




How heavy, the booming arch, and murky, 
somber, deep!... 
I enter: the moon silvers the rotting giant.  
Like sunken eyes of the extinct, arcades 
Glance anent. Everything sleeps. A vast 
arena, empty… 
 
And methinks: the ancient race of Nero and 
Locust 
Filled this tender dark…Myriads huddle.  
Kolizei 
 
Kak tiazhkii gulok svod, i mrak ugrom i 
gust!... 
Vkhozhu: luna srebrit istlevshie gromady. 
Kak vpadiny ochei potukhnuvshikh, 
arkady 
Gliadiat okrest. Vse spit. Prostor areny 
pust… 
 
I mnitsia: drevnii rod Neronov i Lokust 
Napolnil chutkii mrak…Tesniatsia 
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Blindly—hawk-eyed, their glances blanket 
me. 
The silent splash, audible: the cry of mute 
mouths… 
 
What with ravenous tremor, as in days of 
bloody orgies,  
Perturbs their high tides under the pale 
moon?  
Where penetrates their gaze? What drives 
their delight?  
 
Whose is the shadow before me in the 
bright arena?  
Do I glance behind, seized with grief and 
horror?  
The cross, visible in the shadows, the 
Crucified on it…189 
 
miriady. 
Nezrimo—zorkie, na mne lezhat ikh 
vzgliady. 
Bezzvuchnyi slyshen plesk, i klik 
bezglasnykh ust… 
 
Chto zhadnym trepetom, kak v dni 
krovavykh orgii, 
Volnuet ikh priliv pod blednoiu lunoi? 
Kuda vperen ikh vzor? Chto dvizhet ikh 
vostorgi?... 
 
Na svetlom poprishche ch'ia ten' peredo 
mnoi?... 
Vzglianu l' nazad, toskoi i uzhasom 
ob'iatyi?... 




Like the Pont du Gard texts, “Coliseum” describes the dark empty space of the building with its 
rows of circular arcades, the invisible presence of the “myriads” dead for centuries, and the arch 
as a threshold to the invisible from where the Dionysian primordial “other” gazes at the 
visitor.190 This “other” is possibly the stars he views through the arches or the pagan spectators 
who once filled the stadium: bodies of history and its mysterious governing spirit.   
The concept of a mysterious unity with a visible rift is once again central. A presumed 
site of mass executions of Christian martyrs, the Coliseum might symbolize a place of 
irreconcilable animosity between old and new religions. Instead, Ivanov envisions a profound 
connection between historical forces in violent conflict with one another. The empty stadium is a 
“bright arena” [svetloe poprishche], where the imagined Roman multitudes witness the spectacle 
of the Crucifixion. The macabre site of “bloody orgies” becomes a cosmic sacrificial altar, and 
the crossroads of two religions, two civilizations and two major historical periods. Poignantly, in 																																																								
189 Ivanov, SS 1:621.   
190 Kotrelev, “Viacheslav Ivanov na poroge Rima: 1892.” 12.  
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Papal Rome the Coliseum was turned into a place of prayer, and for a time a cross really did 
stand on its floor. Ivanov himself even refers to this fact in the commentaries to the poem, 
diligently supporting his idea with historical evidence.191 The mysterious connection between 
Roman civilization and the Christian message once symbolically “witnessed” at the Pont du 
Gard is thus reiterated at the Coliseum.  
A Dionysian theater is once again the subject of “In the Coliseum,” only this time 
historical drama takes second place to the romantic drama between the irreconcilable elements of 
love and sin.192    
In the Coliseum  




Day flamed out wet-coiled, sowing 
Evening fire among the clouds.  
Clouding over, it yawned around 
The Coliseum’s immobile chaos.  
 
Timeless eyes peeped through 
Fate’s elemental dark… Toward night’s 
threshold  
We guided the day of torturous storms  
The avaricious day— 
 
Among the clusters whose fatal eternity  
Was hallowed in sin and blood,— 
Betraying the hopeless spirit  




Great is their love, who love in sin and 
fear 
 Byron  
 
Den' vlazhnokudryi dosiial 
Mezh tuch ogon' vechernii seia. 
Vkrug pomrachalsia, vkrug ziial 
Nedvizhnyi khaos Kolizeia. 
 
Gliadeli iz stikhiinoi t'my 
Sudeb bezvremennye ochi… 
Den' bud' istomnykh k pragu nochi 
Den' alchnyi provozhali my— 
 
Mezh glyb, ch'ia vechnost' rokovaia 
V grekhe sviatilas' i krovi,— 
Dukh beznadezhnyi predavaia 
Prestupnym terniiam liubvi, — 
 
 																																																								
191 Ivanov, SS 1:860. 
192 A. Shishkin mentions that the Coliseum witnessed an important conversation between Ivanov 
and his future wife L. Zinovieva-Annibal.  Both he and Zinovieva-Annibal had to end their 
previous marriages in order to be together, which perhaps explains the biographical side of 
“loving in sin and fear.”  A. Shishkin, “Viacheslav Ivanov i Italiia” in Daniella Rizzi and Andrei 
Shishkin (eds.), Archivio Italo-Russo, Dipartimento di Scienze Filologiche e Storiche (Trento: 
Labirinti, 1997). Ivanov compared the Coliseum to a holy sepulcher (Ivanov, SS 2:396).  
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Like two whirling leaves, resigned,  
To the greedy bondage of liberty,  
Until once again an easy sigh 
Of inclemency will part them. 193 
 
Stesnias', kak dva lista, chto mchit, 
Bezvol'nykh, zhadnyi plen svobody, 
Dokol' ikh slivshei nepogody 
Vnov' legkii vzdokh ne razluchit… 
 
The anachronistic paradox at the center of this poem is the discussion of Romantic love and the 
Dionysian spectacle that frames such love, in explicitly Christian terms. The space sets the stage 
for two lovers who find themselves at the Coliseum at sunset. Dusk as a liminal time, the arena 
as a liminal space and love as a liminal state invite an otherworldly presence permeating time, 
space and heart. Like Dante’s Paolo and Francesca, the lovers enact the drama of love, sin and 
death. But, unlike Dante’s, Ivanov’s speaker indicates that this couple might be redeemed 
through their sin. The Coliseum as a site of martyrdom provides a stage where these sinful lovers 
can find redemption. The epigraph, excerpted from Byron’s drama Heaven and Earth, also 
suggests that there is the possibility of synthesis rather than a stark dichotomy of sin and 
virtue.194 Christianity inscribed within the greater context of the Dionysian cult suddenly yields 
such a possibility. Through the “timeless eyes of fate” there is the sense that the spectacle 
itself—the lovers, the theater and the sky visible through the arches—is but the phenomenal 
expression or incarnation of a transcendent deity. 
In these texts the Roman arch embodies Ivanov’s concept of “clarity” as he formulated it 
in his youth. As a structure, it represents the path whereby a visual experience becomes a 
visionary one and sight as it transforms into in-sight. First, the visionary approaches the object of 
his contemplation and in merging with it loses his subjectivity. The journey of the pilgrim in the 																																																								
193 Ivanov, SS 1:521.   
194 Byron’s Heaven and Earth is written in the genre of a medieval mystery that pertains to the 
dramatic events leading up to the Great Flood. Ivanov chooses a quote that might reference this 
passage from The First Epistle of John 4:18: “There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth 
out fear: because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love.” King James 
Bible Online. 1 John U.S. Congress. Nov. 2007. Web. 15 Dec. 2017.	
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Pont du Gard and from one draft of this text to the next demonstrates a progression from the 
personal to the impersonal. In the Coliseum poems, the speaker remains subjective, but the 
imagery suggests that he is taking part in a spectacle orchestrated by a greater consciousness. 
Unlike a mystical merging with a greater whole, this concerns a cognitive unity, or intellection. 
The arch emblemizes in-sight or the kind of vision that supersedes a subjective point of view, 
one that “sees through” to the reality beyond the visible. Second, the arch emblemizes the 
inextricability of the transcendent and the phenomenal. The transcendent is marked by a 
Byzantine gold mosaic or the black void framed by the arch; the phenomenal is the structure 
itself. Furthermore, the arch as a metonym of Rome is the event horizon of civilization, beyond 
whose limits lies the realm of the transcendent. The “lion’s gaping roar” [(“Pont du Gard,” F1-3) 
and the likewise “gaping” “immobile chaos of the Coliseum”(“In the Coliseum”) echo the same 
idea: myth eternally captures the relationship between the transcendent and the phenomenal.  
Once told, myth reemerges in history or even as history. Roman civilization both incorporates 
and devours Dionysus thus enabling its own resurrection. With respect to classical history, this 
structure embodies the creative potential of the ancient civilization. Standing on the threshold of 
a transcendent reality, themselves its incarnation, the mythic Romans ingeniously “inscribed” it 
as they laid the foundations of civilization. The arch is emblematic of the relationship between 
two forces. But which forces did Ivanov understand these to be?  
 
Transcending Clarity: Ivanov’s Goethe between Rome and Athens  
By the early 1890s Ivanov’s “clarity” was obviously an epistemological concept relating 
to vision as a metaphor for knowledge. “Clarity” in the Pont du Gard texts is an attribute of 
seeing into history and finding in its depths the “form” of its mystical engine. To understand how 
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Ivanov’s thoughts developed with respect to “clarity” and history in the years following his 
arrival in Rome, it is necessary to fast-forward to the year 1912, when in the wake of the “crisis 
of Symbolism,” and certainly with Kuzmin’s “On Beautiful Clarity” in mind, Ivanov wrote an 
essay entitled “Goethe at the Turn of Two Centuries” [“Gete na rubezhe dvukh stoletii”]. In this 
essay on Goethe, Ivanov really expounded on his own epistemological method in relation to his 
craft and history. In this essay it is Greek, not Roman, antiquity that plays the main role, while 
Italy is mentioned in the context of the Renaissance and Goethe’s voyage there. While the 
importance of Goethe to Ivanov cannot be underestimated, here he is secondary to “clarity” and 
its relationship to Italy and Greece.   
In this essay Ivanov first mentions “clarity” in relation to Winckelmann, the great art 
historian who thought the art of the Greeks born of “white visions of shining marbles, as the 
shining dream of Homer’s Olympus.” Following Winckelmann, German neo-humanists formed 
an  
almost religious community, united by their faith in the vivifying power of antiquity… 
and proving that in Europe everything new in art is born out of the combination of the 
Christian and the Hellenic ethos, and that this amalgamation continuously forms and 
transforms the ancestral substratum of the barbaric (Celtic-Germanic-Slavic) soul. 195 
 
This community declares ancient Greece the place of shining Apollonian “clarity” to be the 
origin of civilization. At the same time, Ivanov asserts that Christianity as a retelling of the 
Dionysian myth is a source of great creative power.  
Inspired by Winckelmann and seeking to overcome everything “formless, barbarian and 
Gothic,” Goethe set out for Italy to study, but found his purpose fractured upon his arrival. He 
appeared at once to be interested in everything and nothing in particular. Here Ivanov begins to 
																																																								
195 Ivanov, SS 4:109-157; 120.  
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outline Goethe’s cognitive and creative methods: “clear contemplation in nature and art, […] 
lively temperament, carelessly-joyful sensuality tempered by grace—become Goethe’s slogans at 
this time, shared, he thought, by the marbles that smiled their Olympic smile at him.” Rather than 
focusing narrowly, Goethe simply seeks “clear, objective knowledge, complete mastery over the 
subjective aspects of his soul.” Furthermore,  
Goethe condemned himself to objectivization […] He demanded only one thing from 
himself and sought satisfaction from only one thing: clarity. He wanted his physical and 
spiritual eye to reflect nature clearly. It seemed to him that by studying a mineral he was 
studying himself. He created his own world by seeking to incorporate it within himself, 
emptying out the contents of his subjectivity so as to receive the whole world within his 
soul.196 
 
Once again, equating objective knowledge and “objectivization” of the self, this time Ivanov 
ascribes it to Goethe. Regardless of what the object is, it is the object of knowledge.  
While in Italy, Goethe developed his version of classicism, based not only on his study of 
antiquity but also the Italian Renaissance. In this endeavor he was developing a style that would 
supersede the “formless, barbaric, Gothic” patrimony of his native land. It is no mere accident 
that while in Italy he completed his drama Torquato Tasso. The tormented poet favored by the 
Romantics, Tasso hardly embodies classical Apollonian clarity. Ivanov writes:  
It is easy for him [Goethe], in his present spiritual lucidity, to subdue the anxiety of his 
hero, while the harmony and rhythm of the lines that surrounded him allow him to find 
the most perfect form imbued with transparent calm like the golden ethereal vistas on the 
landscapes of some old southern master colorists.197   
 
Clarity imbues the Goethe’s work, lending it a perfect “Apollonian” form especially when 
madness and imbalance threaten his Olympian calm. Moreover:  
In ‘Tasso’ Goethe tried to depict a genius’s fated proclivity toward madness, which, he 
thought, developed from unspoken, irrational resistance to any figuration, which he, who 																																																								
196 Ibid., 123. 
197 Ibid., 133. 
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sought salvation from Dionysus and all that is immanent within transcendent Apollonian 
form, sensed within himself. 198 
 
A few lines earlier Ivanov writes that while in Italy Goethe turned away from 
Christianity, avoiding Christian religion and Christian aesthetics. Ivanov suggests that Goethe 
feared both Christ and Dionysus and was enthralled by the so-called “clear form” because it 
holds the immanent Dionysian chaos in check. Antiquity and the Italian Renaissance as 
perceived by Goethe and German neo-humanists are themselves such forms, restraining the 
barbarian chaos inherent in all things.   
Discussing the second part of Faust in the conclusion of the essay, Ivanov returns to the 
idea of the transcendent form. He writes of Faust’s love for Helen, who represents antiquity as 
well as an “ideal form”:   
This image, this form, is necessary: for, the immanent within the spirit does not seek to 
expand by means of an obscure union with the immanent in nature; no, it is in love with 
the transcendent, with what the spirit beholds as an objectively given form, and which it 
craves to possess, that is, to merge with its immanent content while retaining its 
transcendent form.199  
 
 
While this rather convoluted sentence references a line of philosophers including Plato, Kant, 
Schelling and Schopenhauer, the point itself is rather simple. Ivanov suggests that both “spirit” 
and “nature” contain immanent Dionysian forces and transcendent Apollonian forms, but only 
through the “other” can the subject obtain what is immanent. Only through Apollo can Dionysus 
obtain Dionysus. Only the object of love and desire— in Faust’s case, Helen, who also reminds 
him of Gretchen—can lead to the source of the “essential.” Only by locating this source can the 
self lose the limitations of subjectivity. And only through a beautiful ideal is this transformation 
possible. In Helen the Earth manifests the “eternal feminine” as an image of itself and as its 																																																								
198 Ibid., 125.  
199 Ibid.. 153. 
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essence. Her visible form is therefore a living image and living soul of a higher realm. The 
Apollonian form is a function of an invisible realm, whence both Apollo and Dionysus spring 
forth, and it is this realm that must be recognized or at the very least sought in the object of one’s 
desire. In light of this, the “beautiful clarity” of the Homeric world, the lucidity of the golden 
vistas depicted by the Renaissance masters, the Roman arch filled with the golden sunset is an 
invitation to a game of hide and seek. The invisible speaks in the language of forms that express 
but do not disclose the invisible. This explains Ivanov’s objection to Benois’ juxtaposition of 
Dionysus and Apollo as spirit and body. According to Ivanov, one cannot exist without the other, 
and yet their interdependence is not symmetrical.  The phenomenal world is only an invitation to 
the Dionysian invisible one.  
Among other things, in this essay Ivanov once again describes an epistemology that 
applies to history in addition to science, art and metaphysics. Indeed, Goethe is not only a poet 
and scientist, he is a historian as well. But, writes Ivanov, unlike “our Pushkin” or his friend 
Schiller, Goethe was not a “historiographer.”  He studied the “chemistry” of history, not its 
“mechanism.” He studied the living forces of its styles and its symbols. As a historian, Goethe 
initially followed Winckelmann, rejoicing in the somewhat hollow “clarity” of antiquity and the 
Renaissance. Their “Gothic,” northern souls— predisposed as they were to formless melancholic 
states or, worse, to Dionysian chaotic madness—unconsciously found in clarity a necessary 
counterpart. But in their enthusiasm at finding such a counterpart, they overlooked the deeper, 
more obscure, meaning of antiquity. Goethe, too, depicted the Italian court in his Torquato Tasso 
as perhaps “too refined,” too clear, and ignored the darker, more violent forces that persisted in 
the Renaissance. Like his immediate predecessors, he wanted to harness an aesthetic “clarity” 
lacking within the northern ethos. Only in the second part of Faust does he capture the 
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relationship between the Dionysian north and the Apollonian south. Presumably, it is here that 
Faust (and perhaps also Goethe himself) surpasses “beautiful clarity” in favor of the “höchsten 
Klarheit” – the total clarity of revelation.200 Ivanov believed that because Faust represented the 
European spirit and its evolution, his love for Helen and his final blindness symbolically surpass 
earthly vision and its remarkable use as an epistemological tool, finally to stand on the threshold 
of revelation. Having traveled to the furthest edge of clarity he crosses into invisible reality. 
In “Goethe at the Turn of Two Centuries,” Goethe engages “clarity” in much the same 
way that Ivanov himself did in the years preceding his 1901-1902 trip to Greece. The major 
difference, of course, is that Ivanov’s “visions” of antiquity included the concept of Dionysus-
Christ as early as 1892, when he arrived at the Pont du Gard. The essay implies that Goethe, too, 
was aware of this aspect of clarity (which apparently Winckelmann overlooked) but avoided it 
until his later years. Ivanov informs his reader that his own position is different. Characterizing 
Goethe’s writing of Torquato Tasso as a “victory” over the Dionysian, he provides his own 
insight into the nature of the Italian Renaissance: 
There were two elements in the Renaissance: the element of fresh, barbarian, chaotic 
verse, peculiar not only to the European north, but perceptible also in the titanic spasms 
of the Italian Michelangelo; and the element of voluptuous southern aestheticism, which 
converted the barbarian into the native tsarevich Paris who abducted Helen of Troy, most 
beautiful of women, immortal, and perhaps only an illusory antique beauty.201 
 																																																								
200 Ivanov quotes this poem from Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years in his “Two Elements in 
Contemporary Symbolism”:  
Wie Natur im Vielgebilde  
Einen Gott nur offenbart, 
So im weiten Kunstgefilde 
Webt ein Sinn der ewigen Art. 
Dièses ist der Sinn der Wahrheit,  
Die sich nur mit Schönem schmückt,  
Und getrost der höchsten Klarheit  
Hellsten Tags entgegenblickt. 
 
201 Ivanov, SS 4:130. 
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In Ivanov’s opinion, the two elements that contributed most to the Renaissance ethos resemble 
the two elements of the Roman ethos, the difference being that now Michelangelo (not the 
ancient Romans) represents the Dionysian element instead of the ancient Romans while ancient 
Greek culture is an Apollonian vision. But while the golden Apollonian vistas depicted by 
Renaissance masters may have temporarily seduced Goethe, the essay’s speaker knows the truth, 
and this knowledge sets him apart from his hero and his own earlier incarnations alike. Ivanov 
recognizes the clear image of joyful antiquity as a mirage. Making the error he attributed to 
Winckelmann and his followers, he “perceives” that Goethe in his later years likewise comes to 
this same conclusion. The writer of Faust blinds his protagonist to indicate that he had seen 
through not only the beautiful form of antiquity but all observable phenomena. Helen symbolizes 
the mirage of the world, even as she is a conduit to the invisible.   
Ivanov’s Goethe closely follows Ivanov’s own progress along the path of “clarity,” the 
important difference being that Ivanov approached Rome “knowing” of the Dionysian within the 
Roman civilization, embedded as it was in his first vision at Nîmes. But he and his hero share 
clarity as a method. Applied to history, it reveals how the secondary image of flawless 
Hellenistic and then Renaissance clarity is a construct: a projection or even a representation of 
this very method. Much like the Roman arch, Helen represents clarity as a vehicle of knowledge, 
embodying antiquity in its “clear” aspect. As a result, she is a “transcendent form”: a conduit to 
the realiora, the greater invisible reality. The visible, therefore, corresponds only partly or not at 
all with what it represents. 
Let us note that while Ivanov regards his own relationship to vision as similar to 
Goethe’s, and while his tone at times seems to suggest a touch of superiority in his understanding 
of its role, in fact the two authors differ greatly on this subject. Ivanov wants to say that in Faust 
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Goethe finally overcomes the idea of sight as knowledge, and yet we know that vision remained 
of supreme importance for Goethe. For Ivanov, vision is something to overcome. In addition to 
the idea that Faust’s Helen is an ideal representation of a concealed aspect of a cultural past and 
an embodiment of a metaphysical concept, he implies that all visible fabric is “transcendent 
form.” This renders the entire visible universe an object of knowledge only when perceived as if 
derived from an invisible reality.  
 
Dionysus against “Clarté” 
The paradox of the unknown visible and the visible unknown informs Ivanov’s work up 
until his late period. This has two important implications: one with respect to time, and the other 
with respect to images of space in his poetry. Ivanov who as a historian had to see into the 
“chemistry” of history—pushing past the visible facts into their secret “substance”—had to travel 
further than Rome. In 1901-1902 Ivanov traveled to Athens to study the archaic Dionysian cults. 
After this trip the visual aspect of his poetry became emblematic, and, to the reader, apparitional.  
  The trip to Athens was not a casual event for Ivanov. A decade of arduous scholarship 
preceded it, along with a tempestuous period in his personal life, the lack of a permanent home, 
and the death of an infant daughter in 1900, followed by a prolonged and difficult illness. In a 
letter to a friend, his wife Lydia Zinovieva-Annibal wrote that on the eve of their departure for 
Greece, Ivanov “broke down and wept loudly, then wept all night, refusing Greece, demanding 
to return home, wanting only renunciation in life. He fears for Vera’s health…” Bogomolov 
comments that while Zinovieva-Annibal attributed Ivanov’s heightened emotional state to the 
recent death of his daughter and his fears for the health of his adopted daughter Vera, the truth is 
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likely deeper.202 His own contemporaneous letter to Grevs reveals the cause of his highly 
emotional state: “Of my internal state I will say only that my infancy (in turning toward the 
Hellenic antiquity and especially the history of religion) is difficult for me: that menacing distant 
vistas unfold before my eyes, that for now I discern ‘nothing but waves.’”203 His state of extreme 
spiritual and nervous agitation was due primarily to an anticipated transformation experience that 
of course exceeded the bounds of scholarly research. He stood on the threshold of initiation. 
Unlike the more meditative state described by the speaker of  “Clarity” or the pilgrim of the Pont 
du Gard travelogue, this was to be a violent disintegration: a kind of Dionysian “death” of the 
self and resurrection to the “utmost” truth.204 Ivanov was setting off toward the vanishing point 
of Western civilization. To travel beyond the known was to travel to a place that set the 
conditions for all that was known while itself remaining elusive. Situated in the context of both 
history and metaphysics, this “unknown” destination necessarily blended fact and fiction. It also 
anticipated the invisible, mystical origin of the “transcendent forms” in Ivanov’s Goethe’s essay.  
Little is known about Ivanov’s life in Greece, but by the time he emerged in 1902, 
Dionysus had strayed into every corner of his experience. The Apollo-Dionysus dichotomy 
effected a drastic change in his attitude toward the concept of clarity, which he now associates 
with Apollo and considers dangerous. In his 1904 essay “Nietzsche and Dionysus” for example 
he attributes Nietzsche’s mental illness to a surrender to Apollo. In the same paragraph he also 
quotes Pushkin, another important follower of Apollonian clarity:  
																																																								
202 N. Bogomolov, “Viacheslav Ivanov mezhdu Rimom i Gretsiei.” Antichnost’ i russkaia 
kul’tura serebrianogo veka (Moscow: Iz-vo Fair, 2008), 57-64, 63. 
203 V. Ivanov, Istoriia i poeziia:perepiska I.M. Grevsa i Viach. Ivanova. 235. 
204 L. Silard writes at length on Ivanov’s thorough knowledge of the orphic cults and on the 
concept of symbolic death and dismemberment as prerequisites for the symbolic resurrection of 
the initiate. Silard, “‘Orfei rasterzannyi’ i nasledie orfizma,” 77.  
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The scholar Nietzsche, “Nietzsche the philologist,” remains the seeker of “knowledge” 
and never ceases to delve into the creations of Greek thinkers and French moralists. He 
should have stuck with tragedy and music. But from his god’s wild paradise his other 
soul beckoned him to an alien, non-Dionysian world; not an orgiastic, pan-humanist soul, 
but a soul in love with the complete clarity of resplendent faces, in the proud incarnate 
perfection of privately conceived ideas. He’s captive to 
 The Delphic idol: a spry face 
 Angry, full of terrible pride, 
Breathing with unearthly force.205 
 
 
Ivanov quotes Pushkin’s poem “From Early Life I Remember School” [“V nachale zhizni shkolu 
pomniu ia”] with its salient references to Italian poetry and neo-classical sculpture. Ivanov uses 
the word vsechelovek [pan-human], famously used by Dostoevsky in his Pushkin speech with 
respect to the poet’s genius. Ivanov reverses expectations by situating both Nietzsche’s madness 
and Pushkin’s poetry within the sphere of the Apollo, and associating vsechelovechestvo [pan-
humanism] with Dionysus. Apollo’s image leads Pushkin’s narrator astray and leads Nietzsche 
into madness. In another 1904 essay On Verlaine and Huysmans, he disparages the “notorious, 
‘French’ (but actually only irresponsible), elegant clarity and simplicity of Anatole France, a 
crowd-pleaser, ergo a reactionary of the art of the word.”206 Here, Apollo isn’t mentioned once: 
only the irresponsibly elegant, clear, and simple writing of Anatole France. Evidently, Ivanov 
considers it offensively superficial to embrace “Apollo,” to write as if standing over the seething 
chaos of “Dionysian” chasms and not once look down. To concern oneself only with the visible 
universe that lends itself to knowledge and where the image and the word may indeed 
correspond in meaning is for Ivanov an abhorrent posture.  
Ivanov’s diaries comment more personally and less harshly on this subject, without the 
intentional obfuscation and highfalutin rhetoric of his essays. For example on August 8, 1909 he 
notes that while listening to a Mozart quartet, “I once again experienced my Mozart mood, once 																																																								
205 Ivanov, SS 1:715-726; 722.   
206 Ivanov, SS 2:562-565.  
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again dreamed of clear joyful lyricism, of life’s joyous visage, obscured in people’s 
consciousness.”207 This joyful visage is the same one that Ivanov will associate with 
Winckelmann’s discoveries in Hellenic art. It is not a false image, but merely one aspect of 
existence. It is worth mentioning that Kuzmin was at the piano when this particular mood 
descended upon Ivanov, and that the 1909 diary entries reference “clarity” and Kuzmin together. 
In the entries dated August 1, 6 and 9, Ivanov associates Kuzmin with the clarity of humanism 
and Mozart as well as “clarity of form,” and a “clear” state of mind; all positive associations. But 
the most revealing statement on this concept dates to Ivanov’s conversation with Georgy 
Chulkov on August 11. Ivanov writes: “I spoke about the demands of time, about the law of 
egocentric self-assertion into history (about individualism as obviated by clear consciousness of 
man’s lower ego).” This statement encapsulates Ivanov’s position on “clarity”—not the 
irresponsible elegance of “French” style, but his own understanding of the term — as a marker of 
an egocentric epistemology and of history as the active field of this egocentric epistemology. He 
sees clarity as something he left behind in Athens. Even the title Transparence (1904), the poetry 
collection that followed Pilot Stars, suggests a seeing through the phenomenal world. Ivanov 
included the poem “Clarity” into this volume. Finally, in “The Precepts of Symbolism” (1910) he 
expresses contempt for the idea of “the word’s adequacy, its sufficiency with respect to the 
demands of reason, the communicability of ‘beautiful clarity’ that could, if it wanted, always 
achieve transparency, if it didn’t prefer to dissemble.”208 Clear apprehension of the world is an 
invitation to look beyond the world.    
																																																								
207 Ibid., 785.  
208 Ivanov, SS 2:593. He writes of Tyutchev’s treatment of the lyric word: “how far this is […] 
from the XVIII century views […] on the word’s adequacy and sufficiency for the mind, and on 
the direct communicability of “beautiful clarity,” which could always be transparent, if it did not 
choose to—dissemble!”  
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Conclusion: The Theater of the Self 
Whatever the intellectual or spiritual nature of Ivanov’s experience in Athens, he became 
convinced of a non-correspondence between the word or image and its meaning, and displaced 
meaning to the realm of the invisible. He arrived at this notion while journeying into the realm of 
the invisible in a different sense. He was, of course, in a specific place—Athens— with specific 
geography and history, but his research, informed as it was by religious aspirations, delved into 
the realm of the hypothetical. Spiritual experience tied to a hypothetical historical reality 
produced what Bely called “the union of mythical science with the scientific origin of the 
imagination.”209 Most problematic in the years following Ivanov’s trip to Greece was his attempt 
to forge a “clear” and “objective” geography for the so-called “invisible” or “unknown” realm of 
clarity, which cannot be clear or objective. The dubious aspects of Ivanov’s scholarship have 
been outlined in Philip Westbroek’s book Dionysus and Dionysian Tragedy and especially in 
Nina Braginskaia’s essay “Tragedy and Ritual in Viacheslav Ivanov.”210 Without dismissing his 
work entirely, both scholars argue that Ivanov made valuable contributions to the study of the 
Dionysian myth, although Braginskaia demonstrates the extent of his factual manipulation and 
the rhetorical maneuvers whereby he achieved it.211 
If, as Braginskaia points out, Ivanov filled the historical gaps in his scholarship with 
fictions, the opposite took place in his poetry: the unknown—the fictional—disappeared, as if 
dragged into the light of reality and consumed by knowledge. His landscapes are situated entirely 
																																																								
209 Quoted from Braginskaia, ““Tragediia i ritual,” 325. 
210 See Philip Westbroek’s Dionysus and Dionysian Tragedy paints a vivid picture of Ivanov as a 
scholar, contextualizes his ideas, and offers a convincing critique, concluding that although 
Ivanov was a philologist, he should be viewed primarily as a religious philosopher who as a 
scholar was guided by his religious intuition (273). See also Braginskaia, ““Tragediia i ritual,” 
294-329.  
211 Braginskaia, ““Tragediia i ritual,” 302. 
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within the realm of the known, traversed everywhere by the human intellect. As a result, 
immediate experience in its own right is entirely absent. This mechanism is evident already in 
Ivanov’s Pont du Gard texts, where the text persists as an ekphrastic exercise: the landscape is 
reminiscent of a French classical painting, the arch is a Byzantine mosaic. “Illuminating” the 
“unknown” or the “invisible” corner of the text gives the sense that Ivanov’s textual visual 
sphere is mediated by a previous incarnation of the object he contemplates. The cultural and 
historic artifacts supplant the unknown rather than signify it. Both Pilot Stars and Transparency 
are filled with explicitly or implicitly ekphrastic texts, but even in the poems that are not the 
author creates a space for his knowledge.  
This can be gleaned from the Coliseum poems, which appear to function as the model of 
Nietzsche’s visionary artist who is like “that uncanny image of a fairytale which can turn its eyes 
around and look at itself” so as to be “at one and the same time subject and object, 
simultaneously poet, actor, and spectator.” In these poems the pilgrim finds himself in the vortex 
of mysterious Dionysian activity. The Coliseum is a disquieting setting, shot through with the 
visions of what peers and asserts itself through the gaping arches, but is not actually there. 
Ivanov transforms the dark arches into empty sockets [vpadiny ochei potukhshikh] that watch 
him, the speaker. In one poem he imagines these arches are “fate’s timeless eyes/ [that] watched 
from the spontaneous dark” [gliadeli iz stikhiinoi t'my/ sudeb bezvremennye ochi] and the 
multitudes of eyes that watch closely while being themselves invisible (“invisibly watchful” 
[nezrimo-zorkie]). The idea is that those who are present in spite of their absence administer the 
fate of the phenomenal—consuming it like the lion in the Pont du Gard texts. But ultimately, the 
Coliseum is a theater where the speaker plays all the parts. Moreover, while the arena represents 
a kind of Dionysian centrifuge, it is also an object of study like the Pont du Gard. The historical 
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precedent Ivanov’s footnotes point out, grounds these poems in reality, with knowledge once 
again the protagonist of these texts. Thus Ivanov’s “mark of silence” consistently refers the 
reader either to his own “knowledge” or to cultural precedents of knowledge, being, in the end, a 
mark of endless loquaciousness. 
The reader of Ivanov’s work will inevitably experience knowledge as tyranny. In absentia 
the unknown transforms the visual universe of his poems into clustered emblems of specific 
meaning. It is difficult to perceive Ivanov’s ancient Romans, described as sculptural Nietzschean 
“supermen” complete with their “broad square heads on powerful necks” [“chetyrekhugolnymi 
shirokimi golovami na moguchikh vyiakh”] as anything but such an emblem, indicating what 
Ivanov “knows” of them (F4,5).It is this aspect of Ivanov’s writing that Averintsev deemed his 
“clarity.” The Pont du Gard texts offer a fascinating example of how visual ambiguity can 
enliven an image. In the third fragment, where the road is difficult to discern in the twilight, the 
speaker envisions the “legions” of Romans that once upon a time passed through this region. He 
observes: “The contours are smoothed away, and the imagination enhances […] It seems that 
legions pass this way.” This vivid image is poised on the threshold of unknowing and obscurity.   
Ivanov’s diary entry on his 8 August, 1909, conversation with Chulkov conveys the idea 
that “clarity” is a measure of an individual’s conscious capacity to know, and that this 
consciousness realizes itself and its knowledge within the parameters of history. A brief 
comment in the Pont du Gard texts prefigures this idea with an illuminating twist. The speaker 
mentions that the aqueduct is beautiful enough to be a natural marvel, but that the clarity and 
practicality of its design sets it apart from nature (F5). “Clarity” is a specifically intellectual 
quality, pertaining to conscious reason, meaning that nature falls outside its domain. The first 
comment is, if not dismissive of clarity, then at least condescending: Ivanov has already 
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overcome the individual egocentric mind. The comment in one of the Pont du Gard fragments 
admires those who stood at the threshold of civilization, and purposefully divided it from nature. 
The Pont du Gard pilgrim was still a scholar of history when by 1909 Ivanov began to create a 
language that would if not halt history, then exist outside its flow. This emblematic vocabulary 
was meant to function as a tableau of fixed, unchanging knowledge beyond any specific event or 
subjective perspective.212 The crisp emblematic clarity of Ivanov’s symbolism has a strange 
effect: as a receptacle of knowledge, it occupies a de-contextualized and idiosyncratic space that 
renders his knowledge obscure and his landscapes uninhabitable.   
While Ivanov’s attitude toward history changed with time, nature remained consistently 
outside the purview of history and thus the domain of  “clarity.” Indeed, all nature, including the 
human body, remains entirely outside the scope of Ivanov’s interest. In the poet’s writings from 
the 1890s to the 1910s, a genuine “other” reveals itself in this absence. While the poet earnestly 
attempted to overthrow the idea of correspondence between objects and their function or words 
and images and their meanings, he was never able to overcome the great mirage of the 
nineteenth-century scholarship: that of objective knowledge.  Moreover, he attempted to recover 
and express such knowledge by means of poetry.   
Could the role of clarity in poetry diverge from the one Ivanov ascribed it? Could art 
communicate knowledge by means radically different from Ivanov’s vision? Could the body as a 
perceiving part of nature that resists abstraction conceive of clarity in ways that undermine the 
idea of objective knowledge? This type of clarity is not antithetical to obscurity and ambiguity 
but reliant on it. “Beauty” [“Krasota”], the opening poem of Pilot Stars, contains a fascinating 																																																								
212 In “On the History of Russian Classicism,” Pumpianskii observes that the emblem’s function 
is “deeply a-historical.” It preempts the event, understood as a basic “unit” of history, and 
attempts to solve the “problem” of the future by means of allegory. Pumpianskii, “K Istorii 
russkogo klassitsizma,” 156. 
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reference to the possibility of such an alternate clarity. The speaker of the poem does not, 
however, acknowledge this possibility. He describes a mystical initiation in the form of an 
allegorical dialogue with Beauty set in the mountains of Umbria, Italy, the country of Ivanov’s 
poetic “awakening.” In a move that is typical of Ivanov, he situates his speaker in two locations 
at once: on the mountainous horizon, in the depth of the atmospheric perspective, and on the 
reader’s plane: “I see you, divine depths, blued crystal of the Umbrian hills! Ah! There gods 
justified my dreams:/There it woke up a traveler.” The rest of the poem describes the initiation 
through dialogue with a mysterious woman in the Umbian mountains. She tells the speaker that 
“Whoever sees my face/sees forever” [“kto moi lik uzrel/tot navek prozrel”] receives the gift of a 
superior vision—which she proceeds to bestow on him. The speaker now has new vision through 
or by means of her: “Traveler, henceforth you’ll see through me” [“Putnik, zret’ otnyne budesh’ 
mnoi”]. The poem’s familiar vocabulary: “distances” [“dali”], “dream” [“son”], “in reality” 
[“v”iave”], especially those verbs relating to vision: “to see” [“zret’”], “to behold” [“uzret’”], “to 
see the light” [“prozret’”], relate it in theme to “Clarity.” The poem is an allegorical 
representation of Ivanov’s “objective subject” who overcomes limited perspective with a 
superior “clear” or maybe even “transparent” vision. The speaker’s gaze has traversed the 
landscape of the poem in every direction. Looking toward the blue mountains on the horizon he 
sees himself receiving insight on their slopes. Once again, he recognizes everything he sees and, 
not surprisingly, compares this zone of transformation to crystal.  
The fascination of this poem pertains precisely to these blue mountains on the horizon, 
the place of the speaker’s revelation. This makes intuitive sense. It is not by chance that in much 
later times Osip Mandelshtam would refer to Italy’s “iasneiushchie” hills, albeit in Tuscany, not 
Umbria. Both Mandelshtam and Ivanov refer to a work of art rather than an actual landscape, yet 
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be it actual or representative, this distant space is the vaguest, the least clear—the least accessible 
to the intellect. It is for this reason that Ivanov claims this space as one for receiving knowledge.  
Could it be, however, that this luminous un-clarity is a necessary condition of poetic reason and 
that as such it must forever remain illusive? Mandelshtam, in any case, refrains from pursuing 







































The Clear Glass: Mikhail Kuzmin against St. Paul 
 
 “Поэзии живой и ясной…” 
           А. Пушкин 
Clarity as a Ritual 
On the cusp of the twentieth century, Mikhail Kuzmin (1872-1936), already an 
accomplished musician and aspiring writer, wears the dress of an Old Believer and pursues a 
strict religious way of life. Between 1904 and 1906 he will enter the salons of the World of Art, 
publish his novella Wings, and gain both fame and notoriety in literary circles. He will become a 
regular presence in the bohemian gatherings at Ivanov’s Tower, and even live there for a period 
of time. He will scandalize some with his undisguised and unrepentant homosexuality, and 
charm many with his talent, wit, and general brilliance. But in 1901, still far from the literary 
arena, Kuzmin writes a long letter to a longtime friend, aristocrat, socialist and fellow 
homosexual Grigory Chicherin, in which he passionately defends his unprogressive, religious 
lifestyle. Chicherin will eventually become a revolutionary with connections to Lenin and 
Trotsky, and have a brilliant career as a Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Communist 
Party. His letters are not dated, and some might be lost. It is therefore difficult to establish the 
specific letter that inspired Kuzmin’s response, but the general sense of his argument may be 
gleaned from two letters quoted at length by Nikolai Bogomolov and John Malmstad. They are 
filled with historically-specific, dated vocabulary, and therefore are not always easy to 
understand, but it is clear that as he outlines a vision of imminent social and artistic 
transformation, he presents it in terms of binary oppositions, contrasting two types of creator: the 
one who lives for the present, and “l’homme moderne,” a visionary who creates for the future. 
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The former is a “native” [“urozhenets”] and authentic [“pochvennyi”], the latter is “alien” but 
“naturalized” [“naturalizovannyi”]. He categorizes Kuzmin as having previously been the 
“native,” and now the visionary “homme moderne.” Either he implies that in this context 
Kuzmin’s affiliation with the Old Believers is a reactionary gesture expressive of nostalgia for 
the status of a “native,” or directly attacks him for it in another letter.213 In his response, the 
twenty-nine-year-old Kuzmin articulates a personal philosophy that will last him well beyond his 
days as an Old Believer. Since the letter too long to be quoted here in full, I reference only the 
concepts directly relevant to my topic. Kuzmin writes: 
I have only the unchanged Church that has come down to our time, historically 
determined, determining the rituals and even everyday life [...]. Once something is 
known, of course, it can’t be un-known, but one’s attitude toward it changes, and often 
what is known is rejected as falsehood. [...] Innocence does not return, but it is possible to 
return to a state in which one may not be innocent, but penitent and free from sin. And 
besides, only physical chastity, virginity does not return, but isn’t Mary of Egypt more 
chaste than many virgins? [...] And later adhesions can be washed away; just as one can 
discover old frescoes beneath plaster, one can find an ancient nature beneath the most 
modern passions. [...] I say: “Glory to you, Lord!” I was an homme moderne and I 
became one because everyone alive is moderne.  I am not making a broken shard whole, 
but cleaning the dirt from the old glass to make clear what has heretofore been obscure. 
[...] And belonging to the nineteenth century is only a temporary circumstance, nothing 
more. [...] You say “impossible” about what is, and you say that it’s fictitious. [...] Isn’t 
that sacrificing known reality to a fictitious and harmonious theory? [...] But the very 
harmony of the theory and its syllogisms leads one to suspect their incompatibility with 
reality, where everything is clear and confused, simple and contradictory, and can hardly 
be subject to systematization. And isn’t this literariness necessary? [...]214 
 
Kuzmin rejects Chicherin’s linear vision of history, along with his complex system of binary 
definitions. He explains that the Old Believers appeal to him because their ancient church has 
resisted reform and remains unchanged [“neizmennaia”]. As he insists on the concept of his 
return to wholeness, he also emphasizes the fact that it is never truly lost, only obscured 
temporarily. A change in one’s relationship to the knowledge that constitutes the fall from grace 																																																								
213 Nikolai Bogomolov and John Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin: iskusstvo, zhizn’, epokha (St. 
Petersburg: Vita Nova, 2007), 89-91. 
214Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 92-95.  
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can overturn the fall, the subsequent expulsion from Eden, and emergence of historical time, and 
restore one to the state of innocence: “Once it’s been known—it is, of course, known, but the 
relationship to the known changes.”[“raz poznano—est’ poznano, konechno, no izmeniaetsia 
otnoshenie k poznannomu.”] Kuzmin conveys this concept polemicizing with St. Paul’s 
Corinthians 1:13: “Not to piece the shattered glass together again, but to clean the dirt off of it, 
so as to see its hitherto invisible transparency.”[“Ne razbityi kusok sdelaiu tsel’nym, a so starogo 
stekla smoiu griaz’, chtoby ono bylo prozrachno, ne vidnoe do sei pory.”] In the Epistle Paul 
famously contrasts the obscurity of “now” with the direct grasp of the truth “then,” in the 
afterlife. He believes that the soul does not attain the clarity once squandered by Adam until after 
death.215 Kuzmin associates Chicherin’s dogmatic approach with St. Paul’s, and suggests that 
there is a kind of vision that sees no distinction between “now” and “then,” enigma and “face to 
face,” as well as Chicherin’s “native” and “alien.” To attain it is “to clean the dirt from the old 
glass,” and to expose the original fresco, concealed beneath the layers of more recent paintings.  
  Although Kuzmin questions the temporal distinction between “now” to “then,” he 
appears to privilege the past by joining an obviously and emphatically anachronistic religious 
group. The Old Believers lived throughout the region where Kuzmin spent his childhood, in and 
around Saratov and further along the Volga. Beyond issues relating to personal origin there is 
also the question of the sect representing “original” Christianity, certainly in Russia. In a letter 
dating to 1898 Kuzmin describes his dislike of the Russian Orthodox Church specifically 
																																																								
215 In the famous passage from The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul writes: “For now we 
see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face.” King James Bible Online. The First Epistle to 
the Corinthians. U.S. Congress. Nov. 2007. Web. 20 Aug. 2017. 
Toward the end of the passage Kuzmin references Paul directly: “But truth, as divine revelation, 
true faith and Orthodox life and practices are one and the same [...] Paul did not convert in order 
to serve science...” Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 95. 
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because of its “universality”: “Faith should be a small bark of salvation for the few […] I am 
attracted to Christianity as it was only in the first centuries, not later, when it surged like the sea 
[…] In the beginning it was but a gathering of sects […]”216 Kuzmin claims to be attracted by the 
specific character and humane, personable scale of the group, associating individuality and 
uniqueness with a certain parochialism. His approach to the question of origin and the original as 
something located in the past is to realize it in the immediate present. In joining the Old 
Believers, he flouts time as a condition, but experiences it in its creative capacity. This action 
defines ritual, which according to Schamma Schahadat, “copies the original action (for example, 
creation), and repeats it over and over as though it were happening for the first time.” Schahadat 
continues: “Ritual removes the distinction between copy and original, between the creator and 
the usurper of creation. The participant of a ritual acts as though he is the creator, though in fact 
… he repeats the action of another as though performing it for the first time … Unlike a theater 
actor, the participant of a ritual strives to obliterate the distance between copy and original and 
attain the presence of the original within the copy.”217 Motivated by genuine religious feeling, 
Kuzmin’s affiliation with the Old Believers was also a symbolic gesture that signified the 
abiding presence of the “original” Edenic moment. The religious sect served the function of a 
prototype—an original “text” that Kuzmin introduced into the present moment not only for its 
own sake, because he actually took part in religious ritual at this time, but in order to situate two 
distinctly different “eras”—“now” and “then”— next to each other. This action adds a significant 
aspect to the “ritual” as the purpose becomes not only to experience the original instance, but to 
remove time as a condition, and expose the original as inherent in every moment.  
																																																								
216 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 80.  
217 Schamma Schahadat, Iskusstvo zhizni: zhizn’ kak predmet esteticheskogo otnosheniia v 
russkoi kul’ture XVI-XX vekov (Moscow: NLO, 2017), 9.  
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 Although Kuzmin’s first significant works, Wings and the Alexandrian Songs, date to 
1904-1905, while his first meeting with Viacheslav Ivanov occurs in 1906, it is worth noting that 
during this earlier period, his life bears some resemblance to the Symbolist zhiznetvorchestvo—a 
composite of the Russian words “life” or “zhizn',” and “creative work” or “tvorchestvo.” An 
important aspect of the Symbolist philosophy, this concept signified the effort to reform life 
through art as a spiritual practice. Since the Old Believers approached daily life as a kind of 
religious ritual, merging the religious with the aesthetic, it is possible to view Kuzmin’s stay with 
them as a variant of zhiznetvorchestvo.218 But the letter to Chicherin evidences some essential 
differences between the Symbolists’ and his thought.  
 First, Kuzmin rejects a priori the universalist ambition and social drive of the Symbolists. 
Strictly personal reasons, rather than a lofty social mission, motivate his religious pursuit. 
Second, unlike the Symbolists, Kuzmin preferences space and spatial thinking. Rather than defer 
the “original” into the past, or project it into the future, he introduces the idea of “origin” and 
consequently the “original” into the present. Rather than conceptualize space in terms of time, he 
conceptualized time in terms of space, abolishing it as a condition and simply inhabiting an 
image of an uncorrupted age.219 Aptly, in the letter to Chicherin, Kuzmin interprets the idea of 
return to Edenic innocence by means of a spatial metaphor. Clear glass or an original fresco upon 
a wall is a trope that represents the clarity that St. Paul refuses to grant the soul in this life. These 
images signify a kind of relationship to knowledge that restores the subject to Eden.  
 Ritual aestheticizes life for a religious purpose, yet maintains a strict distinction between 
itself and art as a worldly pursuit. Unlike the Symbolists, who tried to merge art and religion, 																																																								
218 Wachtel, Russian Symbolism, 144-145. 
219 I use the word “image” purposefully. Kuzmin’s letter emphasizes the aesthetic appeal of the 
Old Believer lifestyle. The sect frowned upon art, but for him its “byt'” clearly represented a kind 
of “total” art form, and an ancient one at that.    
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Kuzmin as a young man was conflicted about his need for both. In the same letter to Chicherin 
the poet expresses his discomfort with his inability to stop writing: “For now everything is as 
before. I am writing, I think it an evil, and superfluous, but I am writing […]”220 During this 
period Kuzmin struggles not only writing, but also with “desires of the flesh,” and wishes to 
transcend them.221  
 In a matter of just a few years, he will definitively change his mind about both. In 1913, 
presenting his lover, Iuri Iurkun, with a photo of himself as a young man in an Old Believer 
outfit, he writes: “How I was ten years ago, and how I do not intend to be again.”222 But in fact 
he rearranges the variables of the same equation: the worldly desires to write and love absorb the 
qualities and functions of a ritual. A poem from a later cycle, “A Voyage in Italy” [“Puteshestvie 
v Italii”], exemplifies this idea.223 In “A Visit to Assisi” the poet describes a visit to this town 
with its famous Basilica of St. Francis. Kuzmin likely visited it in real life when traveling 
through Italy in 1897, while alone, though “A Voyage in Italy” describes a journey à deux. 
Although Franciscan poetry and religious philosophy were an early and important influence on 
his writing, the significance of the basilica with its famous cycle of frescoes dedicated to the life 
of St. Francis, is only one of the elements in the poem.224 Kuzmin deliberately structures it as a 
list of equally intimate details, so that in the first stanza the sheets on the bed in the hotel are 
emphasized just as much as the “shrine” [“sviatynia”] at the top of the hill: “The air is fresh after 
																																																								
220 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 96.  
221 Ibid., 79. 
222 Ibid., 116.  
According to his biography, Kuzmin shaves his beard and dons secular clothing in August of 
1906. (Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 129).  But in his 1905 diary Kuzmin 
mentions September 16th as the day it happened. M. Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1905-1907. (St. 
Petersburg: Iz-vo Ivana Limbakha, 2000), 43.  
223 Kuzmin, “Poezdka v Assizi,” SS 2:56-57. 
224 Shmakov, “Blok i Kuzmin,” 311-364; 352. 
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/ The exhausting bed sheets . . . / The joyful donkey will take us / To the high shrine.” A donkey, 
chirping birds, a conversation in the village, peeling paint on a fence are observed, named, and 
left behind. Such nonchalance is, of course, deceptive: the trip to the basilica ends when at the 
end of the day the couple returns to the room mentioned in the first stanza: “At home, sweet and 
happy / We lie down and turn off the light / Having completed our pious / And amorous rite.” 
[“Doma sladko i schastlivo/ Liazhem i potushim svet/ Vypolniv blagochestivyi/ I liubovnyi nash 
obet.”] The author deliberately situates the “pious rite,” or even “sacrament” [obet], of 
lovemaking in the same context as St. Francis’ basilica, the sun, the birds, etc.  
 One of the lines in the poem hints at the fact that it may be based on an illustration, a 
painting, or a memory that is as vivid as a two-dimensional image. When the narrator describes 
the vista of Assisi as both “shallow” and “deep” [“gorod melok i glubok”], he could refer to a 
vista that appears flat from afar, or, conversely, to an image that appears three-dimensional, but 
that is painted on a flat surface. The walls with the fresco depictions of the life of St. Francis in 
the basilica in Assisi are an example of the idea of surface as the substratum that lends 
everything an equally sacred significance. Kuzmin resorts to this image to convey that love and 
writing yield clarity as the kind of vision that recognizes every instant as a religious rite.  
 Once Kuzmin embraces his calling to be a writer and changes the garb of an Old Believer 
for secular dress, his writing becomes the ritual space, synonymous with clarity. Two early 
texts—the novella Wings and a short autobiography, ironically titled “Histoire édifiante de mes 
commencements”—reveal that the ritual transformation of a “copy” into an original in its own 
right is as much a formal device as it is a part of the plot. Since the novella contains many 
autobiographical facts, while the “Histoire” is obviously autobiographical, these texts accomplish 
more than stage the “ritual” within the plot and as a formal device. The autobiography implies 
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the author’s participation in the ritual, while in the novella the protagonist’s experience of 
attaining clarity presumably echoes the views of the author.225 An examination of both these 
texts reveals Kuzmin’s approach to the problem of clarity.   
In 1906 Viacheslav Ivanov asked Kuzmin to write an autobiography. Kuzmin agreed: in 
the summer of 1906 he wrote “Histoire édifiante de mes commencements” as an introduction to 
the diary he had begun in 1905.226 The emotionally restrained, almost detached tone of the 
autobiography and the swift pace with which the narrator recounts his story contrasts with the 
spirited, openly emotional tone of the letter to Chicherin. The narrative that claims to be a history 
of the narrator’s beginnings is in fact an account of physical and psychological discomfort. It 
begins with the memory of the narrator’s first serious illness, and proceeds to tell the story of 
incestuous advances from his older brother, his father’s illness and death, the narrator’s suicide 
attempt, an intense, and extremely significant romantic relationship, an important voyage 
together with his lover followed by his sudden and untimely death, and an ensuing profound 
psychological crisis. The final event in this unfinished narrative is the mother’s sickness and 
death.  
While the voice that recounts the autobiography is not indifferent to what appears to be a 
summary of events— it references emotions and some impressions left by certain memories—the 
narrator observes a certain distance from his younger self and his ordeals. For example, in a 
passage that describes a pivotal moment in the narrator’s life, Kuzmin writes:   
																																																								
225 The autobiographical aspect of Wings was first noted by Chicherin, who studied with Kuzmin 
when the two were the age of Vanya Smurov, the protagonist of the novella. Chicherin and 
Kuzmin grew up in the same circles and knew many of the same people. Chicherin recognized 
their portraits in the novella (Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 159). Bogomolov and 
Malmstad write at length on the connections between the novella and the biography of its author 
in the first two chapters of their biography.  
226 Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1905-1907, 267-273, 496.  
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In 1893, I met a man, with whom I fell very much in love and ties with whom promised 
to endure. He was about four years older and an officer in the cavalry <…> It was very 
hard to spend enough time with him, to conceal where we met, etc., but it was one of the 
happiest periods of my life, I wrote a lot of music, inspired by Massenet, Delib and Bizet. 
It was an enchanting time, especially because I found a new group of merry friends […] 
My mother did not especially approve of my lifestyle; oddly, at this time I tried to 
commit suicide by poisoning. I do not understand what guided my actions, perhaps I 
hoped to be saved.227 
 
Kuzmin provides a concise account of the suicide attempt and continues: “In the morning  
mother came. I stayed a while longer, was discharged but forbidden to play music for a few days, 
and left the conservatory. My love doubled; I confessed everything to mother…”228 The text 
almost flaunts its pseudo-superficiality, openly refusing to interpret what only the narrator could 
interpret: “I don’t know what motivated me… perhaps I hoped….” Kuzmin articulates his 
hesitance to indulge in exegesis, purposely exaggerating the text’s mirror-like, or “glass-like” 
nature. The paradoxical role of the concept of “surface,” fortuitously associated with the notion 
of superficiality in English as well as in Russian, comes to the fore.229 In the poet’s letter to 
Chicherin the surface—as glass or the wall upon which a fresco is painted— represents clarity as 
buried beneath layers of lesser things. According to this image, what is “surface” is also the most 
profound: Kuzmin’s ostensible resistance to interpretation, the faux superficiality that strikes an 
innocent reader who might expect “more” from his diaries, is his “clarity” in action.230 
Immediately following the description of his suicide attempt Kuzmin elaborates on his first 
serious relationship with the man known only as “Count Georges.”  
																																																								
227 Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1905-1907, 270.  
228 Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1905-1907, 271. 
229 The OED defines “superficial” as “located on the surface, consisting of or measured in two 
dimensions, etc.”  “superficial, adj. and n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2017. 
Web. 21 August 2017.  
230 I refer to a specific encounter with a reader, sorely disappointed by Kuzmin’s diaries and their 
ostensible lack of substance. 
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In spring Count Georges and I went to Egypt. We traveled through Constantinople, 
Athens, Smyrna, Alexandria, Cairo, Memphis. It was a magical journey; collage for the 
first time, an enchanting and improbable vision. On the way home he had to go through 
Vienna to visit his aunt, while I returned alone. In Vienna my friend died from heart 
disease, and I tried to forget myself in strenuous studies.231  
 
 
It is possible to compare this record of the journey taken with Count Georges with a letter to 
Chicherin written by Kuzmin in 1895 during the trip. He writes from Egypt, “I don’t know how 
to describe to you Constantinople, Asia Minor, Greece, Alexandria, Cairo, the pyramids, the 
Nile, and Memphis. I am madly, absolutely intoxicated [...] I can’t write, so many impressions 
[...] Really, I can’t write.”232 The sites seen, the company kept, the age—they were twenty-three 
and twenty-seven respectively—and the tragic ending of the voyage would have made this 
voyage a milestone for Kuzmin. The passage from the “Histoire” reveals the deliberate, almost 
mannered refusal to use text for the purpose of disclosing the self. No self-indulgence slips 
through, no one aspect of this narrative dominates: the voice does not prevail over the events, the 
events likewise do not overwhelm the voice, apparently speaking for themselves. The text 
appears as a list of events that have sped by without any effort of the narrator to hold on to one or 
another. Or rather, extending Kuzmin’s metaphor from the letter to Chicherin, the text presents 
itself as a surface over which these events glide.  
The narration of the “Histoire” as a story of the narrator’s “beginnings” or “origins” does 
not explain the origin of the voice that narrates. The narrator and the narrative appear to a certain 																																																								
231 Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1905-1907, 271. 
232 From a letter to Chicherin, dated May 17, 1895. Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 
53-54.  
Lada Panova compares another traveler, A. Eliseev’s, record of his visit to Alexandria. Where 
Kuzmin is completely overwhelmed with impressions, Eliseev is disappointed by the city’s 
dearth of remaining monuments and repelled by a “fanatical” dervish. He came there seeking 
evidence of the ancient Greek civilization, whereas Kuzmin appreciated the syncretic, layered 
complexity of the contemporary city. Lada Panova, “‘Aleksandriiskie pesni’ Mikhaila Kuzmina: 
genezis uspekha.” Voprosy literatury (November-December 2006): 226- 249, 242-3. 
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degree independent from each other: there is a distance between them. Adding to the question of 
the relationship between the narrator and his story is the issue of the text’s veracity: Bogomolov 
and Malmstad observe that its very first fact is a falsehood. Kuzmin changes his date of birth, 
claiming to have been born in 1875, rather than in 1872.233 They also note that in some sections, 
especially pertaining to the years spent with the Old Believer community, the text appears to 
withhold information.234 It is impossible to know what, if anything, Kuzmin leaves out, but it is 
clear that purposeful misleading or fictionalizing of the self is not the author’s goal. The 
“Histoire” itself describes the effects of duplicity on the protagonist, who attempts suicide 
following a lengthy period of concealment of his identity from his family. But writing a 
confessional documentary account of his life is likewise not the purpose of the narrative. As he 
writes a history that purposely reminds the reader of its flawed, subjective nature—that explicitly 
does not know what it should know, that refuses to plumb the protagonist’s psychology, 
frivolously changes his date of birth by three years, and subtly avoids certain topics— he 
presents the text (with its narrator) and his freedom from it (as well as the narrator) at the same 
time. The author and his story seem ready to leave each other at every point of the narration, and 
in fact, the narrative is perhaps purposely left without a conclusion. The distance between the 
author, his narrator and his narrator’s character, who in this case is his own younger self, is a 
crucial part of Kuzmin’s narrative. 
 This distance signals a change in the narrator’s relationship to knowledge, namely, a 
freedom from it. Since the origin of the voice that recounts the “Histoire” appears to be 
independent from the origin that it describes, the self-portrait that Kuzmin creates in the text 
obtains an independent existence—a life of its own. Rather than mimicry, this is mimesis as the 																																																								
233 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 17. 
234 Ibid., 84. 
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instrument of difference. It is also clarity in action as a technique, and, one may speculate, 
something of a spiritual exercise—a ritual of changing one’s relationship to knowledge.  
 
The Novella “Wings” as a Fictional Account of the Genesis of Clarity 
 In order to understand Kuzmin’s approach to his personal history in the autobiography 
but also in his diaries, one has to look to his fiction, namely, the novella Wings. In this text 
Kuzmin tells a different history, one that pertains to the origin of his persona as a writer. The 
short philosophical Bildungsroman was considered scandalous at the time of its publication 
because of the homosexual relationship between a teenage boy and an older man at the center of 
the story.235 Wings’ unapologetic, celebratory approach to the topic of homosexual love caused 
critics to launch accusations of pornography against the author. Today it is difficult to understand 
why. Although there is a suggestive scene in a St. Petersburg bathhouse, the central relationship 
in the book is entirely platonic. Vanya Smurov, the protagonist of Wings, enters adulthood as he 
heals the divide between spirit and the body that plagued Kuzmin as a young man. The body 
represents the soul as it awakens through the erotic—in relationship with the other— to embody 
the artist’s voice. Whereas in the “Histoire” the body is represented as a constant source of 
discomfort, in the novella it is whole, young, and free of pain. 
The novella appeared in print in 1906, in the November issue of the Symbolist 
publication Scales, though Kuzmin read it to friends already in 1905.236 Gennady Shmakov 
																																																								
235 John Malmstad provides a thorough analysis of the novel’s reception in his “Bathhouses, 
Hustlers, and a Sex Club: The Reception of Mikhail Kuzmin’s Wings.”Journal of the History of 
Sexuality 9 1/ 2 (2000): 85-104. Zinaida Gippius was one of the most outspoken critics, as was 
Andrei Bely.  
236 Shmakov, “Blok i Kuzmin,” 351.  
Kuzmin read Wings to his friends in 1905. His journal entry from October 13, 1905, for example, 
contains the reference to Somov who is so delighted with the novel, that he stops acquaintances 
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describes it as “saturated” with philosophy of Plotinus, St. Francis of Assisi, Wilhelm Heinse and 
Johann Hamann.237 Bogomolov and Malmstad support this view, adding Goethe and Herder to 
the list of major influences.238 Like Shmakov, they do not believe Wings to be a mature work of 
fiction, and claim that Kuzmin’s philosophical principle of “clarity” does not emerge until the 
essay “On Beautiful Clarity” in 1910. Evgenii Bershtein adds the name of Walter Pater as 
influential in forming the classicizing philosophy of Leon Shtrup, Vanya’s love interest and 
central figure in the novella.239 Vladimir Markov considers Wings to be the key to Kuzmin’s 
writing. He believes it to be a “novel about the discovery of one’s ‘self’” [“roman ob obretenii 
svoego 'ia'”] and calls for a closer study of its Platonism and its “zapadnichestvo” pointing out 
that it is not by accident that Vanya Smurov discovers himself in Europe, “after the vulgarity of 
Petersburg and the constraints of Old Believer Rus.”240  Donald Gillis provides a careful analysis 
of the process whereby Vanya transforms into a Platonic lover, and the role that mirrors and 
reflections play in this transformation.241 Finally, Klaus Harer argues persuasively that the 
novella is a philosophical discourse on love and that this discourse, rather that the peregrinations 
and love troubles of the protagonist, is its main plotline.242  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
on the street to tell them how much he loves it: “Somov is so impressed by my novella that he 
stops everyone on the street to say he had never read anything like it, and now a whole group of 
people (including Leonid Andreyev) wants a second reading.” Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1905-1907, 57. 
237 Shmakov, “Blok i Kuzmin,” 352-354. 
238 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 131-140; 156-161. 
239 Evgenii Bershtein, “An Englishman in the Russian Bathhouse” in Lada Panova with Sarah 
Pratt (ed.), The Many Facets of Mikhail Kuzmin (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2011), 75-87. 
240 Vladimir Markov, O svobode v poezii (Izdatel’stvo Chernyshjova, St. Petersburg, 1994), 164-
165.  
241 Donald C. Gillis, “The Platonic Theme in Kuzmin’s Wings.” The Slavic and East European 
Journal 22: 3 (Autumn 1978), 336-347.  
242 Klaus Harer, “‘Kryl’ia’ M.A. Kuzmina kak primer ‘prekrasnoi iasnosti’” in G. Morev (ed.), 
Mikhail Kuzmin i russkaia kul’tura XX veka. (Leningrad: Muzei Anny Akhmatovoi v Fontannom 
dome, 1990), 37-38. 
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Contrary to the opinions of Bogomolov and Malmstad, who suggest that Wings predates 
Kuzmin’s philosophy of clarity, I argue that the novella not only addresses this philosophy, but 
also narrates its emergence. As the relationship between the two main characters, Vanya and 
Shtrup, unfolds along the lines of Plato’s discourse on love in Phaedrus and Symposium, and as 
the protagonist discovers his true self in the process, he transforms from a “copy” into an 
“original.” Kuzmin’s desire to “clean” St. Pauls’ obscure glass yields the central image of the 
novella: a reflective or a translucent surface that aids in Vanya’s transformation.  
Vanya’s journey toward clarity begins, appropriately, in a train, as he anxiously looks out 
the window, anticipating his arrival in St. Petersburg. The view is foggy and unsettling: “In the 
coach, which had emptied out somewhat before morning, it was growing lighter, and through the 
steamy window he could see the green of the grass, almost venomously bright, although it was 
late August […]”243  
The problem of origin is associated with vision at the outset: as he examines the 
uninspiring outskirts of the city through the glass, he recalls the recent death of his mother. This 
death appears to have severed him from the family tree altogether. His father is never mentioned, 
while his much older cousin, Nikolai Ivanovich, will leave him with a family of strangers and 
disappear from the text. As he arrives in St. Petersburg, the boy feels contradictory emotions of 
“disappointment and curiosity.” He is generally uneasy, but apparently only half-aware of his 
isolation.  
Another episode involving semi-obscured vision soon follows. At the St. Petersburg 
gymnasium for boys Vanya awaits Daniil Ivanovich, who teaches ancient Greek. As the boy 
peers into the teachers’ lounge, separated from it by a glass wall, he is enchanted by its 
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resemblance to an aquarium: “It was very smoky in the teachers' lounge, and glasses of weak tea 
gleamed slightly like amber in the half-dark room on the ground floor. It seemed to the people 
entering that figures were moving in an aquarium. The pouring rain outside the dull windows 
amplified that impression.”244 The images are in no need of clarification: their mystery is what 
begins to draw him out of his somnambulant state.245 
Images of glass or other semi-clear barriers between the observer and the view recur 
throughout the text marking important moments of encounter with an enigma. Enchantment 
proves to be a state characterized by an attraction to but also a separation from an object. An 
important episode in the apartment of Leon Shtrup, the man destined to be Vanya’s lover, sheds 
light on the meaning and role of the enigma in the narrative. Shtrup appears on the third page of 
the novella. He immediately attracts the protagonist’s attention, mesmerizing him much in the 
same way as the view of St. Petersburg or the teachers’ lounge. The older man quickly assumes 
the role of Vanya’s instructor, and as their relationship progresses, the boy begins to attend 																																																								
244 Kuzmin, PE 1:80-82.  
245 Although Kuzmin’s tour de force poem “The Trout Breaks the Ice” will not be discussed in 
this chapter, it stands to reason to point out the significant parallels between this work and the 
novella. As Boris Gasparov demonstrates, the poem features the theme of two brothers, twins, 
also lovers who belong to two distinctly opposite worlds, one of which is historical and “real,” 
while the other inhabits an otherworldly “green” land, associated with the Ultima Thule in 
Nordic folklore. A sheet of ice, but also love and desire of a woman, blue smoke, etc. represent 
an obstacle between them. This theme finds its equivalent in Wings, but the relationship between 
the boy and Shtrup is that of an adult and an ingénue, rather than twins. A series of glass and 
smoke obstacles also stand in Vanya’s way, but unlike the brothers in “The Trout Breaks the 
Ice,” he eventually finds his way past them, symbolically “breaks” the ice and presumably 
continues on unscathed, with Shtrup as his companion. Although the text leaves open the 
possibility that symbolically they transition into an otherworldly realm, they do so together. Pr. 
Gasparov’s thesis is that in the poem clarity emerges as an instance of collision of opposites, and 
momentary utmost dynamism. This concept is certainly relevant to my research into the topic, 
though on the structural, rather than the narrative level. I return to it later in this chapter.  
Boris Gasparov, “Eshche raz o prekrasnoi iasnosti: estetika M. Kuzmina v zerkale e’e 
simvolicheskogo voploshcheniia v poeme ‘Forel’ razbivaet led” in John Malmstad (ed.), Studies 
in the Life and Works of Mixail Kuzmin, Wiener Slawistischer Almanach (Vienna: Gesellschaft 
zur Förderung slawistischer Studien, 1989), 83-114. 
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gatherings at his apartment. An important scene takes place during one such gathering, when 
instead of joining the others upon entering, Vanya seeks solitude in Shtrup’s study. He wants to 
enjoy a song played by a stranger on the piano in the living room. The song is one of Kuzmin’s 
“Alexandrian Songs,” published two years before the novella.  
When Vanya entered Shtrup’s apartment, he heard someone singing and playing the 
piano. He slipped quietly through the study to the left of the entrance hall, without 
entering the living room, and began to listen. An unknown man’s voice sang: 
Dusk above the warm sea, 
Fires of lighthouses on the darkened sky, 
The scent of verbena at the end of a feast, 
A fresh morning after a long vigil, 
A walk in the alleys of a spring garden, 
Cries and laughter of bathing women, 
Sacred peacocks in Juno’s temple, 
Vendors of violets, pomegranates, and lemons, 
The doves are cooing, the sun is shining— 
When will I see you, my hometown! 
 
And the low chords of the piano, like thick fog, enveloped the voice's languid words. A 
conversation between two male voices interrupted the song, and Vanya entered the room.  
How he loved that viridescent, spacious room; [...] that bedroom with its sink, where a 
garland of dark red fauns danced against a bright green background; that dining room all 
in ruddy brass; those stories of Italy, Egypt, India; [...] those perplexing but fascinating 
discussions; that smile on the ugly face; that scent of peau d'Espagne, with a hint of 
decay; those slender, strong ringed fingers; those slippers on that extraordinarily plump 
pillow—how he loved all of this, not understanding, but uneasily enthralled.246 
 
Everything in this scene spells enchantment and seduction. Consistent with his previous 
encounters with an enigma, the boy finds himself alone, green prevails among other colors, and 
his ability to see is obstructed by the “fog” of music. Shtrup’s apartment and Alexandria in the 
poem form one fluid environment. The abundance of water imagery and color scheme of the 
scene emphasizes fluidity and a natatorial feel. The green of the garden and the peacock’s tail 
becomes the green of the wallpaper in the apartment. The smell of verbena and violets echo the 
floral scent of “Peau d’Espagne.” The syntax of the prose likewise mirrors the syntax of the 																																																								
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song: the long catalogue of the things beloved by the poem’s narrator extends into a catalogue of 
things, beloved by the protagonist. This list has an incantatory quality.247 It is potentially infinite, 
endlessly intimating but never presenting a greater whole.  
 Although the scene suggests a fluid relationship between time periods, places, languages, 
personas, it is also based on two instances of rupture: in the last line of the poem the narrator 
reveals that he is only remembering his native city, while the boy is physically separated and 
concealed from the party that includes the singer who might be his author and literal origin. Both 
the singer and the poem’s narrator belong to the realm of the timeless, of which the drowned city 
is an emblem since it, too, is accessible only through detachment from one’s environment. As the 
protagonist begins to approach this place beyond time, and as he is enchanted by its “exotic” 
otherness, he is in fact en route to self-recognition. But “Alexandria” represents an invitation, not 
attainment. In Kuzmin’s diaries and letters, he emphasizes the syncretic nature of the city, 
evoking a plurality of cultural genealogies, and the liminality and fragility of their co-
existence.248 According to the “Histoire” it is also a city he visited and was delighted by on his 
trip with “count Georges,” and one of the last destinations they explored before the sudden death 
																																																								
247 Stanislav Shvabrin writes about the importance of catalogues in Kuzmin’s poetry, 
emphasizing the connection between the catalog as an exemplar of encyclopedic knowledge, and 
memory.  Stanislav Shvabrin, “‘The Burden of Memory’: Mikhail Kuzmin as Catalogue Poet” in 
Lada Panova and Sarah Pratt (eds.), The Many Facets of Mikhail Kuzmin: A Miscellany 
(Bloomington: Slavica, 2011), 3-25. 
248 Kuzmin writes: “As I was walking home through a dark, narrow alley, I thought that I 
perceived the beauty and fascination of life most of all in the Renaissance and the eighteenth 
century, but the complex, uneasy moods evoked by smoky sunsets in large cities, the attachment 
to flesh to the point of tears, the sorrow of dead things, the readiness for privation, some kind of 
prophetic joy, the Bacchanalian, and mysticism, and sensuality—all of this appears to me either 
mingled with ancient cults—Rome, Alexandria—or in the near future of modern times. Despite 
Lorenzato and Cesare Borgia, the Italians of the Renaissance are, after all, rather staid, simple, 
and laconic. [...] Of course, this doesn’t prevent me from loving Italy most of all.” Kuzmin, 
Dnevnik 1905-1907, 49.  
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of the latter. In the novella, it represents not only an invitation to seek one’s self in the 
unfamiliar, but, as befits an enchanted place, the danger of loss or entrapment.  
Immediately following this scene is Shtrup’s famous speech, in which he elaborates on 
the theme of origin already adumbrated in the “Alexandrian Song”:  
We are Hellenes, lovers of the beautiful, Bacchantes of the future life. As in the visions 
of Tannhäuser in Venus’s grotto, as in the prophesies of Klinger and Thoma, there is an 
ancestral homeland filled with sunlight and freedom, with beautiful and bold people, and 
we, Argonauts, are going there, across the sea, through fog and darkness!  And in the 
most unprecedented novelty we will recognize the most ancient roots, and in the most 
wondrous radiance we will sense our homeland!249 
 
Shtrup represents himself and his friends as the eternal “Hellenes,” and invites Vanya on a quest 
to reach their common land of origin. He describes them as everlastingly authentic, and as 
witnesses rather than subjects of history. Yet Shtrup’s rhetoric is very much of the age, recalling 
some of the Symbolist writings of this period. In Bely’s essay “Symbolism as World View” 
(1904), for example, the author writes about the desire of distance, perspective, and discovery, 
and appeals to the new Argonauts to set off on a quest to re-enchant the world. Shtrup’s 
Argonauts also resemble the poet in Ivanov’s “The Poet and the Masses [Poet i chern']” (1904), 
whose “inner freedom is the inner inevitability of a return to and union with native elements.”  
Ivanov’s poet, very much like Shtrup, “invents the new and obtains the ancient” [“izobretaet 
novoe i obretaet drevnee”].250 Despite appearances, however, Shtrup’s position differs 
significantly from the Symbolists’, first and foremost because for him the ancient ideal is not an 
abstract notion, but one that emerges in and by means of love. It exists only in interaction, as a 
combination of the spiritual and the erotic experience. Shtrup articulates this concept early in the 
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novella, when Vanya complains to him of the difficulty of Homer’s Greek, and expresses a 
desire to read the text in translation. The terms in which Shtrup rejects this idea are telling:  
In lieu of a flesh-and-blood human being, laughing or gloomy, whom you can love, kiss, 
and hate, whose blood you can see flowing through his veins, and the natural grace of a 
naked body—to have a soulless doll, often made by a craftsman—that is a translation.251  
 
 
At the end of their conversation he looks at Vanya “with infinite regret,” but encourages him, 
telling him that he has what it takes to become “a truly new man.”252 As he speaks of Homer’s 
text in the original ancient Greek, he compares it to the body of the beloved. The description is 
deliberately not “Classical”—not idealized, cold and remote, but close, familiar, inimitable. 
Shtrup’s “original” is so alive, it is easy to forget that he is talking about Homer. Indeed, the text 
proceeds to reverse his metaphor. For Vanya to embody the original is to welcome love.   
Shtrup’s emphasis on Homer’s Greek as the original, or his exalted invitation to the 
Cythera should not be confused with the Symbolist veneration of the original as authority, or an 
objective truth claim. Wings undermines the possibility of such a reading, when Daniil 
Ivanovich, the “Greek,” draws his pupil’s attention to the fact that in history perception is 
contingent on the point of view:  
It’s funny how much we see what we want to see and understand what we are seeking. 
The Romans and the Romance peoples of the seventeenth century saw only the three 
unities in Greek tragedies; the eighteenth century—grand declamations and liberating 
ideas; the Romantics, feats of great heroism; and our age—the sharp outline of the 
primitive state and Klingeresque illuminated expanses...253  
  
For Daniil Ivanovich, Shtrup’s “clairvoyant” painters Klinger and Thoma see merely [“tol'ko”] 
what their historically defined position allows them to see, or what they themselves need for their 
artistic purposes. The presence of Klinger’s name in the Greek’s discourse signals that Shtrup is 																																																								
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252 Ibid., 78. 
253Ibid., 86. 
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not immune to partiality, and that, in spite of his claims, he is a man of his time. The text 
precludes the notion of origin having the authority of an objective truth claim. It is apt to recall 
Kuzmin’s personal views on the subject of the original. While still in his religious phase, he 
described his impressions of prayer in Greek versus in Russian to Chicherin: “And I remember 
how I read all of the most beautiful prayers in the Greek original: what pitiful pedantic doggerel 
in Sapphic and Anacreontic meters!  Of course, this does not make them less sacred, but 
poetically their translations are by far superior, and they are the only versions possible as prayers 
for church recital (in Russia).”254 Kuzmin can be quite irreverent of the prototype, even when it 
is Greek.   
Positing the Classical “original” as loveable and personal, rather than cold and remote 
Kuzmin in Wings polemicizes with a specific literary tradition that represents the classics as 
irrelevant and obsolete. The text takes issue with Dostoevsky and Chekhov especially. Vanya 
Smurov shares his last name with a young boy from the “Boys” chapter of Dostoevsky’s 
Brothers Karamazov. In his conversation with Shtrup, he echoes the sentiment of Kolya 
Krasotkin, another boy in the group that includes Smurov, who claims that the classics are 
obsolete and dull, and that translations into Russian should be introduced in school instead of the 
originals. Shtrup and Daniil Ivanovich will disabuse him of such views. The Greek’s enlightened 
attitude conspicuously contrasts with the stereotypical teacher of classical languages derided by 
Chekhov in “Man in a Case.”255 Vanya's progress toward authenticity is marked by a separation 
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255 Aleksandr Timofeev’s essay “‘Kryl’ia.’ Mikhail Kuzmin v polemike s Dostoevskim i 
Chekhovym”  analyzes the passage where Shtrup and Vanya discuss translations and original in 
the context of Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, and examines the character of Daniil 
Ivanovich as an anti-Chekhovian classicist.  
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not only from his personal history, but his literary genealogy as well. He represents a departure 
from the Russian realist tradition.  
The novella also rejects the “original” as an unequivocal absolute, an authority by virtue 
of association with or representation of the “origin.” In the previously discussed scenes, this 
notion refers to Alexandria and Homer, respectively. Elsewhere in the text it also references 
Hadrian’s Rome and Renaissance art. The concept of the original figures in the text in the form 
of its numerous interpretations, rather than a static absolute. In accordance with Shtrup’s speech, 
as well as the “Alexandrian Song” performed in his salon, it is beyond reach, until rendered 
concrete in love or in writing. 
Vanya’s transformation into the “original” occurs as he learns a specific lesson, offered to 
him by several different teachers as the narrative unfolds. It concerns the relationship between 
body and spirit, and therefore the problem of love. Daniil Ivanovich is the first to articulate the 
notion that in love the object is less important than the love. He discusses the love of Patroclus 
and Achilles in Homer’s Iliad, and explains to Vanya that even though the interpretation of their 
relationship as romantic emerged during the Italian Renaissance, it is not necessarily incorrect. 
He then makes the following statement: “[O]nly a cynical attitude to love makes it debauchery. 
Am I acting morally or immorally when I sneeze, dust the table, pet a kitten? And yet these same 
acts can be criminal: if, for instance, I sneeze in order to alert a murderer of the best time to kill 
[...].256 The object means little in and of itself. The relationship to it, however, is extremely 
significant.  
The next person to reiterate this idea is an Italian composer, Ugo Orsini whom Vanya 
encounters in Italy. After he and the boy watch the opera Tristan and Isolde, Vanya compares its 
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plot to an erotically charged, but grotesquely comical scene witnessed earlier that day at an inn. 
Vanya proposes that since the same physical act appears to be the culmination of all kinds of 
love, from elevated to comedic, no rhetoric can rescue it from its base nature. Ugo corrects him: 
“Of course, the act itself and its bare essence are not important; what is important is one’s 
attitude; even the most shocking act, the most unthinkable situation can be justified and purified 
by one’s attitude toward it.”257 Orsini does more than reject Vanya's reductionist view on love. In 
effect, he rejects the idea that an objective fact may prevail over one’s subjective power to 
interpret.     
Finally, Vanya’s Florentine host, Canon Mori, offers him the same advice. This time they 
discuss the Emperor Tiberius’ depravity and compare them with Emperor Hadrian’s love for 
Antinous:  
What is important in every act is one’s attitude, its purpose, and its motivation; actions 
themselves are merely mechanical movements of our body, incapable of offending 
anyone, least of all the Lord.258 
 
Ironically, a Roman Catholic priest speaks these words.259 Mori has the authority of the Church 
on his side, though he clearly also does not follow its decrees. Notably, each of the three teachers 
speaks on behalf of a specific historical period: the Greek for Homer and ancient Greek history, 
Orsini for the fin de siècle decadents in the spirit of D’Annunzio, and Mori for Roman antiquity, 
the Florentine Renaissance and Baroque respectively. Each also introduces Vanya to a different 
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259 A Canon Mori really did host Kuzmin in Florence. His life-affirming disposition, erudite 
knowledge of Roman and Florentine history and genuine religiosity in a harmonious union with 
a rather heathen way of life made a powerful impression on the poet. Mori appears in his 
“Histoire,” and in his letters from Italy. He lodges Vanya at the same address in Florence as 
where he actually stayed with him. (Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 41.) 
135 	
language: Daniil Ivanovich to ancient Greek, Orsini to music, especially Wagner, and Mori to 
Italian.260  
This lesson conjoins the discourse on love and the discourse on language, for it reveals 
that the “original” is not an object at all, but a relationship to the object. But while Vanya’s 
teachers emphasize this point, they do not specify what the relationship should be. In the course 
of the novella Vanya also witnesses two instances where it goes terribly awry. Poignantly, in 
each instance allusions to the underwater realm and the color green imply the presence of 
“Alexandria”—a locus as enticing as it is dangerous.  
In the second part of Wings Vanya finds himself in an Old Believer town on the Volga. 
One day after bathing in the river he beholds a disturbing scene: villagers pull ashore the body of 
a drowned boy his age, who is also named Vanya. He has committed suicide because while 
extremely pious and even aspiring to be a monk, he was unable to resist the advances of a 
woman, who deliberately set out to seduce him. The text’s misogyny is not subtle: desiring a 
woman renders the conflict between spirit and body especially acute, and leads to this character’s 
demise. Vanya observes with horror and repulsion the corpse without any distinct, recognizable 
features.261 It embodies disembodiment and indistinctness as the opposite of clarity.  
The concluding part of the novella, set in Italy, contains a story of a metaphorically 
“drowned” man. In Florence, Vanya encounters a Russian painter, who falls prey to an Italian 
femme fatale, Veronica Cibo. Cibo has “dissolute mermaid eyes on a pale face” [“razvratnye 
																																																								
260 Detailed analysis of the role of Wagner and the Celtic legends as well as use of veils and 
screens in Kuzmin’s “Trout Breaks the Ice” in B. Gasparov’s essay “Eshche raz o prekrasnoi 
iasnosti.” See also Gennadii Shmakov, “Mikhail Kuzmin i Rikhard Vagner” in John Malmstad 
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rusaloch’i glaza na blednom litse”] and observes her surroundings from behind a green veil.262 
When she lifts it, we learn that her gaze has a quality of eerie immobility and appears blind: 
“Cibo stared fixedly at Blonskaya as though she didn’t see her, as though she were blind.”263 
Ugo Orsini mentions also that her speech is vulgar and inarticulate. He and Vanya encounter the 
painter and Cibo at the train station, where they are getting ready to depart for an unspecified 
destination. Vanya comments that the encounter feels like the painter’s funeral. The painter’s 
dilemma is similar to that of the drowned Old Believer. He appears to have the Madonna-Whore 
syndrome. He believes he must choose desire over love, and departs with Cibo so as to not 
contaminate the purity of the angelic Anna Blonskaia, the woman he actually loves.264 Cibo’s 
name translated from Italian means “food,” and references the body and its base needs.265 
Departing with her, the painter exchanges clarity for blindness.  
Vanya begins to accept and understand love as he develops a proper relationship to his 
own image as seen in a reflection. In the beginning of the novella he does not yet have one. As 
he looks at his reflection in the mirror, the narrator comments, “He neither liked nor disliked this 
tall, slender boy with thin eyebrows wearing a black smock.266 Little by little, this begins to 
change. On the Volga he observes his image reflected in the river:     
[Vanya] looked at the reflection, distorted by the dispersing circles in the water, 
of his tall, limber body with slim thighs and long, graceful legs, tanned from 
sunbathing; his blond curls flowing down over the slender neck; and his big eyes 
in a round, lean face; and, smiling to himself, he entered the cold water.267 
 																																																								
262 Cibo represents the femme fatale trope favored in the World of Art circle. Neil Granoien, 
“Wings and ‘The World of Art’.” Russian Literature Triquarterly 11 (1975): 393-405. On the 
femme fatale in the World of Art, see 401-2.  
263Kuzmin, PE 1:133, 138-139. Cibo’s mermaid eyes are mentioned twice, on 133 and 138.  
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Soon after this scene, the same river yields the drowned boy’s body. Later that evening, very 
upset, Vanya examines his reflection in the mirror, and suddenly repeats Shtrup's words of 
admiration for the male body: “And there are ligaments, muscles in the human body that cannot 
be seen without a tremor! Everything will pass; everything will perish! I myself know nothing, 
have seen nothing, but I want to, I want to...I am not unfeeling, not a stone, and now I know my 
own beauty!”268  Origination is a mimetic process: only as Vanya sees himself through Shtrup's 
eyes does he emerge as the “original” rather than the “translation.” Shtrup, himself an 
embodiment of the “original” that the boy seeks, is Vanya’s “prototype,” and the catalyst for his 
transformation into an authentic being. It is apt to recall Daniil Ivanovich’s words about the 
prototype as always interpreted in terms of the needs and capabilities of the interpreter. 
Elsewhere, he subtly applies this concept to the relationship between the boy and Shtrup. He 
outlines the itinerary of the journey he plans to undertake in order to take part in archeological 
digs, where else, but in “Athens, Alexandria, Rome,” as well as Pompeii. He plans to follow 
Shtrup’s earlier call, but as a scholar rather than an aesthete. Before the conversation with Vanya 
is finished, he makes a connection between his journey and Vanya’s: “I [...] am showing you 
what you are lacking—the kind of life that for you is embodied in Shtrup.”269 For Vanya, Shtrup 
is the transformative destination: his “prototype.”   
Since Daniil Ivanovich connects archaeology and love, and Shtrup’s description of 
Homer’s Greek describes ancient text, but insinuates love, Vanya’s transformation not only 
marks a milestone in his development, but also provides commentary on writing. His attainment 
of his individual self parallels the process of stylization, wherein the text responds to the original 
work by both assimilating it, and maintaining a distance from it. It gives the original a new life 																																																								
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269 Kuzmin, PE 1:119. 
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by imitating it, but also by relating to it as an entity that is extrinsic to the text. In the heart of 
“authenticity” mimesis replaces genealogy.  
 Kuzmin’s novella delivers his protagonist from a state of being constricted by personal 
and historical circumstance, to a state of freedom within the same context. Freedom from 
authority, especially that of origin, is the somewhat counterintuitive significance of “Classical 
ideal” in Wings. The text provides another example of this idea, bringing together the 
protagonist, his author, and the “ideal” prototype. The three meet in Florence, where Vanya is 
hosted by the aforementioned canon Mori.  
“Here is your room!” announced Mori, leading Vanya into a large, square, light bluish 
room [...] a simple table, a shelf of edifying books, and, on the dresser under a glass 
lampshade, a painted wax doll of St. Luigi Gonzaga dressed in a sewn fabric enfant de 
choeur outfit made the room look like a monk’s cell.270 
 
The wax doll of St. Luigi, considered a patron saint of Christian youth, is especially important in 
this description. St. Luigi is Aloysius Gonzaga, a sixteenth-century aristocrat who died a young 
man while taking care of the sick during a plague epidemic. He is associated with medicine, and 
therefore the body.271 Kuzmin mentions him in the “Histoire”: “I wandered around visiting 
churches, his [Mori’s] acquaintances, his mistress [...], I read vitas of holy martyrs, especially 
Luigi Gonzago (sic), and I was ready to convert and become a monk.” [“Ia brodil po tserkvam, 
po ego [Mori] znakomym, k ego liubovnitse […], chital zhitaia sviatykh velikomuchennikov, 
osobenno Luigi Gonzago (sic), i byl gotov sdelat’sia dukhovnym i monakhom.”]272 Kuzmin also 
wrote of him in his 1897 letters from Florence:  
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They often call me St. Luigi here, as they see in me a striking resemblance to portraits 
and icons of St. Aloysius Gonzaga. I didn’t see his portrait, but I read the vita of this 
enchanting Jesuit, who died in his twenty-fifth year. Immersed in his life and making 
mystical inferences from the trivial facts that he looked like me and died in his twenty-
fifth year...I asked whether I would be capable of imitating and continuing His life.  Mori 
said he felt certain that I could..273  
 
In Wings the episode with the doll of St. Luigi differs from the previous interpretations of the 
copy-original relationship in that while the doll is obviously an image, its “original” is a text. 
While Kuzmin resembles “portraits and images” of St. Luigi, he has never seen them. The doll 
embodies identity in metamorphosis from word to image, in other words, it embodies a 
metaphor. Mimesis as a kind of metaphoric relationship governs the relationship between the 
prototype as the saint’s written hagiography, the author as the saint’s “copy,” and the protagonist 
as another double—and another text— of both the author and the saint. None of the three can 
claim authority over another in this relationship. Toy-like and separated from Vanya by its bell 
jar, the doll allows the protagonist to retain his independence, much as he did while listening to 
one of the “Alexandrian Songs” in Shtrup’s living room.  
Although the relationship between these characters is not hierarchical, the doll has 
symbolic agency. Presumably a passive object among others strewn about Mori’s shelves, it is 
actually a potent agent of transformation. The substance out of which it is made betrays its 
magical power. Associated with bees and the sun, Apollo, Dionysus, Persephone, and the 
Eleusinian mysteries, wax represents an amalgamation of the spiritual and the corporeal. As 
Descartes famously observed in the second of his Meditations on First Philosophy, its only 
permanent properties are extension, changeability and movability. Its very identity is 
transformation. While arrested and still behind the glass barrier, the doll guides the boy in the 
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process of metamorphosis, just as the saint presumably looked over the author while he was in 
Florence. His function is not to exercise control, but to guide the protagonist to freedom.  
In the concluding sentences of the novella Vanya gets up after a sleepless night, having 
made the decision to accompany Shtrup on his journey to the Apulean port city of Bari. The 
reader can safely assume that the sea route will take them from there to Greece and on to North 
Africa.274 With the doll of St. Luigi looking over the scene, Vanya stands in his bedroom in 
Florence, writes a brief note to Shtrup, and opens the window onto the sunlit street:  
He arose after a sleepless night [...] and, after washing and dressing slowly and 
deliberately, without opening the blinds, he sat at a table with a glass vase of flowers on it 
and wrote unhurriedly, “Leave.” He thought a bit, then, with the same expression, not yet 
entirely alert, he added, “I’m going with you” and opened the window on the brightly 
sunlit street.  
 
 
The glass obstacle is finally removed, and Vanya enters a new life. Unlike his less fortunate 
doubles, he learns the liberating lesson that the relationship of the individual to the fact prevails 
over the fact. While several teachers repeat this point until the boy grasps its meaning, only one 
discloses the nature of the relationship itself. The image of the glass holds the key to the notion 
of clarity as the conceptual center of the text, connecting it also with Kuzmin’s thoughts about it 
in his letter to Chicherin. This happens in the second part of the novella, when Vanya has a series 
of encounters with an Old Believer his age. During one of their conversations, the boy tells him: 
[...] so you've been, after all, on the Unzha, the Vetluga, and the Moscow River, and you 
don't see anything except what concerns you, as though you were blind <...> How boring 
that is, you know. You're like an architect, let's say, who builds only churches, and not 
entire churches, but only cornices for churches, who travels the world and everywhere 
looks only at his cornices, without seeing the various people, nor how they live, how they 
think, pray, love, without seeing the trees and flowers of those places—without seeing 
anything but his cornices. A person should be like a river or a mirror, accepting whatever 
is reflected in him; just as on the Volga, sometimes there will be sun in him, sometimes 
clouds, and forests and tall mountains, or cities with churches—you should be open to 																																																								
274 Shtrup tells Vanya that he is leaving Florence for Bari and invites him along on the page that 
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everything equally, then everything will be integrated in you. If you latch onto just one 
thing, it will devour you, and greed is the worst thing of all, or religious ideas.275  
 
 
Adumbrating the story of the Russian painter, Sasha likens fixation on a single object to 
blindness, contrasting it with a model of vision whereby the subject is both witness and also a 
participant in a world in a state of constant flux. He describes the original “Edenic” gaze: the 
river’s reflective surface is an obvious alternative to St. Paul’s obscure glass. Unlike all other 
references to reflections in Wings, his is a figure of speech: a human being should be “like” the 
river. Nominally, this is a simile, but in fact, it’s a metaphor, enacted numerous times throughout 
the text already. As the episode with the doll of St. Luigi demonstrates, the self as an image is 
also the self as text. Sasha’s simile is an instance where the text gains awareness of itself, thereby 
obtaining a relationship to itself, and not only describing, but enacting clarity. An explicitly 
secondary reality—a reflected image—transforms itself from a simulacrum into the original 
before the reader’s eyes. This is the paradox of Kuzmin’s clarity: the attainment of the “right” 
relationship to oneself means integration of the self and a childlike or “Franciscan” acceptance 
and evenness of perception and expression, at the same time as it signifies a separation.  
Elaborating on the idea of reflection is the novella’s commentary on the hermeneutics of 
reading. When Vanya reads aloud a cryptic section from Dante’s Purgatorio to his tutor, Ida 
Golberg, she teaches him not to interpret the text too literally or too pedantically:  
“…e vidi che con riso  
Udito havenan l'ultimo construtto;  
Poi a la bella donna torna il viso,—  
and he noticed that they had listened to the final conclusion with a smile, then turned to 
the beautiful lady.” 
“The beautiful lady—is that the contemplation of active life?” 
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“Vanya, you can't believe everything the commentators say, except for the historical 
background. Understand it simply and beautifully, that's all. Otherwise you'll get some 
kind of mathematics instead of Dante.” 276  
 
 
Vanya reads the concluding lines of Canto XXVIII, where the Pilgrim reaches the top of Mount 
Purgatory and enters Earthly Paradise. There he is greeted by the beautiful Matelda, who walks 
along a riverbank singing and gathering flowers.277 Her precise identity resists interpretation, but 
Vanya is right to think that she is associated with Laban’s daughter, Leah, who appears in the 
Pilgrim’s dream in the previous Canto, and who represents active life. Her sister, whom he also 
dreams, represents a life of contemplation. More important than her precise relationship with 
Leah and Rachel is the idea that Matelda is the “unfallen version of one of the original 
inhabitants” of Eden.278 She is a prelapsarian being, as well as an object of desire untainted by 
the fall. When Ida rejects various types of hermeneutic discourse except specific historical 
knowledge, she herself acts as Matelda, greeting Vanya on the threshold of terrestrial paradise, 
which in their case is not only the boy’s new life, but also art.  
Since the trajectory of Vanya’s evolution delivers him into Edenic clarity, it is impossible 
for various interpretations of Matelda to not play a part in her appearance in Wings. Since the 
narrative repeatedly emphasizes relationship to fact over the fact itself, Ida does not teach willful 
ignorance or naïve and oversimplified reading, just as Sasha’s simile is only pseudo-naïve when 
it suggests that a person simply “reflects” things, presumably, “as they are.” The idea is that 
interpretation, meaning or knowledge emerge spontaneously, as if of their own volition, and 
always as something other than merely a replica of the original. In other words, metaphor is the 																																																								
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structure that governs the relationship between the “object” or fact of contemplation, and its 
interpretation. For example, in the course of the novella, Vanya comes to know himself as 
something other than the passive subject of his biography: the historical character discovers 
himself as an eternal being. The narrator of the “Histoire,” conversely, creates a text wherein he 
is present as his own historical, biographical double. Within Wings this concept signifies also an 
identity within the  dichotomy “text—image”: a hagiography appears as a doll, which, by virtue 
of the material of which it is made—wax—refers back to writing. Sasha’s trope is the focal point 
of a series of transformations from “self” to image, from image to text, and from text back to 
image again. The mimetic process yields difference without destroying identity.  
When in the last sentence of the novella Vanya opens the window of his chamber, he 
removes the barrier between himself and the life that beckoned him for the duration of the 
narrative. This symbolic gesture signifies that as he surrenders to love, he embodies Sasha’s 
metaphor and on the symbolic level becomes the clear surface that reflects and integrates all 
things indiscriminately. In other words, Vanya obtains the liberating point of view or 
“relationship to fact” that this metaphor suggests, and finally becomes an “original.” His position 
has another name: perspective, understood precisely as a subjective position, a point of view. 
Indeed, according to the scholar and critic Gleb Morev, perspective is Kuzmin’s “truly major 
theme” that has “formed his poetic myth and determined the dramatic effect of his later works.” 
279 But as it is evident from my discussion of Wings, this theme is as central to his first literary 
success as it is to his later works. It is therefore highly significant that Kuzmin’s hero 
experiences liberation before an open window in Florence: the conclusion of the novella 
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positions its hero in front of an important perspectival device that was invented in Florence. 
Vanya’s action, however, symbolically subverts its function.  
Perspective emerged in fifteenth-century Florence, and was from the beginning 
associated with the origin myth in the book of Genesis 1-3, and Pauline description of the human 
condition as seeing “through a glass, darkly.” It is a method that organizes the visual field 
according to the observer’s position in space, and therefore introduces the notion of subjectivity 
into representation. Before the word entered artists’ vocabulary, it was not only part of the 
optical science of the Middle Ages, but was actually synonymous with optical science. It was 
also inextricable from medieval mysticism. In 1425 a Florentine architect, Filippo Brunelleschi, 
was the first to apply optics to the art of representation.280 Brunelleschi’s method hinged on a 
“centric point”—eventually renamed “vanishing point”—that allowed him to create a realistic 
representation of a scene from a single point of view. Standing at the western door of the 
Florentine Duomo, he faced away from the Baptistry directly in front of the Duomo, and painted 
it looking at its mirror reflection instead. Afterward, he made a hole in the center of his small 
painted panel, and asked his viewers to look through the back of the painting at its reflection in 
the mirror that the viewer held out in his hand in front of the painted panel. The viewer saw his 
own eye embedded in the middle of the composition. The eye “certified” the veracity of 
Brunelleschi’s representation, and its own centrality to the painted image. To understand the 
significance of this ritualistic action, it is important to know that as one of the “founders” of the 
Renaissance, Brunelleschi was working within the parameters of medieval optics which he 
simply applied to a painting, resulting in the idea that the perpendicular axis from the eye to the 
“certification” point to the picture plane represented how God “conceived the universe itself in 																																																								
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his divine mind’s eye at Genesis,” and how grace passed from its divine source to the soul of the 
believer.281 Since the divine gaze originally meets his creation in Eden, Brunelleschi’s choice of 
the Baptistery as his subject is also highly symbolic. Looking through the peephole made in the 
painting, the viewer entered Eden: a copy became an original.  
Brunelleschi’s use of the mirror was not merely a technical tool, but a symbolic response 
to the problem of clarity as stated by St. Paul:  
[…] Brunelleschi’s demonstration permitted viewers to believe that they had 
penetrated the very “enigma” of the mirror, to see both the virtual reflection and 
actual Baptistery “face to face” behind the reflection, just as Saint Paul had 
preached. […] By focusing his perpendicular axis, across the typological 
Paradiso, and onto the eastern entrance to the Baptistery with its own sacramental 
symbolism, Brunelleschi was identifying his certification point as if it were in the 
very eye of God as he created the first human beings during the sixth day of 
Genesis. Brunelleschi’s viewers were enticed to believe themselves envisioning 
the very process by which “the prophets see God or his divine mysteries behind 
the images and likenesses of sensible things.”282  
 
The scholar explains that this gesture would have been considered “promethean” in scope: 
“Prometheus unbound! What Brunelleschi had just wrestled from the Creator’s closet […] might 
indeed be likened to that other famous Olympian thievery, granting to mortal man the heretofore 
sacred privilege of imagining nature just as God himself projected it from his own divine eye.”283 
His invention intended to recover the innocence lost with the fall of Adam, responding to 
Corinthians 1:13, with a reiteration of the first two chapters of Genesis. The paintings of the 
Baptistery were a defiant act of seeing through apostle’s dim mirror. This concept became so 
firmly associated with perspective, that its clarity, rooted as it was in medieval mysticism, was 
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the beginning of the world’s demystification. Based on the idea of excision of the eye from the 
body, and the image from the eye, it eventually contributed to the creation of the lens, the 
telescope, and the camera, all of which purport to show objective reality. Erwin Panofsky, the 
eminent scholar of the Renaissance and author of the foundational Perspective as Symbolic 
Form, gruffly calls this cyclopean claim of the subject to an objective truth “the objectification of 
the subjective.”284  
The history of this representational device would appear only tangentially related to 
Kuzmin’s narrative, were it not for the fact the word “perspective” contains an etymological 
ambiguity that renders it highly relevant to his work. Commenting on Dürer’s definition of  
“perpectiva” as “a Latin word which means ‘seeing through,” Panofsky states: “The word ought 
to be derived not from perspicere meaning “to see through,” but from perspicere meaning “to 
see clearly”; thus it amounts to a literal translation of the Greek term optikē”285 In the Western 
tradition, it came to be firmly associated with the concept of “seeing through,” however. The first 
person to secure this definition was Leon Battista Alberti, also a native of Florence, and the next 
artist to contribute to the development of the method. He replaced the mirror with the more 
pragmatic and instantly widely used “window”: a gridded glass pane now separated the artist 
from the scene, simplifying the process of copying the original.286 The window was a deadpan, 
mysticism-free approach to realistic rendering that eventually led to the mechanization of 
representation and caused Panofsky to accuse perspective of objectifying the subjective.  
  Kuzmin knew Florentine history and culture exceptionally well. The writer and art 
historian Vsevolod Petrov records him as saying: “There are only three subjects that I know truly 																																																								
284 Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form (New York: Zone Books, 1997), 67-72.  
285 Panofsky, Perspective, 27, 75. Dürer’s definition refers to the visual pyramid. The artist was 
thought to represent its cross section, thus “seeing through” it.  
286 Edgerton, The Mirror, 126-132. 
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well: in music—the XVIII century before and including Mozart, in painting—Italian 
quattrocento, and the Gnostic teachings.”287 Not only the Italian quattrocento, but Italy in general 
plays an extremely important role in Kuzmin’s world not. In the 1920 poem “Italy” he calls it his 
“second mother.” Incidentally, the poem also contains an image of the “wings of the heart.”288 
His knowledge of Italian culture was extensive, and included Franciscan poetry, Dante, 
Commedia dell’Arte, XVIII century literature and XIX century opera. For this reason, it is 
particularly poignant that in conversation with Petrov he mentions specifically the fifteenth 
century—the height of Florentine Renaissance— as one of his absolute favorite periods. Italy, 
especially Florence, is a kind of Eden for the protagonist of Kuzmin’s novella as well. Here 
Vanya’s heart finally sprouts its “wings.” Although his liberating gesture might only 
coincidentally evoke the specifics of the history of perspective, it implies a reversal of its history 
nonetheless: a decision in favor of seeing clearly against seeing through.  
Pictorial perspective was a metaphor that claimed to recapture “original” vision. It was an 
instance of mimesis that claimed to mend a severed genealogy. When in Russia at the turn of the 
century the problematic of the “original” vision once again became relevant, perspective as this 
central paradigm of Western vision reentered artists’ vocabulary.289 As the Symbolists and 
																																																								
287 Vsevolod Petrov, “Kaliostro: vospominaniia i razmyshleniia o M.A. Kuzmine.” Novyi 
zhurnal 163  (1986): 81-116. Petrov specifically mentions the importance of quattrocento 
Florence for Kuzmin on 98 and 101. Kuzmin’s love and extensive knowledge of the Italian 
Renaissance (and the Italian eighteenth century), is well-known, but since further in this paper I 
am examining texts that Kuzmin wrote between 1904 and 1906, it is particularly apt how many 
references—and declarations of love of Italy—figure on the pages of his 1905 diary. See for 
example: August 27, 30, September 2,4, 9, 13,15, 22, 29, when he writes that he loves Italy 
“most of all,” October 8, 21, etc.   
288 Kuzmin, “Italiia,” SS 2:282-283.  
289 In the essay “V ozhidanii gimna Apollonu” (1909), published in the  inaugural issue of the 
magazine Apollo, Alexandre Benois proclaims: “Tomorrow must begin a new Renaissance.” 
Anticipation of a new Renaissance was a common sentiment of the age. Interpretation of the 
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World of Art artists and thinkers alike sought to reconsider perspective as the central trope of the 
relationship between the subject and the object, and between the ersatz and the original, they 
looked to the visual culture of the Italian Renaissance as its origin. Images that referred not only 
to Italy, but to the specifically Renaissance representational tropes as well as iconic Italian works 
of art appear, for example, in Viacheslav Ivanov’s poem “Transparency” (1904). In the poem he 
describes a personified mystical Transparency as resting on the brow of the Gioconda, and 
appearing in her smile: “Ethereal Transparency of tenderness, / You slumber on the Gioconda’s 
forehead,” “Transparency! of a divine mask, / You hover in the Gioconda’s smile.” 
[“Prozrachnost’ Vozdushnou laskoi / Ty spish’ na chele Dzhiokondy,” “Prozrachnost’! 
bozhestvennoi maskoii/ Ty reesh’ v ulybke Dzhiokondy”].290 Ivanov also implores Transparency 
to make limpid the “veil of Maya.” An emblem of the Italian Renaissance coexists in this poem 
with esoteric Indian thought and the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Ivanov requests the 
ability to see through the phenomenal to a more real reality, but as he does so, he references da 
Vinci’s Mona Lisa as a figure on the threshold between the visible and the invisible.  
In 1904 the Symbolist Andrei Bely publishes his programmatic essay “Symbolism as 
World View,” where he also references perspective:   
Not long ago it was thought that the world had been thoroughly investigated. All the 
hidden depths had disappeared from the horizon, and only a vast, flat plane stretched 
away into the distance. All the eternal values, which previously had revealed new 
perspectives, had become a thing of the past. Everything had lost its value. But the urge 
to seek faraway things had not disappeared from men’s hearts. At a certain point the 
desire arose for new perspectives, and the heart of man began once again to inquire after 
the eternal values.291 																																																																																																																																																																																		
research into new ways of seeing as new perspective should be viewed in this context. A. Benois. 
“V ozhidanii gimna Apollonu,” Apollon 1 (October 1909): 5-11.  
290 Ivanov, SS 1:737-738. 
291 A. Belyi. “Simvolizm kak miroponimanie.” Simvolizm kak miroponimanie, Ed. L.A. Slugai 
(Moscow: Respublika, 1994), 244. At the time of writing this essay, Bely’s Moscow branch of 
Symbolism, called the “Argonauts,” was already a year old.   
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Here, perspective is associated with spaciousness, the aforementioned Symbolist “vistas,” 
nostalgia for the ability to have aspirations, a desire to desire the “original.” Bely describes 
Nietzsche as a new Prometheus who restores depth to the shallow world: “He brought depth 
from the immortal distance” [On prines glubinu iz bessmertnykh dalei], and describes his effect 
on Bely’s generation: “our former myopic naiveté is gone” [net v nas prezhnei blizorukoi 
naivnosti].292 Nietzsche is the “father” of a new perspective, though it is still a figure of “seeing 
through” to a truer reality.293  The finale of Wings demonstrates that Kuzmin rejected this kind of 
vision wholeheartedly.294 Neither the concept of seeing through the illusory world, nor the 
essentially identical idea of setting out in search of the elusive eternal values in the post-
																																																								
292 Ibid., 248.  
293 The theme of perspective plays an important role in Bely’s Petersburg. Published in 1913, it 
is set in St. Petersburg in the momentous year of 1905. The text contains endless play on the 
word “perspective” [prospekt], meaning “avenue,” including the city’s central Nevsky 
“prospect,” as well as “perspective” as an emblem of Western rationalism and its uncanny 
absurdity—that, Bely believes, represents the shifty substrate of the city’s history.  At the same 
time, perspective retains the meaning that Bely attributed to this concept in “Symbolism as 
Worldview.” This becomes apparent in chapters where Bely references the Art Nouveau 
aesthetic and the World of Art fashion of the period. In the chapter entitled “Sofia Petrovna 
Likhutina,” example, he describes this character’s interior as “lacking perspective” – just as the 
Japanese prints on her walls lack perspective. Her mind is as cluttered as her quarters. In Bely’s 
text this state of “flatness” and the same time clutter is directly related to “perspective” as the 
rational order that the capital supposedly exemplifies.  
294 Unlike Bely, he embraced myopia for its ability to erase the insignificant details leaving only 
what is important. In Kuzmin’s 1934 diary there is an entry on the magic of myopic vision: 
“Rain on the leaves. When the sun comes out after the rain, and all the bushes start to glimmer 
like diamonds and crystals, and a kind of Hoffmannesque magic seems to breathe beneath a 
gentle breeze. It all lasts for an oddly long time when I’m looking without my glasses. I put on 
my glasses, and all of the raindrops vanish somewhere, each leaf protrudes separately, and there 
is no breast, no breath, no fairy, as though a devil from an Andersen fairy tale had thrust a shard 
from a mirror into my eye. Glasses constitute one of the causes of rationalism and pessimism. 
Myopia is the foundation of idealism and painting in the narrow sense of the word.” M. Kuzmin. 
Dnevnik 1934 goda (St. Petersburg: Iz-vo Ivana Limbakha, 1998), 37. 
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Nietzschean world would have appealed to him: Kuzmin’s philosophy and aesthetic was, 
according to Bogomolov and Malmstad, “pre-Kantian.”295  
 
Kuzmin’s Clarity and the World of Art Aesthetics  
Vanya’s gesture and the novella on the whole are informed by the aesthetic of the World 
of Art, a group of artists with whom Kuzmin became close in 1901, when he began to frequent 
an offshoot of the World of Art, the “Evenings of Contemporary Music,” organized by Walter 
Nuvel, who was eventually to introduce Kuzmin to Ivanov.296 To an extent the interests of this 
Russian variant of the Art Nouveau movement overlapped with those of the Symbolists, leading 
some critics to believe that Symbolist philosophy nourished the World of Art, and that this 
movement “made concrete” but also a “vulgarized” of the Symbolist ideas.297 This view is 
appealing, but contestable, since there were significant differences in the motivations of artists in 
these groups. Unlike the Symbolists, the World of Art never attempted to transform the sense of 
absence and loss that so plagued people at the dawn of the new century into a site of theurgic 
conquest, but based their aesthetic on these sentiments. The members of the World of Art 
preferred that art speak for itself rather than serve metaphysical concepts. They also rejected the 
position of the artist as a medium between two worlds. Kuzmin certainly shared this position.298 
Nikolai Bogomolov’s essay “Viacheslav Ivanov and Kuzmin: On the History of the 
Relationship” describes the nuances of the relationship between the two after Kuzmin in one of 
																																																								
295 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 131.  
296 Bogomolov and Malmstad, Mikhail Kuzmin, 121-122. 
297 E.V. Ermilova, Teoriia i obraznyi mir russkogo simvolizma, 102.  
298 Magdalena Medarić, “Modern kak predavangardnyi stil’.” 57-80, 71.  
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his novellas derided Anna Mintslova, who lived with Ivanov and effectively controlled him and 
his household with her spiritual teachings and theosophic visions.299   
The World of Art artists believed themselves to be creators of beauty, and they valued 
playfulness and theater as a means of developing new approaches to it. They worked across 
several disciplines at once, and used the concept of artistic synthesis to create a dialog between 
as many different artistic media as possible, “translating” their aesthetic into music, graphic arts, 
theater, architecture and craft. Reacting against socially dogmatic realism, and much in the spirit 
of the European Art Nouveau, they rejected illusionism together with perspective, and instead 
mined the creative and emotional potential of flattened space, amply using it as they stylized 
their work after a variety of favored historical periods.  
The stylizations by Alexandre Benois, Leon Bakst, Eugene Lanceray, and later 
Konstantin Somov were based on serious research. They revived Greek antiquity, Petrine Russia, 
and eighteenth-century Versailles with accuracy, transforming them according to their aesthetic 
and always with a sense of ironic, nostalgic, or both ironic and nostalgic distance from the 
imitated style. Reduced detail and flat surface carried expressive, emotional charge.300 Writing 
on this subject in an essay about Somov, Kuzmin observes that in Somov’s paintings the 
eighteenth century wears a mask that conceals “the smiling boredom of eternal repetition, the 
sundry, momentary enchantment of the lightest specks of dust as they fly into the meaningless 
void of oblivion and death” [“ulybaiushchaiasia skuka vechnogo povtoreniia, pestrogo i 
																																																								
299 Neither the novella “Double-Confidant” [“Dvoinoi Napersnik”], nor its caricature of 
Mintslova were the only factors contributing to the cooling of their relationship, but they 
certainly played an important role.  N. Bogomolov, “Viacheslav Ivanov i Kuzmin: k istorii 
otnoshenii.” Voprosy literatury 1 (1998): 226-242.  
300 Ahn Ji Young, “Problema ‘stilizatsii’ v russkoj dramaturgii nachala XX v.” ‘Mir iskusstva i 
stilizatsiia pod ‘balagan’ M. Kuzmina.” Toronto Slavic Quarterly # 1 (Summer 2001): Web. 15 
August 2015.   
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minutnogo ocharovaniia legchaishikh pylinok, letiashchikh v bessmyslennuiu pustotu zabveniia i 
smerti.”].301 In this statement the association with Nietzsche is secondary to the emotional 
content of the work, as perceived by the viewer. Such representation shows the eighteenth 
century “original” in a new light, but also makes use of it for its own expressive purpose, of 
which devaluation is an integral part. Ivanov’s optimistic quest for the recovery of the “original” 
finds its pessimistic correlate.302   
While in many respects Kuzmin’s work exemplifies the World of Art aesthetic, his 
relationship to the idea of “seeing clearly” sets him apart from the World of Art just as his 
relationship to the idea of “seeing through” sets him apart from the Symbolists. Like this group 
of artists, he championed the notion of surface and flatness, detectable even in his “gliding” style 
of writing, yet this idea is grounded in a philosophy that reaches beyond the scope of the World 
of Art.303 He associates it with clarity, a concept he first mentions in the letter to Chicherin. As 
previously mentioned, to see as on a clear surface, and to narrate “superficially” is for him to 
assert that the most profound is the most “surface,” and vice versa. This worldview underscores 
the availability of what is needed in the present, and rejects the anxiety of the void that Kuzmin 
describes in his essay on the World of Art painter Somov. It finds plenitude where others at this 
time see absence and loss.  
Kuzmin’s perspective, an idea that means a point of view, signifies two contradictory 
ideas: integration and division. As the concept of integration or acceptance, it finds its expression 
																																																								
301 Kuzmin, “Uslovnosti: stat’i ob iskusstve: K.A. Somov.”  PE 3:628. 
302 Such a perspective on the “original” potentially devalues it. This effect of the World of Art 
aesthetic annoyed Ivanov. The artists of this group represented the decadence that he abhorred. 
But historically, the notion of the devaluation of the original proved inaccurate. Revzin credits 
the World of Art with the development of the Neoclassical style out of what initiated as playful 
stylization. Poignantly, he dates this shift to the year 1910. (Revzin, 88-89) 
303 Gasparov, “Eshche raz o prekrasnoi iasnosti,” 83. 
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in Sasha’s statement that the self should be like the surface of a river, or using another trope, like 
St. Paul’s “glass” made clear. To be and to see like this means to make space for contradiction. 
This is why the narrator of Wings describes Vanya as experiencing mutually exclusive feelings 
of disappointment and curiosity, and the narrator of the poem “A Trip to Assisi” describes the 
view of the town as both shallow and deep. This position allowed Kuzmin to accept his own 
contradictory persona. In his personal correspondence from 1905 he makes a characteristic 
remark on this subject: “I do not acknowledge any ascents in life—or the fulfillment of any 
designs [...] and I do not have to stop casting back and forth between two points that are perfectly 
well known now” [“Ia ne priznaiu nikakikh voskhozhdenii i zhizni—kak i ispolneniia kakikh-to 
prednachertanii […] i dlia dokazatel’stv etogo vovse ne dolzhen lomat’ svoikh metanii mezhdu 
teper’ otlichno izvestnymi dvumia tochkami.”]304 Subsequent letters clarify that the “two points” 
refer to two distinct positions prevalent in two distinct demographic groups and social classes 
between which Kuzmin navigated during the unrests of that year. He finds no fault in occupying 
apparently conflicting positions at the same time. Unlike the Symbolists, who viewed life as a 
process of “ascents” and “descents,” he abides with inconsistency.   
In addition to this “equalizing” vision as a totality, Kuzmin’s concept of seeing clearly 
also involves a confrontation of opposites. In this dynamic capacity it is not only a response to 
the image of St. Paul’s obscure glass, but an elaboration of the apostle’s notion of seeing “face to 
face,” as well as an enactment of the idea of mimesis as difference. For example, in Kuzmin’s 
“The Trout Breaks the Ice,” clarity results from an encounter of lovers who are also “twins,” who 
																																																								
304 “Kuzmin-Chicherinu.” Letter. Oct. 1905. Stikhotvoreniia. iz perepiski. (Moscow: Progress-
Pleiiada, 2006), 384. On October 26, 1905, Kuzmin also writes in his diary: “I am deeply 
convinced that the life not only of a single person, but also of a country is not an ascent or a 
descent, but a series of coincidences” (62).  
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belong to either side of a barrier—a sheet of ice that grips the surface of a river.305 In Wings this 
concept is also present throughout the novella, but since Shtrup leads Vanya into a new 
“original” life, their relationship is not exactly that of equals. Still, their encounter is a moment 
of a “dynamic” collision between two opposing worlds, while his metaphoric crossing the glass 
barrier signals a journey to “Alexandria” – the realm of the eternal, and so also the dead. Not by 
chance, Shtrup’s last name conceals an unpleasant association with the Russian “trup” or 
“corpse.”  
The “face to face” configuration involving a mirror, a page, or a canvas as the surface, 
and the observer or creator is consistent in Kuzmin’s oeuvre from the earlier “Classical” period 
to the later expressionist, hermetic one.306 As a dynamic, dialogic relationship between opposites 
it leads to the attainment of the fluid “reflective” vision that accommodates all beings. The 
discovery of personal perspective or “point of view” through love is a stage or a right of passage 
in the discovery of divine perspective. In this sense, Kuzmin’s approach to perspective recalls 
Brunelleschi’s original concept, but has none of its insistence on uniformity. On the contrary, it 
is anti-systematic, anti-mechanical and so represents an alternative to the “original” Renaissance 
invention. This is evident from his treatment of the issue at the heart of the problem of 
perspective: the face-to-face dynamic specifically as it applies to the relationship of the 
“original” and the “copy.” 
																																																								
305Gasparov, “Eshche raz o prekrasnoi iasnosti,” 110.  
306 See Omry Ronen’s “Mikhail Kuzmin’s Symbolism in Connection with his Concept of the 
Book of Life” or Tatiana Tsivian’s “The Symbolism of Kuzmin’s Cycle ‘Fuji in a Saucer’” for 
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1990), 43-47.  
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Personal perspective attained through love leads to an “eternal” or “objective” vision. But 
its “objective” nature is quite distinct from the “objectified” subjectivity of perspective, because 
it is dialogic. Mikhail Bakhtin’s definition of stylization, which plays such an important role in 
Kuzmin’s writing, elucidates this concept. Bakhtin writes:   
 
The stylist uses the other’s word as other and thus casts a light objective shadow on that 
word. True, the word does not become an object. After all, the stylist values the totality of 
the devices of the other’s word precisely as the expression of a certain point of view. He 
works with the other point of view. That is why a certain objective shadow falls precisely 
on the point of view itself, and it [the point of view] consequently becomes relative.307 
 
As the narrator incorporates an original as the “unfamiliar” or “other” perspective into his text, 
his own voice absorbs—not the words of the other —but their “object-ness,” in a sense, 
becoming “other” to itself. This narrative stance is what creates the space of clarity. So, when 
love for Shtrup transforms Vanya into an “original” and he symbolically crosses over to an 
eternal dimension, he behaves like a stylized text that has obtained its individuality and at the 
same time a certain “objectivity” by adopting the point of view of the original. Notably, Vanya 
does this literally, when he sees himself in the mirror and quotes Shtrup’s words in reference to 
his own reflection as an original. The dialogic “face to face” relationship between the copy and 
the original leads to the discovery of clarity as an Edenic perspective. The “Histoire” actualizes 
the plot of Wings as a narrative mode, and it is possible to apply this idea to the diaries in 
general. The narrator appears to speak from a place of otherness or “object-ness,” detached from 
his own biographical, historical self, though not indifferent to it. Some of this distance results 
from the ironic title with its reference to an eighteenth century instructional autobiography of a 
religious figure, or conversely, Casanova’s irreverent Histoire de ma Vie. Some of it originates in 																																																								
307 Mikhail Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii v semi tomakh, 7 vols. (Moscow: Russkie slovari, 
2000), 2:85-86.  
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the narrator’s purposeful nonchalance with respect to the question of knowledge. It is important 
to the narrator to demonstrate that understanding his own psychological motivations and states, 
for example, is secondary to the list of unfolding events and the cadence of the narration itself. 
As a result, the narrator’s historical “twin” has an independent existence within the lucid space of 
the narrative voice, sharing none of its clarity. This narrative voice is the space that 
accommodates not only his younger self, but potentially anything that it narrates. But a 
confrontation between the narrator and the character as two “representations” of presumably the 
same subject reveals the narration itself to be the prototype, while the younger self has yet to 
become authentic.   
 “The New Hull”: Clarity as Magic 
   In the 1920s, Kuzmin experiences the influence of expressionism, imported into Russia 
from the Weimar Republic in the form of music, cinema and literature. As his texts reach new 
heights of mastery and complexity, the principle of clarity not only remains at the core of his 
worldview, but comes to the forefront as a device laid bare and made to actively contribute to the 
new “dramatic effect” of the work. Various images of flat surfaces become triggers of plot 
development rather than static symbols. For example, in the cycle of poems “The New 
Hull”(1924), the “clear” narrative voice enters the text, incarnated as a character alongside 
others. The author plays three roles: a viewer of a film and therefore an observer; a lover “face to 
face” with the object of his love; and a creator who watches his narrative unfold as he creates it 
upon the glass of a “magic crystal.” Clarity appears as the passive principle of observing 
transformation, as a dynamic, dialogic, transformative relationship between lovers who are 
separated from each other, and as the active principle of creation that encapsulates them.   
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The poems of “The New Hull” are dedicated to Lev Rakin, with whom Kuzmin had a 
relationship in 1923. He believed Rakin resembled the actor Paul Richter in the role of Edgar 
Hull in Fritz Lang’s expressionist masterpiece Dr. Mabuse the Gambler [Dr. Mabuse der 
Spieler]. Furthermore, Rakin reminded him of Vsevolod Kniazev, a young man with whom 
Kuzmin had a relationship in 1910. In 1913 Kniazev, who soon also began an ill-fated love affair 
with St. Petersburg’s famous beauty, Olga Glebova-Sudeikina, shot himself underneath her 
portrait, and died a few days later. He plays a part in Kuzmin’s “The Trout Breaks the Ice.” In 
his 1923 diary Kuzmin notes that Rakin reminds him not only of Kniazev, but of the 1910s in 
general.308 
Prior to discussing Kuzmin’s poem it is necessary to say a few words about Lang’s film 
and Edgar Hull specifically. In this expressionist masterpiece Hull is a supporting character: a 
stunningly handsome, wealthy and noble, if naïve, young man, who falls victim to the villainous 
Dr. Mabuse. Mabuse is a criminal mastermind, who hypnotizes his victims. He hypnotizes Hull, 
too, and then steals his fortune at the gambling table. Although Hull never remembers what 
happened to him, he eventually recovers his senses and seeks to help the police capture his 
offender. To his misfortune, he falls in love with Mabuse’s loyal accomplice, who leads him into 
a trap where he is murdered.309 Hull’s fate resonates with that of some of Kuzmin’s characters 
discussed here, such as the enchanted and doomed Russian painter from Kuzmin’s Wings.   
Lang’s Dr. Mabuse, whose Nietzschean slogan is: “no love—only desire, no happiness—
only will for power” represents the hypnotic power of cinema in “the age of mechanical 
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309 Dr. Mabuse der Spieler. Dir. Fritz Lang. UFA Studios, 1922. Film.DVD. 
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reproduction.”310 Consistently with Walter Benjamin’s statement that cinema “introduces us to 
the unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses,” he manipulates the 
psyche by means of optics: for example, he uses eye contact and the flickering of reflected light 
upon his spectacles to invade Hull’s psyche.311 Mabuse hypnotizes the passive viewer by “seeing 
through” him. He could have inspired Benjamin’s later observation that the camera acts like a 
surgeon, as it delves beyond what meets the eye and extract objects from their environment.312 
Benjamin famously bemoans the inevitable violence of the mechanical copy and privileges the 
“original,” defined by the aura as “the essence of all that is transmissible from [a thing’s] 
beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has 
experienced.”313 He also describes the aura itself as “a phenomenon of distance,” and contrasts 
the surgeon’s approach with that of the magician, whose art has an effect only if the 
“phenomenon of distance” is observed.314   
In the first poem of “The New Hull” Kuzmin’s narrator watches the film, intertwining the 
account of the events that unfold on the screen with his personal reflections. One of these is an 
observed resemblance between the film character and someone in the narrator’s life: “On tak 
pokhozh… / Ne potomu l’ o nem zagovorila muza?” 315 He is so similar... / Is that not why the 
muse began to speak of him?” The narrator proceeds to focus especially on the scene, where 
Lang zooms in on Mabuse’s face to express the powerful effect of his eyes on the victims—and 
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on the viewers. Kuzmin’s narrator, conversely, addresses his protagonist as if anticipating 
Benjamin’s observation about the relationship between the surgeon and the magician:  
But a gaze, obstinate and ardent, 
Follows you just as intently. 
Don’t be afraid: it will do no harm, 
Your nape won’t start to hurt. 
It is a stargazer watching to see 
Which way a star will flow. 
 
No tak zhe pristal'no sledit 
Za Vami vzgliad, upriam i pylok. 
Ne boites': on ne povredit, 
Ne zabolit u Vas zatylok. 
To karaulit zvezdochet, 
Kakim putem zvezda techet. 
 
  
Kuzmin references the moment when Hull, unaware of Mabuse’s presence, who has already 
spotted him in his binoculars, begins to experience the effect of the hypnosis. He is suddenly 
overcome with a headache, and as he grasps the back of his head, he has already unwittingly 
ceded his autonomy to the doctor. At this crucial instance, Kuzmin’s “stargazer” reverses 
perspective, from a close-up, to “zooming out” to a view of the night’s sky. He then begins his 
version of the tale that will pluck Hull from the flat screen and the invasive “face-to-back of the 
head” gaze of the villain, and restore him to clarity.  
The rest of the poems narrate an encounter between the speaker and the new Hull. Of 
course, this is a tale whereby the copy—Hull—transforms into an “original,” overcoming his 
history not in the form of a biography, but a linear narrative. Notably, in the second poem of the 
cycle Kuzmin explicitly renounces his earlier approach to stylization:  
He who has resolved to love you 
  Must forget antiquity, 
And I am ready to give up 
Beauty spots and wigs, 
The retrospective stage prop 
Lies abandoned like unneeded rags, 
Today’s winged hour 
Laughs from resounding eyes [...] 
Antichnost' nado pozabyt' 
Tomu, kto vzdumal Vas liubit', 
I otkazat'sia ia gotov 
Ot mushek i ot parikov, 
Retrospektivnyi rekvizit 
Nenuzhnoi vetosh'iu lezhit, 
Segodniashnii, krylatyi chas 
Smeetsia iz zveniashchikh glaz […] 
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The rest of the poem then proceeds as a double negation, abandoning of the Classical prototypes 
popular in the early 1900s, and overriding Dr. Mabuse der Spieler as another original. In both 
cases, however, the prototypes remain in the subtext of the new tale, as the metaphorically 
“dead” twin, because the narrator invites associations with Classicism, the World of Art, 
Kniazev, etc., at the same time as he proposes that he has forgotten about them.316 The air of 
stylization and with it a certain “object-ness” permeates the entire poem, but now the “other” 
whose “intonation” the narration absorbs, is even less stable than before—or so the text would 
have the reader believe. The forgotten World of Art “stage props,” the film, and such foreign 
elements as the words “mister” and “Stettin” are some of the elements that contribute to the 
stylized feel of the work.  
The paradox of the poem—though this holds true to an extent in the novella as well— is 
that clarity as the “phenomenon of distance,” analogous also with the “object-ness” of the 
narration, results from a death: the “real” Hull and his unfortunate fate, Kniazev, the 
disappearance of many of the central figures of the 1910s together with the aesthetic of this time 
period inform the encounter between the lovers in the poem and inspire their love. The narrator 
views his beloved through the lens of the dead. Conversely, the beloved is a kind of lens, through 
which the past becomes alive: “A mne ves' mir otkrylsia Vami,” says the narrator in one of the 
poems. “And the whole world was revealed to me through you.” 
 The relationship between the two lovers is in many ways analogous to the one that will 
figure in “The Trout Breaks the Ice”: the two lovers are mystically connected, yet belong to 
distinctly different realms separated by a demarcation line. The screen, a pane of glass, the 
shoreline, and the lover’s eyes all play the role of the impenetrable glassy barrier. But while in 																																																								
316 Ratgauz very aptly uses the term “palimpsest” in reference to the relationship between “The 
New Hull” and the 1910s. Ratgauz, “Kuzmin-kinozritel’,” 54.  
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the eighth poem of the cycle the beloved appears as a corpse, and in the tenth poem he is 
Endymion—a mythic beautiful boy who is eternally asleep—“The New Hull” has none of the 
macabre characteristics of “The Trout Breaks the Ice.” Its imagery and prosody is luminous, and 
the love it describes is spiritual and liberating, and untainted by the interference of a meddlesome 
femme fatale.  
The “face to face” encounter with the beloved in the narrative is an instance of the clarity 
of love between two people that transforms itself into the all-encompassing clarity as divine—or 
near-divine vision. While the image of a river or the ocean plays an important role in the poem, 
Kuzmin also uses another important motif: that of a blood transfusion that happens across the 
barrier between the two men.317 This image and concept is connected to the idea of clarity as a 
fluid all-encompassing sphere of metamorphosis.  
In the second poem of the cycle, as the narrator looks into Hull’s eyes and is 
overwhelmed by memories of “all we love, with which we burn” [“vse, chto my liubim, chem 
gorim”], he sees it all not as in a fog—not through a glass, darkly—but “as though the wine of 
memory gushes forth” [“a slovno bryznulo vino / vospominanii”].  This symbolic spilling of the 
blood signals the commencement of the alchemic action of poetry. In the eighth poem, the 
alchemist beholds the dead body of his beloved, but his death is not what it appears to be. While 
the dead man’s glassy eyes represent the barrier between the two lovers, and there is no pulse, 
the body is warm: “I kiss...closer...the chest is warm... / neither tremor nor pulse... / The minute 
flowed into eternity... / Art is incontrovertible!” [“Tseluiu… blizhe… grud’ tepla…/ni 
sodroganiia, ni pul’sa…/Minuta v vechnost’ protekla…/ Neprerekaemo iskusstvo!”]. The 
beloved is in the realm of the eternal, and the alchemist refuses to revive him—just as the 																																																								
317This is one of the central tropes in “The Trout Breaks the Ice” as well. Gasparov, “Eshche raz 
o prekrasnoi iasnosti,” 92, 98.  
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narrator refused to revive the “stage props” of the past, because a homunculus would upset the 
necessary binary separation.  
I could, I could! ... Delirium is fruitless! 
To believe and not believe the hope, 
Agonizingly capture the response 
In your transparently gray eyes, 
Soar up and fall....Fire and ice... 
Everything alive is blissfully unstable. 
Cabalistic joy 
Does not produce such raptures. 
 
 
Ia mog by, mog!… Naprasnyi bred! 
Nadezhde verit' i ne verit', 
Tomitel'no lovit' otvet 
V tvoikh glazakh prozrachno serykh, 
Vzletat' i padat'… Zhar i led… 
Zhivoe vse—blazhenno shatko.— 
Takikh vostorgov ne daet 
Kabbalisticheskoe schast'e. 
Particularly poignant is Kuzmin’s blunt statement of his major theme: life is not only “blissfully” 
unstable, but instability is its condition. In death there is life, in sleep there is wakefulness, the 
subject is object-like, and vice versa. They are interconnected, yet distinct.  
Finally, in the tenth poem this theme is reiterated, this time with reference to a sacrifice:  
He finds sweet, warm sleep... 
Suddenly a voice, simple and thin, 
Sings: “You sleep, Endymion, 
Magic child! 
You nurtured me, 
Enchanted yourself, 
Accept the influx of mutual efforts.” 
 
Nakhodit sladkii, teplyi son… 
Vdrug golos, prost i tonok, 




Primi zh pritok vzaimnykh sil.” 
 
In this stanza the roles switch: now the sleeping beloved narrates as he hears the voice of the 
poet, who explains that the “enchanted” twin has sacrificed himself—his blood is the wine that 
has set things into motion earlier in the cycle. Now the poet returns the debt: his poetry is the 
“influx of mutual efforts” [pritok vzaimnykh sil] that keeps Endymion alive.  
 The concluding poem in the cycle “lays bare the device” of the poem—if this formalist 
term may be applies to a symbolic object that has an obviously magical, mystical function.  
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I hold an invisible crystal, 
As though a multitude of mirrors 
Had joined facets. 
There is a particular light in each cell: 
The gold of coming years, 
Or the shine of memories. 
 
Derzhu nevidannyi kristall, 
Kak budto mnozhestvo zerkal 
Soedinilo grani. 
Osobyi v kazhdoi kletke svet: 
To zoloto griadushchikh let, 
To blesk vospominanii.  
 
The first stanza of the poem reveals Pushkin’s poetics as the major—indeed, the most 
important—subtext of the poem. In the eight chapter of Eugene Onegin Pushkin references a 
“magic crystal” in which as he started writing his novel in verse, he was not yet able to discern 
its ending. In the same stanza he also calls the novel his “fellow traveler” [sputnik]: a trope that 
in Kuzmin’s oeuvre from Wings to “The New Hull” becomes a personification. Both Vanya 
Smurov and the beloved in the poem are not only who they appear to be, but the text itself. 
Given the personal circumstances to which “The New Hull” alludes, a comparison between the 
enchanted “twin” and Pushkin may seem much too blunt. But Kuzmin’s allusion to Eugene 
Onegin specifically in the context of his concept of clarity is also not subtle. Both in terms of 
style and worldview the poet consciously, but also organically resurrected Pushkin’s aesthetic 
that Boris Gasparov defines as “aphoristic precision, economy of means, ease of expression.”318  
Kuzmin’s image of the magic crystal with its many facets and endless transformative 
possibilities is a more dynamic and more complex version of Sasha’s flowing river as all-
encompassing clarity. Unlike in the novella, however, in the poem the observer is also explicitly 
the co-creator whose method of observation—creation is explicitly presented as “play.” 
Although unlike Sasha, the narrators of the poem enact the principle of clarity, rather than 
engage in didactic commentary, Kuzmin concludes the cycle with a kind of “moral,” 
summarizing his philosophy in six flawless lines:  																																																								
318 B. Gasparov, Poeticheskii iazyk Pushkina kak fakt istorii russkogo literaturnogo iazyka. 73.  
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When love lives in you, 
Nothing will break the glass: 
Neither a hammer nor a bullet. 
I walk closer to the window, 
But no matter which way I turn the  crystal, 
I see only the image of Hull. 
Kogda liubov' v tebe zhivet, 
Stekla nichto ne razob'et: 
Ni molotok, ni pulia. 
Ia blizhe podkhozhu k oknu, 
No kak kristall ni povernu 
Vse vizhu obraz Gulia. 
 
 
Kuzmin’s 1921 poem “Pushkin,” however, it appears less so.319 The word “life,” conceptually 
crucial in “The New Hull” in general and in its last stanza in particular, sets the theme of this 
poem in first line: He’s alive! / Everyone’s soul is imperishable, / But he especially lives!” “On 
zhiv! / U vsekh dusha netlenna, / No on osobenno zhivet!” “Life,” “living,” “enliven” and other 
variants appear eight times throughout the text. Pushkin is also described as rushing toward a 
“line”: “K odnoii cherte napravlen beg,” suggesting the line drawn between the two opponents at 
a duel, that is, the line between life and death. Finally, he is also the one who builds a bridge 
from “the land whence there is no return.” [“Iz stran, otkuda net vozvrata/ cherez goda on brosil 
most.”]. Once again, in “the New Hull” Kuzmin alludes to the connection between his concept of 
clarity and Pushkin’s poetics.   
In prose as in poetry, Kuzmin conveys his concept of clarity using the trope of a 
reflective surface, such as a mirror, glass, or the magic crystal in “The New Hull.” In 1910, the 
midpoint between the novella and this poem, Kuzmin writes his central text on the subject: “On 
Beautiful Clarity.” He begins with a retelling of the biblical myth of creation:  
When the hard elements came together in dry land, and water surrounded the earth in 
seas, rivers and lakes spread over it, and for the first time the world emerged from the 
state of chaos, and above it hovered the dividing Spirit of God. And through further 
delimitation of clear lines, that complex and beautiful world was formed, which, 
accepting or not accepting, artists strive to recognize, see in their own way, and depict. In 
every person’s life there are times when, as a child, he suddenly says: “The chair and I,” 
“The cat and I,” “The ball and I,” then, as an adult, “The world and I.” 320 																																																								
319 Kuzmin, “Pushkin,” SS 2:221-222. 
320 Kuzmin, “O prekrasnoi iasnosti.” PE 3:5-10. 
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Never mentioned directly, the image of the mirror insinuates itself in three key moments in the 
passage: first, as the Spirit flies over the fluvial surface of his creation, second, when a person 
begins to differentiate between herself and the objective world around her, thus beholding herself 
in the mirror as one such “object,” and third, when she begins to write, because the act of writing 
mimics divine creation through division and differentiation. The rest of the essay elaborates 
specifically on the latter, instructing writers to write with “Classical” clarity, and referencing 
Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme: 
Whether your soul is whole or fragmented [...] I implore you to be logical...in your 
conception, in the structure of your work, in syntax. [...]321 
 
Kuzmin continues, quoting a scene in which Jourdain receives a lesson on proper word order and 
syntax. The appeal to greater efficiency and insistence on the transparency of language to 
meaning is evident. Kuzmin deliberately resorts to Molière as his example. The seventeenth 
century as the age of the Port Royal Grammar and Rationalist philosophy believed in universal 
reason and language as a transparent medium.322 But Kuzmin’s—and Jourdain’s admonishments 
should be taken with a grain of salt. A decade later, in the 1920s, Kuzmin once again makes a 
series of statements regarding clarity in relationship to the clarté of French Classicism. In 1924, 
in an essay titled “Emotionality as the Basic Element of Art” [“Emotsional'nost' kak osnovnoii 
element iskusstva”] he writes: “art does not tolerate abstraction and rationality, which is why the 
country poorest in emotional art is France, a country where rationality and abstraction, 
generalization and an aspiration toward unchanging canons wove their principal nests.” 
																																																								
321 Ibid., 6. 
322 Barbara Woshinsky, Signs of Certainty: The Linguistic Imperative in French Classical 
Literature  (Stanford University, Department of French and Italian: Anma Libri, 1991), 4-5. 
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 [“iskusstvo ne terpit otvlechennosti i rassudochnosti—vot pochemu emotsial’nym iskusstvom 
bednee vsego Frantsiia, strana, gde rassudochnost’ i otvlechennost’, obobshchennost’ i 
stremlenie k nezyblemym kanonam svili svoe glavnoe gnezdo.”]323 In this essay he also makes it 
a point to say that the “universal” clarity of French seventeenth-century drama is such a 
profoundly localized phenomenon that no one but the French themselves understand it. 
Deliberately anti-Classical is also Kuzmin’s definition of one of the fundamentally Classical 
ideas of perspective that he provides in the preface to his 1929 play “Hull’s Walks” [“Progulki 
Gulia”]:  
The theme of “Hull’s Walks” is man’s search for an organizing element in life according 
to which all appearances in life and all acts would find their corresponding place and 
perspective. This search takes the form of a more precise differentiation of meanings, 
words, and appearances. In structure, the work consists in a series of scenes and lyrical 
fragments that are not united by the conditions of time and space, but connected only by 
associations of situations and word.324 
 
The organizing element in life, on a surface, and in a text is as unburdened by the Classical 
stipulations regarding unity of time and space as it is free of St. Paul’s distinction between “now” 
and “then.” Kuzmin’s “Classicism” is a phenomenon that he defined against the conventions of 
any aesthetic system. 
As in the texts already discussed in this chapter, the central metaphor in “On Beautiful 
Clarity” is a mirror, both as the surface of the Earth, and as writing. In a later essay, “Scales in a 
Net” [“Cheshuia v nevode”] (1922), he makes the connection between his views on writing and 
St. Paul’s interpretation of clarity: “All of the arts act on the imagination through the sensuous 
external senses. Only poetry is immediately face to face” [“Vse iskusstva deistvuiut na 
voobrazhenie cherez chuvstvennye vneshnie chuvstva. Odna poeziia nepocredstvenno litsom k 																																																								
323 Kuzmin, “Iskusstvo i zhizn’: emotsional’nost kak osnovnoi element iskusstva,” PE Vol. 3, 
375-380, 377.  
324 Kuzmin, SS 3:735.   
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litsu.”]. He elaborates that all arts are equal and autonomous, but painting and sculpture are more 
“earthly” and “basic” [“zemnee i proshche”] because they operate with pre-existing forms.325 
Unlike the visual arts, poetic language is “face to face” with the “un-earthly.” To write is to 
reflect the radical unknown, the proverbial “other.” This idea explains Kuzmin’s frequent use of 
the image of “twins,” one dead, and the other alive, but both engrossed in the mystical process of 
creation, and his interest in the relationship between the prototype and the “copy” that becomes 
an original in its own right, and the author and his work. The metaphor of writing as a mirror that 
persists throughout Kuzmin’s body of work draws attention to its own metaphoric nature, 
suggesting another pairing of equal opposites: the word and the image, which are as connected as 
they are distinct and “unearthly” to each other. Kuzmin’s clarity is a meditation on this essential 












325 Kuzmin, “Cheshuia v nevode,” PE 3:371-372. Kuzmin elaborates that each art form seeks its 
opposite. Music, as the most amorphous, chaotic and vague of the arts, seeks its most exacting 
and “nearly mathematical” complement in logic and philosophy. Unlike the Symbolists, 
Kuzmin—a musician— does not privilege music, although he does consider it chaotic. He writes 
that as the most amorphous of all arts, music is attracted to the least vague and most “clear” in 
the traditional sense of the word: philosophy and logic. Neither has the type of clarity that 
Kuzmin has in mind. 
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Chapter 4 
Speech as ‘Epic Gesture’:  




Osip Mandelshtam’s Critical Response to Ivanov, Kuzmin and Bely 
 
In 1910 Osip Mandelshtam was nineteen years old and not yet a published poet. His 
contribution to the debate on clarity (in 1920s and again the mid-1930s) was a reflection on the 
crisis of Symbolism as a fact of literary history. From the beginning, he understood this concept 
not only as a specific approach to the relationship between the word and the image, but also a 
representation of the preceding generation’s effort to create a poetics of knowledge. 
Mandelshtam’s approach to clarity should be understood in the context of his relationship to the 
poetics of Ivanov, Kuzmin and Bely.  
As the acrimonious exchange between the Symbolists and Kuzmin unfolded on the pages 
of Trudy i Dni, a group of young poets who eventually called themselves the “Acmeists” began 
to define itself against Symbolist theory. Mandelshtam had frequented Ivanov’s Tower since 
1909, but by 1912 he became a core participant in the Acmeist movement. While his poems of 
1909—1912 reflect the influence of Symbolism in general, and Ivanov’s theories and poetry in 
particular, his 1913 manifesto “The Morning of Acmeism” contains an overt polemic with his 
mentor: he objects to Ivanov’s “dubious a realibus ad realiora,” and pledges allegiance to the 
principle of identity, and concrete reality rather than symbolic insinuations of higher orders of 
existence.326 In the same essay, as Mandelshtam distances himself from Ivanov’s theories, he 
																																																								
326 Oleg Lekmanov, Kniga ob akmeizme i drugie raboty (Tomsk: Vodolei, 2000), 57-59. 
Lekmanov writes on Mandelshtam as Ivanov’s opponent in “Motivy esseistiki Viacheslava 
Ivanova v tvorcheskom soznanii Mandel’shtama” (119-118) and “Stikhotvorenie Mandel’shtama 
‘Kazino’ kak manifest i nekrolog,” (463-472).  
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appears to espouse Kuzmin’s “beautiful clarity,” positing the clearly anti-Symbolist idea of logic 
as “the domain of the unexpected,” and insisting on the apparently concrete “here and now,” 
rather than an abstract “there.”327 In this essay, however, he also pays him the dubious 
compliment of likening him to Pushkin’s Salieri: the perfect draftsman who has “measured 
harmony with algebra.” Mandelshtam’s 1916 essay “On Contemporary Poetry” encapsulates the 
ambivalence of his response to Kuzmin’s poetics:328 
It is sweet to read the classic poet living among us, to feel Goethe's fusion of "form" and 
"content," to become convinced that our soul is not a substance made of metaphysical 
wadding, but an easy and gentle Psyche. Kuzmin's poems are not only easy to remember, 
they seem almost to recall themselves [...] However, Kuzmin's “Clarism” has its 
dangerous side. It seems that the kind of good weather one finds especially in his later 
verses can’t really exist.329   
 
Mandelshtam praises Kuzmin’s brilliant poetic diction and credits him with replacing ponderous 
Symbolist abstractions with a graceful and luminous “Psyche.” He associates Kuzmin’s work 
with classicism as unity of form and content, and writes that his poetry is not only easy to 
memorize, but presents itself as a memory. Mikhail Gasparov mentions that in this passage 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Lekmanov’s essay “Osip Mandel’shtam i Viacheslav Ivanov” details instances of intertextuality 
between the two poets’ works: O. Lekmanov and E.V. Gluhkova, “Osip Mandel’shtam i 
Viacheslav Ivanov,” in V. E. Bagno, A.B. Shishkin, et al. (eds.), Bashnia Viacheslava Ivanova i 
kul’tura serebrianogo veka (St. Petersburg: Filologicheskii fakul’tet S.-Peterburgskogo 
gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2006), 173-179.    
327 The problem of Acmeist adaptations and interpretations of Kuzmin’s poetics has been treated 
by critics starting with V.M. Zhirmunsky and his 1916 essay “Those who Overcame Symbolism” 
[“Preodolevshie simvolizm”], and more recently, Iuri Freidin’s “Mikhail Kuzmin i Osip 
Mandel’shtam: vliianie i otkliki,” in G. A. Morev (ed.), Mikhail Kuzmin i russkaia kul’tura XX 
veka (Leningrad: Muzei Anny Akhmatovoii v Fontannom dome), 28-32; Lekmanov, “K voprosy 
o Kuzmine i akmeizme: summiruiia obshcheizvestvnoe.” Kniga ob akmeizme, 45-50.  
328 Freidin provides a careful analysis of Mandelshtam’s references to Kuzmin. Mandelshtam 
praises Kuzmin in “O sovremennoi poezii” (1916) and “O prirode slova” (1920-1922). He takes 
a very critical stance toward him in “’Grotesk’” (1922) and “Buria i natisk” (1923). “Mikhail 
Kuzmin i Osip Mandel’shtam: vliianie i otkliki,” in G.A. Morev (ed.), Mikhail Kuzmin i russkaia 
kul’tura XX veka (Leningrad: Muzei Anny Akhmatovoii v Fontannom dome), 28-32. 
329 Mandel’shtam, “O sovremennoi poezii,” PSS II: 42-45, 44. 
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Classicism signifies the return of the eternal, in contrast to the personal.330 But as Mandelshtam 
praises Kuzmin for his Classical memory, he also criticizes his “Clarism” as artificially perfect. 
In later essays he also accuses him of creating a false impression of Russian prosody’s 
“premature aging” (“Sturm und Drang”), and of “concealing stylization” in the corners of his 
mouth (“Grotesk”).331 He implies that Kuzmin’s “eternal” prototype is a fabrication, in other 
words, that the work of memory has not really been done. In his view, Kuzmin’s eternally 
recurring Edenic original is a fabrication, always situated beyond history and historical memory. 
Its perfection detaches it from the historical reality of language and thus diminishes it.  
The problem of the prototype emerges in Mandelshtam’s criticism of Ivanov. When in 
1923 he writes on the maître’s concept of a hierophantic, “sacred” language, he rejects the notion 
of the sacred original and claims that the imported scholarly Greek of “Byzantine monks” was 
never superior to the Russian vulgate.332 Like Kuzmin, who considered Russian translations to be 
superior to the original Greek prayers, he objects to the idea of an “original,” endowed with 
spiritual authority, used to validate the present utterance, and available only to the select few. 
Mandelshtam reminds the reader that the evolution of Russian literary tradition is measured by 
the degree to which it adopted the “worldly” vulgate. “It’s untrue that Latin rests within Russian 
speech, untrue that Hellas […] rests there […] Russian itself rests there and only Russian itself 
																																																								
330 M. Gasparov, “Osip Mandel’shtam: tri ego poetiki.” O Russkoi Poezii (St. Petersburg: 
Akademia, 2001), 208. 
331 Mandel’shtam, “Grotesk,” “Buria i Natisk.” Slovo i kul’tura, 188, 209. 
332 In the context of European literary history, Dante set the precedent for Mandelshtam’s 
position. Dante’s views are quite complex, however. He does not reject the “original” languages: 
Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. However, in De Vulgari Eloquentia and The Banquet he proffers an 
impassioned defense of the vulgate. His Commedia is also a convincing argument in its favor.  
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[…] Give us the vulgate—we don’t want the Latin Bible.”333 Irina Rodnianskaia demonstrates 
that this essay is a point-by-point response to Ivanov’s “Our Language” [“Nash iazyk”] (1918-
1920).334 She observes that Ivanov believes discontinuity to be the root of cultural evils, while 
for Mandelshtam interruption is consonant with the nature of language.335 In another essay 
Mandelshtam defines Ivanov’s tendency toward archaisms in terms of his “inability to think 
relatively, in other words, to compare names.”336 This inability blinds the poet to the significance 
of difference, transformation, context, and explains his effort to resurrect the prototype in the 
present.  
Ivanov privileges the origin and the original and understands them as identical emblems 
of knowledge beyond history. Kuzmin, conversely, views the original as an alternative to history 
and, as he states in the essays on Gluck, the freedom to forget about historical origins. 
Knowledge is nonetheless always present in his writing as an emblem of something that he 
commands, and also as that from which he is free. Mandelshtam does not dismiss the idea of 
origin like Kuzmin, nor does he elevate it to the status of a truth, like Ivanov. He understands and 
incorporates it into his writing as no-knowledge, and so a rupture in a continuity. The original 
happens post-rupture.  
																																																								
333 Mandel’shtam, “‘Vulgata,’” PSS 2:140-142. As in English, the Russian word “vul’gata” 
refers to the Latin translation of the Bible from the original Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek. Either 
Mandelshtam made a mistake, or he meant to refer to the vernacular Russian as the “new” Latin.  
334 Irina Rodnianskaia, Dvizhenie literatury, 2 vols. (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul’tur, 2006), 
1:253-268. John Malmstad has also contributed an important essay on Mandelshtam’s polemic 
with Ivanov. He discusses Mandelshtam’s “Silentium” as a response to Ivanov’s “The Precepts 
of Symbolism” in: “Mandel’shtam’s ‘Silentium’: A Poet’s Response to Ivanov” in Paul 
Bushkovitch (ed.), Vyacheslav Ivanov: Poet, Critic and Philosopher (New Haven: Yale Russian 
and East European Publications, 1986), 236-252.  
335 Rodnianskaia, Dvizhenie literatury, 254-255.  
336 Mandel’shtam, “Buria i natisk,” PSS 2:128-139, 132. 
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In the essay “On the Nature of the Word [“O prirode slova”]” (1921) as Mandelstham 
polemicizes with Symbolism, he writes against the idea of progress and resorts to Bergson’s 
philosophy to replace the abhorrent principle of causation with the more flexible principle of 
connection. He recalls Bergson’s “fan” as a visual representation of a connective “system.” Like 
Kuzmin, he prefers the spatial paradigm to Ivanov’s temporal model with its culmination in the 
distant “origin” as cause and truth. As space comes to represent freedom from causation, the 
causeless word becomes spacious: neither the meaning nor the sound prevails as the definitive 
origin. The coexistence of the two is the reason Mandelshtam famously states in this essay that 
the word is already an image, and a symbol.337 Polemicizing with Ivanov, the poet also suggests 
that the word is “Hellenic” not because it may or may not derive from ancient Greek, but because 
like ancient Greek, it conceptualizes the word as simultaneously being and action: “The 
Hellenistic nature of the Russian language can be identified with its existential being. The word 
in the Hellenistic sense is active flesh that resolves into event.”338 Mandelshtam goes on to say 
that the event is “the conscious environment of a person with implements [utvar’] instead of 
indifferent objects, the transformation of these objects into implements, the humanization of the 
surrounding world, the warming of it with the subtlest teleological warmth.”339 Any vulgate is 
“Hellenic,” as long as it accords with its purpose. Any language, in other words, is original, if it 
is both the dwelling of the mind, and the “implement” that creates this dwelling: both discrete or 
causeless, and continuous or teleological.  
																																																								
337 Mandel’shtam, “O prirode slova,” PSS 2:64-81. 
The observation that Mandelshtam understands the word as a metaphor belongs to Irina Paperno. 
Irina Paperno, “O prirode poeticheskogo slova: bogoslovskie istochniki spora Mandel’shtama s 
simvolizmom.” Literaturnoe obozrenie 1 (1991): 29-36, 33. 
338 Mandel’shtam, “O prirode slova,” PSS 2:67-68. 
339 Ibid., 76. 
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Mandelshtam understands Classicism as a period in the history of poetic language when 
the vulgate discovers itself as an original.340 This discovery takes place through rupture—a 
forgetting that must be compensated by the effort to remember and the recovery of the lost but as 
something new and transformed. In the essay “Word and Culture” [“Slovo i kul'tura”] (1921) the 
poet declares freedom from “the weight of memory” [“my svobodny ot gruza vospominanii”], 
and compares poetry to the plough that turns the soil of time [“poeziia—plug, vzryvaiushchii 
vremia”]. He goes on to define Classicism: “But there are eras when humanity, not content with 
the present day, yearns like a ploughman, thirsts for the virgin soil of time. Revolution in art 
inevitably leads to Classicism.”341 Within the parameters of a project preoccupied with purpose, 
Classicism as “the virgin soil of time” is always a new beginning.  
This position resembles Kuzmin’s, who also views “classical Psyche” as free from 
causation. For him, liberation takes place when the magic mirror of art reflects the individual as a 
universal, without robbing him of his individuality. Kuzmin elevates this process to the status of 
a ritual. But while for him it is an end in itself, Mandelshtam views it as the beginning. Rejecting 
Kuzmin’s stylization as not open-ended enough, he seeks the origin in the unknown itself. 
Paradoxically, continuity emerges from forgetting. The original that appears thus incorporates 
the unfamiliar—in its form as an ancient or a foreign tongue for example— without depriving it 
of its unfamiliarity. The spoken word—Tyutchev’s “a thought once uttered”— becomes an 
original in its own right by virtue of a relationship first to the fundamental unknown from which 
it separated, and second, to the “other” as a concrete, historical entity. Mandelshtam’s approach 
																																																								
340 Mandelshtam’s poetry is usually considered “classical” especially in his first two books Stone 
and Tristia. See, for example, the aforementioned observation by Mikhail Gasparov, regarding 
Mandelshtam’s approach to Kuzmin’s classicism as reflecting his own.  Below, I refer to Lidiya 
Ginzburg’s discussion of Mandelshtam’s classicism in O lirike.  
341 Mandel’shtam, “Slovo i kul’tura,” PSS 2: 49-55, 51.  
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merges Kuzmin’s universal but detached subject with the Symbolists’ sense of civic 
obligation.342  
Mandelshtam’s response and criticism of Andrei Bely further elucidates his specific 
understanding of the poetic logos and the process whereby it obtains its universal quality, the 
role of forgetting in his interpretation of the open-ended and vulnerable poetic word, and the 
relationship between the speaker and the word. Moreover, it pertains to Mandelshtam’s 
understanding of clarity as a specific concept used by his teachers. His engagement with Bely’s 
work is more complex and more extensive than his response to Ivanov and Kuzmin. While he 
launched some of his most strident criticism against Bely, he may have envisioned him as his 
ideal interlocutor, and represented him in his own poetry as a larger-than-life figure of a 
paradigmatic poet.343 In 1935 Rudakov quotes Mandelshtam saying about Bely: “We see 
craftsmanship not where others do.” [“My ne v tom, chto drugie, vidim masterstvo.”]344 
Mandelshtam’s use of the pronoun “we” in reference to another poet with whom he believes to 
have shared a creative purpose is unique. Since Mandelshtam’s response to Bely is extensive, I 
focus on an instance of textual overlap between the two poets’ work and on a specific critical 
essay—both of which pertain directly to the theme of clarity. 
																																																								
342 Lidiya Ginzburg writes that Mandelshtam turns away from the subjectivism of the Symbolists 
in favor of classicism, which he treats as a synthesis of various classical styles ranging from 
antiquity to St. Petersburg Empire, French seventeenth century and the Russian eighteenth 
century. She mentions that he does not stylize, but synthesizes in the effort to understand them 
historically, and that by the 1920s he transforms these idioms into the author’s speech. Lidiya 
Ginzburg, O lirike (Moscow: Intrada, 1997), 340-343. 
343Andrew Kahn, “Andrei Belyi, Dante and “Golubye Glaza i Goriachaia Lobnaia Kost’” 
Mandel’shtam’s Later Poetics and the Image of the Raznochinets. The Russian Review 53.1 (Jan. 
1994), 22-35, 26.  
344 D.M. Klimova, ed. Ezhegodnik rukopisnogo otdela Pushkinskogo doma na 1993 god: 
materialy ob O.E. Mandel’shtame (St. Petersburg: Gumanitarnoe agentsvo “Akademicheskii 
proekt,” 1997), 67. Rudakov writes about this in a letter dated 6/20/1935.   
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Bely’s Glossolalia (1917) is a lengthy prose poem that resembles an etymological 
dictionary, a shamanic manual, and a fictional history of language all at once. Mandelshtam uses 
the word “glossolalia” once, in the essay “Word and Culture” (1921).  The scholar Vladimir 
Feshchenko believes that while the presence of this term in the two poets’ texts indicates similar 
interests, it is coincidental. Yet in 1921, when the two texts appeared side by side in the almanac 
Dragon, Mandelshtam served as one of its editors. The almanac contained poetry and prose by 
many participants of Gumilev’s “Poets’ Guild,” some prominent Symbolists and Mikhail 
Kuzmin.345 Mandelshtam would have read Bely’s text closely and likely used this word in his 
essay with Bely in mind.  
Bely’s Glossolalia varies the theme—previously featured in the essay “Orpheus”—of 
poetic language as knowledge catalyzed by insight into origins. It further explicates the idea of 
the Orphic symbol as a tautological subversion of the visible. The text begins with its own 
version of the genesis myth, whereby the speech act creates the world as well as the word. 
Enunciation is equated with Rudolf Steiner’s theosophical practice of eurythmy—a dance-like 
performance that aspires to become “visible speech.” But for Bely speech is a kind of dance, 
rather than dance a kind of speech. The text also explores the idea of the historical origins of 
languages, applying comparative and fictional etymologies, and referencing ancient Greek, 
Hebrew, and Sanskrit languages in addition to Russian, German and other modern languages. 
Most of all, Bely is interested in the origins of words themselves, because their original mythic 
significance and power resides in their “inner forms.” The linguist Alexander Potebnya’s concept 
of the “inner form” represents the trace of the word’s development in time, or the “trail” left by 
the thought that created it, such as the Russian word for “eye” or “oko” that inheres in the later 																																																								
345 E. Etkind, “Krizis simvolizma i akmeizm.” Tam, vnutri: o russkoi poezii XX veka 
(St.Petersburg: “Maksima”, 1996), 25-49, 44-45. 
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word for “window” or “okno.” Bely interprets this concept his own way. He believes that the 
“inner form” appears to the individual and collective imagination as a “motivation” of a 
phenomenon, then as myth, and eventually as religious belief. 346  
The word that knows its origin is the source or origin of a future world: its “embryo.” As 
such, it aspires to bridge the distinction between the world as fact and the world as fiction.347 The 
poet’s “shamanic” effort should be viewed in the context of ideas that figured in such earlier 
works as the essay “The Magic of Words,” where Bely emphasized the powers of language to 
subordinate chaos, and described words as the “essence” not only of human nature, but of nature 
as such. The poet who can harness this power mends the incongruent relationship between the 
self and the world.348 Feshchenko suggests that Mandelshtam’s notion of the “heroic era of the 
word,” likewise from his “Word and Culture,” would have appealed to Bely, who views the 
endeavor to revive myth by “remembering” the origins of words and “enunciating” them into life 
as heroic.349  
Bely believed that the word’s power resides in its sound as the magical link between time 
and space, a concrete demonstration of causality, and the key to transformation. The “heroic” 
task of Glossolalia is to animate the soundscape of words’ “inner forms.”350 This can only 
																																																								
346 Feshchenko, Laboratoriia logosa, 160-161. Also Paperno, “O prirode poeticheskogo slova,” 
29-30. She references Bely’s 1907 essay “The Meaning of Art” [“Smysl iskusstva”]. 
347V. Feshchenko calls Bely’s essay “Zhezl Aarona” a study in the embryology of the word. 
Feshchenko, Laboratoriia logosa, 170.  
348 The notion that there is a space of non-correspondence between language and reality plays an 
ambiguous role in Bely’s language theory. In the essay “The Magic of Words” Bely writes he 
writes that the very purpose of art, and therefore language, is to create objects of knowledge. For 
Bely this means that the word and the world are identical. Yet the idea that mind is the creator of 
the very objects it seeks to know could be interpreted in exactly the opposite way haunts his 
writing, especially his fiction, and represents the premise of his novel Petersburg, for example. 
A. Belyi, “Magiia slov.” Simvolism kak miroponimanie, 135. 
349 Mandel’shtam, “Slovo i kul’tura,” 53. 
350 Belyi, “Magiia slov,” 132. 
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happen when the corporeal world has been dissolved in sound, in other words, subordinated to 
language.351 This may appear paradoxical, considering the emphasis that the text places on the 
idea of the words’ origin within the body, and its recourse to the figure of the eurythmic dancer. 
But as mentioned in the context of Bely’s essay “Orpheus,” the material and the visible is present 
only as the renunciation of itself. Indeed, the opening chapter of Glossolalia describes image, 
and metaphor as a “word-image,” as the process of the destruction of sound.  
Concrete physical reality and its visual and verbal representation are meaningful only 
insofar as they are expressions of thought, because thought is the expression of the divine Self: 
“Gestures are the youthful sounds of as yet unformed thoughts embedded in my body; the exact 
same thing that is occurring at the moment only under my frontal bone will happen throughout 
my body in the course of time.352 The achievement of Steiner’s eurythmy is its ability to 
transform the body into thought and the medium of sound: “The imprint on eurythmy of free 
clarity […] and dance; the fleet-footed dancer is he who clothed the flow of thought in the 
ornaments of rhythm […].” It is not by chance that the “free clarity” [“vol’naia iasnost’”] of the 
dancer evokes Kuzmin’s clarity as “police precinct” [“politseiskii uchastok iasnosti”] with an 
opposed image. Reason and form, ratio and the body, which in Bely’s opinion Kuzmin 
advocated, are “limits” that must be overcome. The “freedom” of his dancer is contingent upon 
her body becoming an expression and sign of the invisible. As an extension and representation, 
she, too, is an “icon” in the manner of the mask of Orpheus.  
																																																								
351For Bely time, not space, was the vessel of the sacred. Already in the essay “The Forms of 
Art” [“Formy iskusstva”] (1902), he defined poetry as “the bridge from the spatial to the 
temporal”[“most, perekinutyi ot prostranstva k vremeni”] and called it a “vent through which the 
spirit of music enters spatial forms”[“otdushina, propuskaiushchaia v iskusstvo 
prostranstvennykh form dukh muzyki”]. Belyi, “Formy iskusstva.” Simvolism kak 
miroponimanie, 91, 98.   
352 Andrei Belyi, Glossolaliia: poema o zvuke. (Moscow: Evidentis, 2002).10. 
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In the central chapters of the text an entry on “clarity” or “iasnost’” not only interprets 
the “inner form” of this concept in several languages, but presents it as the exemplary “inner 
form,” and a symbolic representation of glossolalia as the core concept of the text.353 Bely traces 
the word “iasnost’” from the root “ser,” “Serios,” or Sirius, and the Greek “hélios,” or the sun.354 
He improvises on the sound “ser”: “ser-as” is summer and heat; and ser-enus is clear; the sounds 
Ser-ios is the name of a star; it is Sirius, that is blazing with rays: a distant sun […]” [“ser-as”—
leto i zhar; i ser-enus est’ iasnyi; zvuki Ser-ios—imenovanie zvezdy; eto—Sirius, chto pylaet 
luchami: dalekoe solntse …”]. He associates the sound “ser” with “swar” and the Slavic “iadr”:  
[...] the core of solar activity (raz-zor) is the root of the universe, it is the radix; and that 
radix is crimson; “Sas” is the name of Zeus; “ias” clear and ash, a tree dedicated to the 
sun; and “iasis” is Iason (Zeus's son); and from that the later sound “ias” means to us not 
only clarity; it also means “holiness”: “iasis” is holy (is clear); “iassis,” “iaso,” “iasos” 
denoting a shrine (or light); and “iasis” is beauty (what is light is beautiful); and Jason in 
search of the Golden Fleece. 
 
… iadro solnechnykh deistvii (raz-zor)—eto koren’ vselennoi, on—radix, i radix tot—
riadnyi; “Sas”—imenovanie Zevsa; “ias” ias-en i iasen’, derevo, posviashchennoe 
solntsu; i “iasis”est’ iasen’ (syn Zevsa); i ottogo-to pozdnee zvuk “ias” oboznachetne 
tol’ko nam iasnost’: oboznachet i “sviatost’”: “iasis” est’ sviataia (est’ iasnaia); “iasis,” 
“iaso,” “iasos” oboznacheniia sviatyni (il’ sveta); i “iasis”—krasota (chto svetlo, to—
krasivo); i ustremlennyi k Runu Zolotomu—Iazon.355  
 
																																																								
353 Belyi, Glossolaliia, 25-29.  As an origin myth in its own right, the pays special attention to 
the first sentence of Genesis: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” in the original 
Hebrew, and German translation. This is, no doubt, a jab at Kuzmin, whose “On Beautiful 
Clarity” references the biblical origin myth in order to emphasize the idea of distinction. Bely’s 
text revisits it in order to underscore that the word is union and co-creation of the self and the 
world. 
354 The myth of the sun interested Bely as early as the 1900s, as member of the intellectual group 
the “Argonauts.” He also wrote several poems about Jason and the quest for the Golden Fleece, 
equated with the sun. He references the myth in an important series of essays “Crisis of Life,” 
“Crisis of Thought,” and “Crisis of Culture” (1916-1917), in his Notes of an Eccentric and in 
numerous other texts. Glossolalia stands apart from all of them in one important way: it 
elucidates the connection between this myth and Bely’s concept of clarity. 
355 Belyi, Glossolaliia, 44-45.  
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Clarity is the origin: “the root” of the universe. The inner form of the word “clear” or “iasnyi” is 
“ia,” present in such Russian words as iasen’ (ash tree), and in the ancient Greek name Iasón 
(Jason). It indicates and “contains” the sun as the expression of the divine Self. It also represents 
the intersection between literature, myth, and the sacred.356 Once again, the sound “ia,” and its 
meaning as “self” represents Bely’s tautological sign: both an extension and a representation of 
the divine Self. Since this sound concept signifies and effectuates the union of a multiplicity of 
selves and the divine Self, it encapsulates glossolalia as Bely understands it.  
In sum, Bely proclaims the primacy of the invisible and of sound as its immediate 
expression, and views glossolalia as a plurality united in the one. His symbol is one based in a 
tautology wherein the material and the visual signifier leads to the invisible and the singular 
signified. But while the narrator of his poem engages in interpretation and elaboration or 
improvisation on the esoteric meanings of the multiple language concepts that figure in the text, 
the reader relies on this exegetic “dance” in order to arrive at the destination—the knowledge 
that the narrator seeks to convey. It is not possible to gain insight into his ideas based on sound 
alone, but only based on the conceptual explanation and interpretation. For the reader, this 
creates another kind of “sign,” one that is divided into the image and the narrator’s singular 
conceptual interpretation of this image.  
Mandelshtam mentions “glossolalia” just once, in the following passage from the essay 
“Word and Culture” and treats this concept as a metaphor that addresses the state of the poetic 
language of his time. 
These days glossolalia is taking place as a kind of phenomenon. In a sacred frenzy, poets 
speak the language of all times, of all cultures. Nothing is impossible. As the dying man's 																																																								
356 Feshchenko, Laboratoriia logosa, 167.  
Feshchenko discusses Bely’s enthusiasm for imiaslavie, the Russian interpretation of Hesychast 
mysticism that obviously informs the ideas above.  
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room is open to everyone, so the door of the old world is wide open before the crowd. 
Suddenly, everything has become common property. Go ahead and take it. Everything is 
accessible [...] The word became not a seven-stop, but a thousand-stop flute, suddenly 
animated by the breath of all ages. In glossolalia, the most striking thing is that the 
speaker does not know the language he speaks. He speaks a completely unknown 
language. And it seems to everyone that he speaks Greek or Chaldean. Something quite 
the reverse of erudition. Modern poetry, for all its complexity and inner sophistication, is 
naïve […].357   
 
Unlike Bely’s text, wherein the singular narrator interprets the singular meaning embedded in 
many tongues, Mandelshtam’s “glossolalia” is inherently pluralistic. It is available to anyone, 
and represents the heritage of “all ages.” This universally available phenomenon has a specific 
relationship to knowledge. The speaker thinks she remembers something, but in fact she does 
not. She thinks she speaks “Greek or Chaldean,” but memory is only the form of the new. She 
therefore does not, to quote Ivanov, “invent the new and obtain the old,” but invents the old and 
obtains the new. Spontaneous loss of knowledge, rather than its conscious attainment invigorates 
language, allowing the idioms of the past to obtain new form and content. Unlike Bely, then, 
Mandelshtam does not view the origin as validation, nor is he interested in multiplicity as a 
representation of a singular principle or a singular meaning. The reader of his glossolalia would 
need to construe the meaning for herself, without exegetical guidance. This means that the 
moment of the enrichment of language comes when meaning is forgotten, and that knowledge as 
understanding, insight, or interpretation is a secondary phenomenon. Finally, unlike Bely’s 
tautological relationship between the self and the Self, and his emphasis on the word’s identity 
with being, Mandelshtam’s glossolalia assumes the kind of relationship between the speaker and 
the word, whereby identity implies a non-correspondence.  
																																																								
357 Mandel’shtam, “Slovo i kul’tura,” 53-54. 
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At the same time as Mandelshtam implicitly dismisses the idea of origin as validation of 
the present, he validates his contemporaries’ participation in a “glossolalia” in his own sense of 
the word, as the “opposite of erudition.” Kuzmin’s “as if recalled” classical Psyche, Bely’s 
shamanic narrator, and numerous other voices take part in this phenomenon regardless of their 
specific attitude toward the word they speak. It takes place as an event in the life of a language, 
regardless of the intention and the interpretation of the speaker.  
In spite of his very different perspective on the role of the past in the present life of a 
language, there is no evidence that Mandelshtam disliked Bely’s poem. His highly negative 
review of Bely’s novel The Notes of an Eccentric [Zapiski chudaka] (1922), however, engages 
the problem of clarity as it figures in Glossolalia, and further elucidates Mandelshtam’s 
perspective on the purpose of the poetic logos. The novel is a theosophical story of Orphic 
initiation, intended as a preface to a never completed multi-volume epic [“epopeia”] of the 
“self.” In the preface to this preface, Bely introduces the first-person narrator of the text as his 
own double. In the afterward he refers to this epic as a satire on individual experience, especially 
a mystical one. Now the reader finds out that the protagonist falls pray to a “mania grandiosa,” 
the mental illness of Nietzsche, Schuman and Hölderlin, which the narrator of the preface claims 
to have exorcised, unlike the three great minds he references, by writing the novel. The transition 
from the individual and grandiose “self” to the “supra-subjective ‘I’” [“nad-individual’noe ‘Ia’”] 
and “objective” reality is achieved not by the protagonist, but by the “author,” who satirizes his 
protagonist’s and double’s grandiosity, and therefore transcends it without ever abandoning the 
first-person narrative voice.358 The premise of the narrative echoes the concept of clarity as it 
appears in Glossolalia. The multiplicity that merges with the divine Self in the poem appears as 																																																								
358 At least according to the preface, both Bely and Kuzmin view clarity as the passage from the 
self, to the self as object. They differ only in how they interpret the object itself. 
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the narrator’s multiple “selves” in the novel and is echoed by the multiple genres—the novel, the 
epic and the satire—that the text evokes. While in the prose poem a single speaker interprets 
many languages as one, in the satirical epic the author claims to have the singular objective point 
of view on a plurality of selves.  
As in Glossolalia, clarity in the Notes is associated with the loss of the body and emerges 
in the context of an extended polemic with Kuzmin. As Bely’s protagonist experiences Orphic 
initiation, he undergoes a metaphoric decapitation, so that his skull transforms into a cupola, and 
the cupola into the whole universe. As this happens, he exclaims: “No: ‘I’ and ‘the world’ –have 
crossed in me. The union with the cosmos was accomplished in me; the thoughts of the world 
condensed to the shoulders: one’s “I” is one’s own only to the shoulders: the dome of heaven 
rises above the shoulders. I lifted my own skull from my shoulders, like a scepter, with my 
hand.” [“Net: “Ia” i “mir”—pereseklis’ vo mne. Soedinenie s kosmosom sovershilos’ vo mne; 
mysli mira sgustilis’ do plech: lish’ do plech “Ia” svoi sobstvennyi: s plech podnimaetsia kupol 
nebesnyi. Ia, sobstvennyi cherep sniav s plech, podnimaiu, kak skipetr, rukoiu moeiu.”]359 The 
narrator responds to Kuzmin’s “On Beautiful Clarity,” where the author writes: “in the life of 
every human being there arrive moments when […] he will suddenly say […] “I—and the 
																																																								
359Andrei Belyi, Zapiski chudaka, 2 vols. (Moscow, Berlin: Gelikon, 1922), 2:114. The title of 
this chapter of the novel references Ivanov’s 1904 poem “Fio, Ergo Non Sum,” where the 
speaker asks repeatedly “where am I?”  
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world.”360 In Bely’s view, the body as the site of “worldly thoughts” creates the illusion of 
separation between the “self” and the “world” as subject and object.361          
Mandelshtam gave the novel an exceptionally bad review.362 He attributes the text’s 
failure to the narrator’s self-indulgence, and attacks the author for his “literary vanity” 
[“literaturnaia samobliublennost’”] and his desire “to expose himself in the fourth, fifth and sixth 
																																																								
360 Bely polemicized with these words in 1910, when in the beginning of his essay “The Magic 
of Words” [“Magiia slov”] he wrote: “”My “self” does not exist separately from the 
surroundings; nor does the world exist separately from my “self”; “I” and the “world” appear 
only in the process of merging together in sound.” A. Belyi, “Magiia slov.” Simvolism kak 
miroponimanie, 131. 
361 In the essay “’Orfei rasterzannyi’ i nasledie orfizma” Lena Silard discusses the trope of 
dismemberment and decapitation in Bely’s novel as a major Orphic theme (79). Lena Silard. 
’Orfei rasterzannyi’ i nasledie orfizma” Germetizm i germenevtika (St. Petersburg: Iz-vo Ivana 
Limbakha, 2002), 54-101.  
362 It was exceptionally badly received by Kuzmin as well. He included a scathing review of 
Notes of an Eccentric in the same collection as his essays on Gluck. The review, entitled 
“Dreamers” [“Mechtateli”], describes the novel as a site of gory violence.  
 “The epic of “Self” […] is, of course, an event in literature, and a tragic one at that. Never 
before has the chemistry lab of creativity been stripped so bare, never before has formal 
inventiveness, metaphysical dialectics, and psychological self-analysis been so acute; all 
available means were put to use. Nearly the Battle of Leipzig that, in my opinion, has been lost. 
Spiritual fragmentation and whirling [“mel’kanie”] render the brilliance of Bely’s chemical art 
nearly uncanny <…> the chemical amalgamation of life’s elements fails to create a living being.   
Not by chance, Kuzmin likens Bely’s writing to a homunculus—an entity that lacks wholeness. 
In his vocabulary the adjective “uncanny” and references to the “dispersed state” 
[“razdroblennost’”] of the author and his prose are antonyms of “clarity” as an image of organic 
integrity. In the previous chapter I quote Kuzmin’s observations on seeing first without and then 
with spectacles. With the spectacles he sees a disjointed, de-mystified world, and compares this 
kind of vision to seeing with the devil’s shard of a broken mirror in the eye. The entry dates to 
1934, but evidently the ideas themselves date to a much earlier period. In his review he suggests 
that while the ghost of “spectacled” reasoning haunts Bely’s writing overall, it is especially 
present in the pivotal space of his concept of “iasnost’,” as it fails to deliver on its promise of a 
mystical revelation. Parodying Bely’s fascination with dynamism, he describes the futility of his 
“gesture”: “Bely did not leap beyond literature, and, contrary to his assurances, dives not into 
“nothing,” but still only into literature.” Kuzmin likens the desire to create an organic whole 
from rational thought to an alchemy experiment gone wrong, and to an ego-fueled Napoleonic 
battle. (Kuzmin, “Mechtateli,” PE 3:608-609.)   
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dimension” [“pokazat’ sebia v chetvertom, piatom, shestom izmerenii”].363 He observes that the 
text unfolds in a historical vacuum and culminates in a self-satisfied, deracinated theosophic 
commune in Switzerland. Contemptuous of Bely’s mystical aspirations, Mandelshtam describes 
theosophy as the “knit sweater-vest of a degenerate religion” [“viazanaia fufaika 
vyrozhdaiushcheisia religii”]. But most of all, he abhors the novel’s style, especially its 
conflation of prose and lyric modalities. He observes that the text is almost in hexameter and that 
this lends it the “crude and repulsive” musicality of a “prose poem” [“grubaia, otvratitel’naia dlia 
slukha muzykal’nost’ stikhotvoreniia v proze (vsia kniga napisana pochti gekzametrom) …]. It is 
neither prose nor poetry, but “half-verse” like a “schoolboy’s diary.” In this context he provides 
his own definition of prose as “asymmetrical: its movement—is the movement of a verbal 
mass—the movement of a herd, complex and rhythmic in its irregularity; true prose is disparity, 
discord, polyphony, counterpoint.” [“Proza assimetrichna: ee dvizheniia—dvizheniia slovesnoi 
massy—dvizhenie stada, slozhnoe i ritmichnoe v svoei nepravil’nosti; nastoiashchaia proza, 
razlad, mnogogolosie, kontrapunkt …”].364 Prose—especially one that strives to be of epic 
scope—comprises “many voices,” and cannot be tyrannically reduced to a single perspective. An 
inherently polyphonic linguistic mass rejects the superimposed vector of a single individual’s 
will. Mandelshtam cites Gargantua and Pantagruel and War and Peace as examples of prose 
“epics” that respect the polyphonic nature of the genre.365 War and Peace is a particularly 
																																																								
363Mandel’shtam, “Andrei Belyi: Zapiski chudaka.” Slovo i kul’tura (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 
1987), 254-256.  
The difference in Kuzmin’s and Mandelshtam’s criticism is telling. Kuzmin draws historical 
parallels, such as the comparison with Napoleon, in order to underscore the author’s self-
aggrandizement and the anti-artistic nature of the battle he seeks to fight in the pages of his 
novel. Mandelshtam, conversely, believes the author has lost touch with history. This was the 
criticism he launched at Kuzmin as well.  
364 Mandel’shtam, “Andrei Belyi: Zapiski chudaka.” Slovo i kul’tura, 256.  
365 Mandel’shtam, “Literaturnaia Moskva:rozhdenie fabuly,” PSS 2:106-111, here 108. 
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poignant example: Tolstoy depicts Napoleon as a megalomaniac whose personal insignificance 
is the more conspicuous the greater he believes himself to be.366 The French Emperor’s illusion 
of grandeur blinds him to the fact that he merely fulfills his mission within the text. Earnest or 
satirical, Bely’s effort to render the self “objective” amplifies the subject to such an extent that 
the subject leaves no room for the interlocutor. The absence of perspective creates a redundancy 
rather than a tautology.   
Mandelshtam references clarity in “Word and Culture,” the essay in which he also 
discusses glossolalia. A discussion of his treatment of this concept specifically is the theme of 
this chapter’s next section. Here, it is important to point out that while for all of the poets I 
discuss in my work, the term “clarity” pertains to the relationship of the subject and the object, 
the word and the image, and the self and the world, for Bely and Mandelshtam it also involves 
the problem of the one and the many. For Bely multiplicity is first and foremost a metaphysical, 
mystical concept. He seeks to reconcile the many in the one “objective” Self. In Glossolalia, a 
plurality of languages is interpreted in the single voice of the narrator, who knows, remembers 
and understands them all. In the Notes, the author-figure claims to have transcended his own 
double and rendered the troubled, individual self “objective.” For Bely, the singular specific self 
must find its origin, common to all, and by virtue of this discovery obtain “objective” selfhood. 
He associates this idea with sound as the origin of the word and the world. But, as Mandelshtam 
points out, in Bely’s texts the one eliminates the many. Bely’s tautological, icon-like sign 
undermines the plurality of forms and replaces them with an abstraction. This is easily 
																																																								
366 Mandel’shtam and Kuzmin concur on this subject. Kuzmin’s reference to Bely as Napoleon is 
discussed in footnote 54. By referencing Napoleon, obliquely or directly, both poets criticize 
Bely’s neo-Romantic tendencies.  
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interpreted as the author’s individual, psychological drive for self-realization: the very idea that 
Bely’s text claims to have transcended.   
Mandelshtam’s concept of the poetic word also implies a plurality, considered in a 
cultural and historical context that is conveyed by one voice, yet not reduced to a single 
interpretation. The comments to his review of Bely’s novel contain an excerpt from the poet’s 
diaries, which according to the editor complement his observations on the stylistic incongruence 
of the Notes, and which shed light on his concept of the word and its function in prose and 
poetry. Mandelshtam describes prose as the “discontinuous sign of the continuous”: “a story in 
prose is nothing but a discontinuous sign of the continuous […] Semantic vocabulary units 
scattered here and there. An advance without finality. Freedom of arrangement. In prose it’s 
always St. George’s Day.” [“prozaicheskii rasskaz ne chto inoe, kak preryvistyi znak 
nepreryvnogo … Smyslovye slovarnye edinitsy, razbegaiushchiesia po mestam. 
Neokonchatel’nost’ etogo mesta perebezhki. Svoboda rasstanovok. V proze—vsegda Iur’ev 
den’.”]367 Mandelshtam views language as potentially incessant. Prose communicates this idea 
by virtue of an instability and arbitrariness of word choice, and the “intermittent” and 
fragmentary nature of the sign. As its distinct opposite, the lyric sign would emerge from 
linguistic infinity as a discrete and indivisible whole. It would, then, represent a totality that 
contains and integrates a multiplicity, potentially an incessancy of voices. Whereas in prose each 
individual word hints at the possibility of its own replacement ad infinitum, the poetic logos is 
irreplaceable. The lyric dramatizes memory as the process of loss and retrieval of a specific 
word.  
																																																								
367 Mandel’shtam, “Andrei Belyi: Zapiski chudaka,” Slovo i kul’tura, 311.  
Up until the sixteenth century, on St. George’s day serfs could leave their owner for another one, 
if they so wished. 
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In spite of his often critical assessment of Bely’s writing, Mandelshtam may have 
sympathized with Bely’s vision of the sign itself. Both poets conceived of the word as a kind of 
tautology. But where Bely’s tautological symbol leads away from the visible and palpable world, 
Mandelshtam’s reorganizes, recreates and expands it. As both the dwelling and the instrument 
that creates it, his tautological word is dynamic. Paradoxically, such tautology implies a non-
correspondence. This is particularly evident in the likewise simultaneously tautological and non-
correspondent relationship between the speaker and the word.  
In the essay “Osip Mandelshtam: The Poetics of the Incarnated Word” [“Osip 
Mandel’shtam: poetika voploshchennogo slova”] Yuri Lotman argues that Mandelshtam’s 
“grandiose meta-poetic system” is based on a Christological “self-identification” with the 
word.368 The theme of incarnation, which is in fact prominent in the poet’s oeuvre, receives a 
more nuanced interpretation than Lotman’s analysis suggests. Mandelshtam’s narrator frequently 
references misspeaking, interruption and forgetting as an indication of non-correspondence, 
rather than self-identification with the word. The tension between the speaker’s described 
vulnerability and the words that capture and relate this vulnerability as a universal experience 
contributes to what Lotman proposes is the “poetics of incarnation.”  
The experience of speech captures the idea that universality and vulnerability are 
inextricable, because the body, with which the utterance is intimately connected, is its temporal, 
vulnerable and yet universal vehicle. Mandelshtam may have appreciated the beginning of 
Bely’s Glossolalia, where the poet describes how the word originates in the mouth, and a world 
emerges from this basic action. Speech as an act that is both physical and always surpassing the 
limitations of the body is central in the poet’s concept of the relationship between the self and the 																																																								
368Iurii Lotman, “Osip Mandel’shtam: poetika voploshchennogo slova.” In I.V. Abramets (ed.), 
Klassitsizm i modernizm: sbornik stateii (Tartu: Ülikooli kirjastus, 1994), 195-217. 
188 	
word. Mandelshtam’s writing represents this idea. Furthermore, it also represents the interlocutor 
as the “other” to whom speech is directed, and without whom the “incarnation” of the word is 
not complete.  
Lotman supports his concept of Mandelshtam’s “poetics of enfleshment” with an analysis 
of the poem “To German Speech” [“K nemetskoi rechi”] (1932). Although this poem was 
written later than the writings discussed thus far, it illustrates my thesis too well for me to ignore 
it. Lotman discusses it because it evokes the Christological image of the grapevine. In the 
seventh of the poem’s nine stanzas, Mandelshtam writes:  
 
Another’s speech will be my skin 
and long before I dared be born  
I was a letter, a grapevine line, 
I was the book you’re dreaming now. 
 
Chuzhaia rech’ mne obolochkoi 
I mnogo prezhde, chem ia smel rodit’sia 
Ia bukvoi byl, byl vinogradnoi strochkoi, 




Lotman notes that this verse evokes the beginning of John 15, where Jesus likens himself the 
“true vine.” The Biblical concept of the word as origin is indeed central to this poem, but 
Lotman’s observation is incomplete. The poem is dedicated to Boris Kuzin, who was part 
German and possessed a profound knowledge and understanding of German literature and 
language. Mandelshtam valued Kuzin’s erudition and his talent as a friend and interlocutor. In 
the poem, he describes not his origin, but his desire to “originate” or be reborn in the foreign 
tongue of the interlocutor. The soundscape of the poem and its numerous references to German 
culture are—or rather “will be” the “skin” [“obolochka”] of his imagined new self.  
Preceding the stanza that Lotman chooses to illustrate his example, the poet imagines 
himself and his interlocutors as Prussian officers from another century, who go to their grave as 
																																																								
369 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:179.  
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nonchalantly as one descends the steps of the cellar to fetch a glass of Moselwein.370 Following 
this image Mandelshtam refers to the German language as his future “skin,” and states that prior 
to his birth he was a “grapevine line.” The Christological image of grapes transformed into wine 
suggests the poet’s wish for a death in one language and resurrection in another. The interlocutor 
who belongs to a “foreign family” [“chuzhdoe semeistvo”]— teaches about the ease and grace of 
transformation. Moreover, the word, which simply by virtue of being itself already represents 
transformation, cannot equal itself. For Mandelshtam the idea of incarnation implies that non-
correspondence is a kind of totality. The concept of wholeness comprises desire and inclusion of 
the other.  
Mandelshtam does not strive for the “objective” self in the manner of Ivanov and Bely, 
nor for Kuzmin’s self-knowledge and command. Instead, he is partial and vulnerable to the 
interlocutor and his idiom. Of critical importance to Mandelshtam’s “poetics of incarnation” is 
the fact that in the same way that the poem implies the presence of several interlocutors, so the 
foreign word in the poem remains foreign. Whether the unfamiliar encases the native, or the 
native incorporates and recreates the foreign, the relationship between the two shapes the 
speaker, who “slept without image and form” [“spal bez oblika i sklada”] before meeting his 
interlocutor. The line “another’s speech will be my skin” [“chuzhaia rech’ mne budet 
obolochkoi”] illustrates the idea that foreign speech shapes one’s own, but also that the word in 
general contains and is shaped by something other than itself.  
The verse referenced by Lotman and quoted above illustrates another important point: 
“To German Speech” juxtaposes not only foreign and native idioms, but also the written and the 																																																								
370 I priamo so stranitsy al’manakha, 
Ot novizny ego pervostateinoi, 
Sbegali v grob stupen’kami, bez strakha, 
Kak v pogrebok za kruzhkoi mozel’veina. 
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spoken one. Just as sound shocks the speaker awake to the presence of the other— “I was 
wakened by friendship as by a shot” [“Ia druzhboi byl kak vystrelom razbuzhen”]—so a foreign 
tongue awakens the Russian language. Until the encounter with the interlocutor, the speaker 
knows German only on the page. Letters, verses, pages, almanacs all refer to printed text. But 
while the narrator was in writing, he is—in speech, and in this case, in dialog with foreign 
speech. The sound of the foreign language emerges, resistant, hissing and mutinous, in the last 
lines of the poem, as it rebels against the poet’s efforts to introduce it into the soundscape of his 
poem: “the sound narrowed, words hiss and rebel […]” [“zvuk suzilsia, slova shipiat, buntuiut 
[…]”]. But in fact, the poem contains numerous acquiescent German words and names: almanac, 
Goethe, Moselwein, Frankfurt, Walhalla, and nachtigall, among others. The poem’s soundscape 
as a whole alludes to the sound of German. Transition from the written to the spoken word is 
analogous to the transition from the foreign, to the foreign—and—one’s own. To be 
“incarnated,” to be born, the word must be spoken.  
 
 
The Epic “Gesture” as a Model of Clarity 
 
Mandelshtam’s model of clarity reflects both Ivanov and Kuzmin’s approaches, 
combining the idea of continuity with the idea of metamorphosis based in a “sign of rupture.” 
Clarity is a poetic utterance as a literal action as well as a symbolic action. It emerges free of 
cause, spontaneously, yet it is also an act of memory, directed toward, and called forth by, an 
interlocutor. The spoken word is both a totality and a discrete part of a greater whole. As it 
courses between the unknown that precedes it and the unknown that it addresses, both unknowns 
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manifest themselves in the speech act. Mandelshtam’s clarity does not apply to knowledge, but 
rather to the process of knowing, wherein the utterance acts as interpretation and translation.371  
I argue that Mandelshtam’s poetic project gestures toward the epic, imagined as a spoken 
genre and absorbed into the lyric as a gesture, a mode, or an intention of the word.372 Since 
Mandelshtam, like Kuzmin, rejects the biographical self as the speaker of the poem, the poetic 
utterance becomes an origin story with no easily identifiable origin, in the same way that the epic 
is a founding narrative even though it has no historical author. The body— as a primary and 
universally shared reality—appears in Mandelshtam’s poetry as the only reference to the “origin” 
of the utterance.  
 In this context the concept of clarity appears in Mandelshtam’s work in two interrelated 
functions. In the 1920s it represents the “spacious” word, whereby the signifier and the 
signified— in Mandelshtam’s vocabulary, the sound and the image—co-create one another as 
entities that are quantum-like in their capacity to be discrete and continuous at once. This 
definition contains some Italian, and more specifically Roman motifs. In the absence of time as a 
limiting factor, the Italian “image” manifests itself in the Russian word as a beacon of clarity.  
During this period Mandelshtam gives his poetic response to the polemic that transpired 
on the pages of Works and Days and Apollon in 1912. In his “Lethean Poems” (1923) he creates 
an Orpheus who echoes the Symbolists’ hero as it references Kuzmin’s aesthetic. But his 
Orpheus confronts a situation that they eschew: the disappearance and loss of language and 
therefore knowledge. The Orphic quest is still for the “spacious,” clear word whose feat is to 
articulate the unintelligible. This “unintelligible” does not reside within the privileged sphere of 
																																																								
371 Lotman discusses Mandelshtam’s view of the poet as an interpreter in “Poetika 
voploshchionnogo slova,” 201. 372	I have specifically the Homeric epic in mind.		
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Ivanov’s mystical insight, but pertains to the experience of loss, common to all, and raised to the 
dimension of the mystical.  
In the 1930s, when the Silver Age of Russian poetry appeared to be a matter of the distant 
past, the poet returns to clarity not to define it, but to use it as an emblem of the preceding 
generation’s quest for a poetics of knowledge. In the poems that I address Mandelshtam revives 
Orpheus as an embodiment of a paradigmatic poet. He makes references to both Bely and 
Kuzmin—at a time immediately following the deaths of these two poets—and reconciles these 
antagonists specifically on the ground of their disagreement. At this time Mandelshtam’s idea of 
clarity obtains truly epic stature. Below, I first examine the idea of clarity as it pertains to the 
philosophy of the “epic” word in Mandelshtam’s poetry. I then look at several poems from his 
“Lethean Poems,” and conclude with an overview of the transformation of the idea of clarity in 
the 1930s.  
In the 1920s Mandelshtam’s concept of the poetic word in “On the Nature of the Word” 
and especially in “Word and Culture” not only makes use of the notion of clarity, but evokes, 
probably entirely coincidentally, Georg Lukács’ interpretation of the Homeric epic as it appears 
in his 1916 The Theory of the Novel. Lukács describes the epic mindset: “The world is wide and 
yet it is like a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars; 
the world and the self, the light and the fire, are sharply distinct, yet they never become 
permanent strangers to each other.”373 He envisions the epic as a “totality” that is inherently 
meaningful in each instance, and that answers the question “how can life become essential?”374 
As a literary form, it is a “becoming conscious” of its own totality. If Lukács’ essay and 
Mandelshtam’s concept of the word overlap in their understanding of the “Homeric” and 																																																								
373 G. Lukács, The Theory of the Novel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 29. 
374 Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 34.  
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“Hellenic” word as expressing a totality and inherent meaning in each instance, as a whole and 
as a fragment, it is because Mandelshtam’s poetic word also seeks to “become conscious” of its 
own totality. The definition of a genre is applied to the lyric word.  
The poet expresses his views on language as he polemicizes with the Symbolists. In “On 
the Nature of the Word” he writes that the Symbolists “discovered” the “original figurative 
nature of the word” [“iznachal’nuiu obraznuiu prirodu slova”], implying that the word’s 
“original” nature cannot be separated from image. The Symbolists were not able to make use of 
the full potential of their own discovery, affixing the word, label-like, to its symbolic 
signification, but detaching it from its purpose: “The word is already a sealed image; it can’t be 
touched. It’s not for everyday use […]” “Slovo uzhe est’ obraz zapechatannyi: ego nel’zia 
trogat’. On ne prigoden dlia obikhoda <...>  The sealed image removed from usage is hostile to 
man—it is a kind of stuffed puppet or scarecrow” [“zapechatannyi, iz’iatyi iz upotrebleniia obraz 
vrazhdeben cheloveku, on v svo’em rode chuchelo, pugalo.”]375 The Symbolists detach the word 
from its context only to affix it to another, invisible one.376 While they seek to repurpose the 
word, they emphasize causes: the active word that would effectuate their mystical visions. This 
confusion of cause and purpose creates the effect of fracturing. Mandelshtam proposes that 
integrity arrives once the ties between the word’s components are loosened:  
The most convenient and in a scientific sense most correct thing is to regard the word as 
image, that is, as verbal representation. In this way the question of form and content is 
eliminated—if phonetics is the form, everything else is the content. The question of 
which has the primary significance—the word or its sounding nature—is eliminated. 
Verbal representation, the intricate complex of phenomena, communication, “system.” 
The significance of the word can be seen as a candle burning from within a paper lantern, 																																																								
375 Mandel’shtam, “O prirode slova,” PSS 2:64-81, 76. 
376 I. Paperno, “O prirode poeticheskogo slova,” 33.  
Paperno explains that in Mandelshtam’s perspective the Symbolists’ word is indentured to its 
symbolic significance. On the opposite side of the spectrum, there is realism, which envisions the 
word as tied to the object it represents.  
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and, conversely, the sound representation, the so-called phoneme, can be placed inside 
the significance, like that same candle in that same lantern.”377 
 
Purpose (convenience) rather than cause governs the poet’s approach to language. It is easier to 
work with the word once the poet conceives of it as a representation. Untethered from a single, 
specific signification it becomes a coherent and dynamic plurality, where none of its aspects may 
be claimed as a fixed “truth,” and any number of contextual and associative paths can lead to the 
referent.  
In the following paragraph Mandelshtam describes the relationship between the speaker 
and language as parallel to the relationship of the phonetic and the semantic elements of the 
word. Words are “objects” that the mind beholds, but they are also the “organs”— “like the liver 
or the heart”—that render the world intelligible. As an “object,” language does not exist without 
the mind’s illuminating power. As an “organ” indispensable to the function of the mind, it is 
inextricable from the process of making meaning. Like light in a lantern, meaning is both 
immanent and transcendent to the word, and language to the self. The image and the sound, and 
the self and language are discrete and inextricable elements of a totality.  
The “epic gesture” of Mandelshtam’s poetics anticipates Mikhail Bakhtin’s definition of 
the epic. Bakhtin understands the genre as definitively over, and defines it as addressing “a 
national epic past—in Goethe’s and Schiller’s terminology the ‘absolute past.’” He describes the 
source for the epic as “national tradition (not personal experience and the free thought that grows 
out of it)” and believes that “an absolute epic distance separates the epic world from 
contemporary reality, that is, from the time in which the singer (the author and his audience) 
lives.”378 Mandelshtam’s poetics reverses this definition. It emphasizes the physical act of speech 																																																								
377 Mandel’shtam, “O prirode slova,”64-81, 78. 
378 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel.” Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1981), 13.  
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as both most personal and most universal, and directs it toward the listener located at a remote 
distance. As the personal word continuously gestures toward the remote, it gestures to the epic 
by evoking its own universal nature. In the essay “On the Interlocutor” [“O sobesednike”] (1913) 
Mandelshtam expresses this notion:  
So, if individual poems (in the form of epistles or dedications) can be addressed to 
conrete persons, poetry as a whole is always directed to a more or less distant, unknown 
addressee, whose existence the poet cannot doubt without doubting himself. Metaphysics 
has nothing to do with it. Only reality can summon another reality to life. The poet is not 
a homunculus, and there is no reason to attribute to him the properties of spontaneous 
self-generation. 379  
 
The word’s origin is unknown except as the body, whose dynamic, creative form is a shared, 
universal reality. Awareness of this relationship as a universal absolute lends the figure of the 
speaker truly cosmic dimensions, while the drama of the spoken word as it journeys toward the 
distant interlocutor obtains the features of an epic narrative.380 Delivered in the immediacy of the 
present, Mandelshtam’s epic word is always both subjective interpretation and fact.   
Mandelshtam insists that the “reality” of the interlocutor is called forth by the “reality” of 
the spoken word. The interlocutor is both an independent “object” and emerges due to the 
“realness” of the word. The relationship of continuity that exists between the poet and the 
“distant, unknown interlocutor” is not analogous to the continuity of immediate context. 
Mandelshtam emphasizes this idea in one of the chapters of his autobiographical text “The Noise 
of Time” (1923), where he also references the epic, albeit of the kind he does not want to write. 
He writes: “I’d like to talk not of myself, but rather pay attention to the age, the noise and space 
																																																								
379 Mandel’shtam, “O sobesednike.” PSS 2: 212. 
380 Poignantly, some ten years later the metaphoric homunculus—the individualist poet, 
oblivious to partaking in the process of interpretation—will be reinterpreted by Kuzmin as a 
representation of Bely’s failed experiment in prose. As I mentioned earlier, Bely’s fault is 
ultimately mistrust of the body, and metonymy wrongfully applied to an abstraction.  
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of time. My memory is hostile to everything personal,” [“mne khochetsia govorit’ ne o sebe, a 
sledit’ za vekom, za shumom i prostranstvom vremeni. Pamiat’ moia vrazhdebna vsemu 
lichnomu,”] and continues:  
I could never understand the Tolstoys and Aksakovs, and the Bagrov-grandchildren, 
enamored of the family archives with their epic domestic remembrances. I repeat: my 
memory is not loving, but inimical, and works not on the reproduction of the past, but its 
removal. A raznochinets [term for an intellectual not belonging to the gentry class] 
doesn’t need memory—it’s enough for him to talk about the books he’s read, and that’ll 
do for his biography. Where for happy generations the epic speaks in hexameters and 
chronicles, for me there is a sign of rupture in that place, and between me and the age lies 
a gap, a ditch filled with the noise of time […]381 
 
Tolstoy’s and Aksakov’s meditations under the genealogical tree are unappealing to the narrator 
the way they were unappealing to Kuzmin’s Shtrup and Vanya Smurov. Dismissal of an 
overarching biographical or autobiographical narrative is the rejection of metonymy: the self 
does not want to be defined by the whole to which it belongs. This can be gleaned apophatically 
from the fact that in the review of Bely’s Notes of an Eccentric, Mandelshtam praises Tolstoy’s 
“epic” War and Peace, but attacks Bely’s novel, and criticizes Tolstoy’s “epic” trilogy 
Childhood, Adolescence, Youth in the quote above. Mandelshtam’s objection reveals a 
connection between the two fundamentally different texts—Tolstoy’s realist trilogy and Bely’s 
Symbolist Notes—and sets them apart from Tolstoy’s War and Peace. In the latter work the 
narrator maintains the kind of distance from his narrative that allows language to embody “the 
intermittent sign of the incessant.” In both Bely’s Notes and Tolstoy’s trilogy the speaker’s voice 
is defined by the sense of belonging whether of the individual to his kin, or the individual “seer” 
to the Symbolist realm of Platonic Ideas. In this context, the distinction between prose and poetry 
is secondary to the relationship between the speaker and the text. In the essay “Invective” 
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[“Vypad”] (1924) Mandelshtam references the predominantly poetic movement of Symbolism as 
a “tribe” [“rod”] and the time of its reign as a tribal epoch “rodovaia epokha,” associating the 
Symbolists with the “epic” prose writers of the previous century.382 The relationship “self—
world” or “self—text” can only be expressed by “the sign of rupture” [“znak ziianiia”]—a 
metaphor— as opposed to the metonymic “intermittent sign of the incessant.”  
 The sign of rupture is a lapse in knowledge or memory, and the absence of a causative, 
continuous relationship between the image and sound within the word, the self and the world, 
and the speaker and the spoken word.383 The “epic totality” of Mandelshtam’s lyric project 
implies a continuity that originates in a cognitive leap. The speech act is an emblem of clarity as 
interpretation: an utterance is discrete, but in its function as repetition and interpretation it is 
continuous. Speech as a universal, physical phenomenon suggests the likewise universal 
possibility of an inadvertent blunder, forgetting, misspeaking, or mispronouncing a word, 
whereby meaning is created through substitution and metaphor—unexpectedly, rather than 
causatively. Mandelshtam not only allows these interruptions into his poetry, but at times 
represents them within the fabric of his poetics as images of the unknown.  
The word “clarity” appears in the essay “Word and Culture,” where it is embedded in a 
quotation from the Roman poet Catullus. Mandelshtam writes:   
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383 The idea of the epic as based in rupture is consistent with Mandelshtam’s technical approach 
to the epic in his own poetry. Lidiya Ginzburg notes that the language of his Tristia parallels 
Nikolai Gnedich, who recreated Homer in Russian by blending colloquial and archaic Russian. 
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word, for example, “vigils” [“vigilii”], in such a way that the entire poem “Tristia” obtains 
“classical” sound. (L. Ginzburg, 343.) Mandelshtam’s use of archaic lexicon creates a 
discontinuity that renews the classical tradition, for the poet evokes classicism against the 
established classical “clear” model. His contemporaries, such as the futurist Khlebnikov, used 
archaisms and “neo-archaisms” to the opposite effect, to de-classicize the lyric.  
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There are certain epochs when mankind, not satisfied with the present, yearning like a 
ploughman, hungers for untouched strata of time [...] Yesterday has not yet been born. It 
hasn't yet truly existed. I want Ovid, Pushkin, and Catullus once more, and I'm not 
satisfied with the historical Ovid, Pushkin, and Catullus [...] Catullus' silver trumpet: “Ad 
claras Asiae volemus urbes” is more tormenting and disturbing than any Futurist riddle. 
We don't have this in Russian. And yet it must exist in Russian. 384  
 
The poet explains that he has chosen Catullus because the Russian reader easily identifies the 
imperative in the Latin language, and elaborates that the command is to recreate in Russian the 
resounding “this” of Catullus’s verse. To understand what Mandelshtam means by “this,” one 
must know the original. In poem XLVI of the Carmina Catullus’s lyric subject joyously lays 
down his official duties in the Roman provinces in Asia Minor and contemplates his imminent 
return to Rome. But as he looks to his return, he is struck with wanderlust and wants to behold 
the “claras urbes” – the “clear,” “bright,” or “illustrious” cities built by the Greeks on the Asian 
shores of the Aegean Sea.385 Desire of the radiant unknown transforms into clarity of articulation: 
“ad claras Asiae volemus urbes.” He bids farewell to his friends, and states enigmatically that 
while they set out on their journey together, each will return along his own route. Every traveler 
is Odysseus the Ithacan, who arrives on the shores of his native land without his companions. 
Catullus might also be referring to death as a destination that can only be reached alone. 
Catullus’s remote cities are clear because they have no features except remoteness and 
luminosity. They represent a lapse of knowledge and the liberating and radiant promise of 
exploration. Yet there is obvious continuity between them and the speaker. For the Roman, 
ancient Greek cities emblematize an origin, alternative to historical or biographical “roots.” To 
the narrator of the poem, the “clear cities” are what Botticelli’s Venus is to Mandelshtam in 
																																																								
384 Mandel’shtam, “Slovo i kul’tura,” 51. 
385 Valerius C. Catullus, Carmina. Ed. E.T. Merrill (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1893), 80.  
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“Silentium.” The narrator’s choice of destination is analogous to his choice of origin: purpose 
prevails over cause. Since movement toward the future is equivalent to movement into the past—
since to begin is therefore to see the end—Catullus’s clarity is an image of the “spacious” word. 
The “claras urbes” are not the fixed prototype, upon which the author bases his copy, but the sign 
of freedom. They are also the “origin” as the progeny: the past that is yet to be born.  
Catullus’s verse illustrates the thesis of “Word and Culture”: words and images are as 
distinct as they are connected. The open vowels and cold, hard consonants are inextricable from 
the spaciousness and luminosity of the image—yet the narrator insists on the distance between 
them. The space between the sound and the image, or Catullus’s narrator and the distant cities is 
analogous to the relationship between Mandelshtam and Catullus’s poem, and between 
Mandelshtam’s narrator and the interlocutor in the “On the Interlocutor.” In each case, the act of 
speech is an interpretation of the previous utterance, and an address to the future one. The 
beginning is not starting from zero, to the contrary: as is the word within which resound the 
numerous precedents that are also the future possibilities, it is a kind of glossolalia.   
Years later this idea reemerges in the sixth poem of Mandelshtam’s cycle Armenia 
(1930), when he describes Armenia as: “flying eternally towards the silver trumpets of Asia” [“K 
trubam serebrianym Azii vechno letiashchaia.”]386 The verse improvises on the soundscape of 
Catullus’s Latin, and repeats the original composition, except now the protagonist is a country in 
perpetual flight toward a distant object. This time, Catullus’s words themselves obtain the form 
of the “silver trumpet”—though due to the semantic ambiguity of the word “truba” they could 
also mean “smokestacks”— and replace the ancient Greek cities as the remote destination.  
																																																								
386 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:148. 
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“Word and Culture” and the poem from the Armenia cycle depict clarity as the spoken 
word. To “give birth” to yesterday is to speak. Both texts reference the trumpet so obviously 
associated with lungs, the throat and the mouth, and breath: the open, spacious a’s in the line by 
Catullus, and the u-a-e-ii-a-ia in the poem. The trumpet enacts and represents the utterance as a 
perpetual beginning that carries with it the seed of difference – the possibility and the necessity 
of its own alternative. The trumpet is an image of sound—an encapsulation of the idea that the 
two are distinct and inseparable. It is the word in its function as actor and action, noun and verb, 
metaphor and metonymic extension of the body. This tautological image amplifies both space 
and time and incorporates and activates previous instances of speech.  
The relationship of clarity to the spoken word comes into focus in a chapter from 
Mandelshtam’s novella “The Noise of Time” (1923), “In a Fur Coat Above One’s Station,” 
where the narrator describes his older contemporary and another mentor figure, Nikolai 
Nedobrovo, reciting Tyutchev:  
His speech—even apart from this extremely clear, with wide open vowels—as if 
recorded on silver records, became astonishingly clear when it came to reading Tyutchev, 
especially his alpine poems: “And which year shows white” and “And now the dawn is 
sowing.” Then a real flood of open “a's”—it seemed as if the reciter had just rinsed his 
throat with cold alpine water.  
Rech’ ego, i bez togo chrezmerno iasnaia, s shiroko otkrytymi glasnymi, kak by 
zapisannaia na serebrianykh plastinkakh, proiasnialas’ na udivlenie, kogda dokhodilo do 
Tyutcheva, osobenno do al’piiskikh stikhov: “A kotoryi god beleet” i “A zaria i nynche 
seet.” Togda nachinalsia nastoiashschii razliv otkrytykh “a”: kazalos’, chtets tol’ko chto 
propoloskal gorlo kholodnoi al’piiskoi vodoi.387 
In Tyutchev’s poem “Bright snow shone in the valley” [“Iarkii sneg siial v doline,”] the snowy 
peaks of the Alps, like Catullus’s exotic cities, or the Latin he spoke, are beyond immediate 
																																																								
387 Mandel’shtam, Shum vremeni, PSS 2: 256. 
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experience.388 They tower over human experience, and represent eternal, unchanging spring, in 
contrast to the ebb and flow of seasons down below, where the speaker is located. Yet the 
particular quality of Nedobrovo’s speech allows one to experience the distant immediately. The 
metonymic derivative of Tyutchev’s image —cold alpine water that “clears” his throat— is the 
communion of the spoken word as the eternal beginning, shared by the participants in this 
conversation.389 Poignantly, this continuity is based on an imperfection: at least in 
Mandelshtam’s rendering, Nedobrovo says “and which year shows white” [“a kotoryi god 
beleet”], whereas Tyutchev’s original line reads “but which year shows white” [“no kotoryi god 
beleet”]. Much as in the passage about Catullus and the later poem about Armenia, clarity 
emerges from this loss: the open vowel enhances the spaciousness of the line. Mandelshtam’s 
passage unifies a multiplicity of voices that reveal one another as if in perspective: from 
Mandelshtam to Nedobrovo, from Nedobrovo to Tyutchev, and from Tyutchev to the Alps and 
the “eternal dawn” of their snow. These voices and images are incorporated in a whole, without 
losing their individual character.  
Finally, even more obviously than in the previous two examples, in this passage the word 
and the image co-create one another: the Alpine peaks resemble a towering mass of A’s.390 If this 
is a visual echo, based on the appearance of the letter A, it is because Mandelshtam’s emphasis 																																																								
388 The first line of Tyutchev’s poem, which starts with the word “Iarkii,” where the “ia” is also 
emphasized, and then repeats the sound “ia,” again stressed, in the word “siial” supports Bely’s 
take on “iasnost’.” Mandelshtam obviously favors the vowel “a”.  
389 Omry Ronen, An Approach to Mandel’štam (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1983), 348. 
Ronen mentions the idea of communion in reference to Mandelshtam’s poem “Variant” [“Net, 
nikogda, nichei ia ne byl sovremennik”] as well as “Slovo i kul’tura.” He describes “an allegory 
of communion in which poets partake of the creative spirit of all ages.” He refers to the passage 
of “Slovo i kul’tura,” where the poet describes glossolalia as taking hold of the poets of his time: 
[“Slovo stalo ne semistvol’noi, a tysiachastvol’noi tcevnitsei, ozhivliaemoi srazu dykhaniem 
vsekh vekov.”]   
390 This is unlike Bely, whose concept of clarity is based in the concept of self and “ia” as its 
signifier.
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on the spoken does not exclude the written, but obviously incorporates it. Indeed, he uses the 
written word to communicate the idea that the vulnerability and at the same time the universality 
of speech creates, rather than simply transmits meaning.391 
 Mandelshtam’s “Lethean poems” (1923) address not speech but speechlessness as the 
situation that, paradoxically, must be articulated. The cycle comprises two sets of poems initially 
published separately. The two poems, “The Swallow” (“I forgot the word I meant to say”) [“Ia 
slovo pozabyl, chto ia khotel skazat’”] and “When Psyche-Life descends to shades” [“Kogda 
Psikheia-zhizn’ spuskaetsia k teniam”] date to 1920 and were published together. The second set 
of poems, the “Arbenina cycle,” was also written in 1920 and is dedicated to the ending of 
Mandelshtam’s relationship with Olga Arbenina. In 1923 these two cycles were published 
together as the “Lethean poems.”392 “The Swallow,” and “I intervened in the circle dance of 
shades that stamped upon the tender meadow” [“Ia v khorovod tenei, toptavshii nezhnyi lug”] 																																																								
391An earlier example where misspeaking creates not only new meaning, but destroys a world 
and creates a new one is the 1912 poem “Obraz tvoi muchitel’nyi i zybkii.” When its narrator is 
unable to discern an indistinct, troubling image—a visual representation of obscurity—he utters 
God’s name by mistake:  
 
Obraz tvoi, muchitel'nyi i zybkii, 
Ia ne mog  v tumane osiazat'. 
“Gospodi!”—skazal ia po oshibke, 
Sam togo ne dumaia skazat'. 
 
Bozhe imia, kak bol'shaia ptitsa, 
Vyletelo iz moei grudi! 
Vperedi gustoi tuman klubitsia, 
I pustaia kletka pozadi… 
 
The name of the deity flies the coop leaving the “empty cage” of the poet’s body behind. While 
the original separation is not mended, the mistake concretizes the indistinct in a new way. The 
act of misspeaking encapsulates the idea that words do not describe, but substitute and thereby 
create a new reality. Furthermore, the narrator substitutes the word for the image without 
calculation, overriding a rational connection between them. In this poem not only does metaphor 
precede metonymy, it destroy its context.  
392Irina Kovaleva, “Psikheiia u Persefony: ob istochnikakh odnogo antichnogo motiva u 
Mandel’shtama.” NLO 73 (2005): 203-211.   
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describe the descent of living beings—Orpheus, Psyche, an unnamed hero who could be Orpheus 
—into Hades. “The Swallow,” especially, illustrates the idea that as the lyric poem seeks the 
word as a “totality” it dramatizes memory. I will focus on this poem, referencing “When Psyche-
Life…” and “I’ll join the circle dance…” where necessary.    
Ia slovo pozabyl, chto ia khotel skazat. 
Slepaia lastochka v chertog tenei vernetsia, 
Na kryliakh srezannyi s prozrachnymi igrat’. 
V bespamiatstve nochnaia pesn’ poetsia. 
 
Ne slyshno ptits. Bessmertnik ne tsvetet. 
Prozrachny grivy tabuna nochnogo. 
V sukhoi reke pustoi chelnok plyvet. 
Sredi kuznechikov bespamiatstvuet slovo. 
 
I medlenno rastet, kak by shatter il’ khram, 
To vdrug prokinetsia bezumnoi Antigonoi, 
To mertvoi lastochkoi brosaetsia k nogam 
S stigiiskoi nezhnost’iu i vetkoiu zelenoi. 
 
O esli by vernut’ i zriachikh pal’tsev styd, 
I vypukluiu radost’ uznavan’ia. 
Ia tak boius’ rydan’ia Aonid, 
Tumana, zvona i ziian’ia. 
 
A smertnym vlast’ dana liubit’ i uznavat’, 
Dlia nikh i zvuk v persty prol’etsia,  
No ia zabyl, chto ia khochu skazat’, 
I mysl’ besplotnaia v chertog tenei vernetsia. 
 
 
Vse ne o tom prozrachnaia tverdit, 
Vse lastochka, podruzhka, Antigona… 
A na gubakh, kak chernyi led gorit 
Stigiiskogo vospominan’e zvona.393  
I forgot the word I meant to say. 
A blind swallow returns to a hall of shades, 
On clipped wings, to play with transparent things. 
 A night song is sung in unconsciousness. 
 
No bird is heard. The immortelle is not in bloom. 
Transparent are the night herds’ manes. 
In a dry river floats an empty skiff. 
Among the grasshoppers the word forgets itself. 
 
And slowly it grows, a tent or a temple, 
Shoots past itself like a mad Antigone, 
Or like a dead swallow falls to one’s feet 
With Stygian tenderness and a green twig. 
 
O to regain both the shame of sighted fingers, 
And the palpable joy of recognition. 
I'm so afraid of the wailing of the Aonides, 
Of the fog, the ringing and the abyss. 
 
But to mortals is given to love and to recognize, 
For them the sound will flow into their hands, 
But I forgot what I meant to say, 
And disembodied thought goes back to the hall of 
shades. 
 
The transparent thing insists on other things, 
The swallow, a girl—a friend, Antigone.. 
While on the lips burns like black ice 




As the poet tries to remember the forgotten word, forgetting becomes his hero’s external reality. 
Since the central idea is the return of the word into the state prior to articulation, and so its 																																																								
393 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:110.   
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divestment of “flesh” (“disembodied thought”) [“mysl’ besplotnaia”], it is possible to interpret 
this space also as the “inner image” that resounds in the mind of the poet before the poem obtains 
the words. A striking feature of this landscape is the absence of finality. Sound, for example, is 
interminable: “a night song is sung in unconsciousness,” “among the grasshoppers the word 
forgets itself,” “the fog, the ringing and the abyss,” and the discarnate soul repeats something 
over and over again ceaselessly. All action in this space is imperfective: the Immortelle flower is 
not blooming, the boat sails in a hollow river, and the mysterious tabernacle—the metaphoric 
representation of the forgotten word— rises but never reaches completion. In “When Psyche-
Life descends to shades” Psyche also faces this obstacle when she is encircled by the shades, 
whose laments are indistinct and inarticulate. The Soul is suddenly disoriented: “And in gentle 
commotion, not knowing what to start, / The soul doesn’t recognize the transparent oaks […]” 
and for at least an instant loses her purpose. Similarly, the protagonist of “I intervened in the 
circle dance of shades that stamped upon the tender meadow” encounters a situation where 
remembrance of a name or possession of the beloved is frustratingly beyond his grasp.   
In these poems the object is not recovered, nor the word remembered. The hero’s effort to 
remedy the loss is futile: the murmur of forgetting is not interrupted by the recovery of Eurydice. 
What the lyric word does recover is the forgetting itself. It is appropriate that the entire poem, 
indeed the entire poetic cycle—references, resembles or takes place in a theater: since oblivion 
cannot be approached literally and requires figurative language.  
The final image of the poem—the din of the underworld that burns on the lips of the 
speaker like black ice— encapsulates the idea of the word as a totality predicated on rupture. 
Presaging Mandelshtam’s “Word and Culture,” the image of the melting ice resembles Catullus’s 
word as “silver horn.” Both tropes treat sound and image as inextricable and distinct components 
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of the word, and both function simultaneously as metaphor and metonymy. But unlike the 
“clear” word in “Word and Culture,” Orpheus’s word addresses continuity in reverse.  Catullus’s 
narrator “originates” in the “other” en route to a rebirth. His “imperative” is to perpetuate 
tradition as a kind of communion. Never caused or determined by history, and free of time as a 
condition, it always relates to history and recreates it on its own terms. Conversely, Orpheus’s 
voyage is the opposite of a homecoming. He travels through an alienating landscape that 
signifies the death of the word, and his imperative is to “originate”—or to make intelligible—this 
very death. The hero descends into “rupture”—as the unintelligible space that yields words—and 
recovers the “night sun” of language: the silent word that burns on his lips as a metonymic 
extension of the glacial waters of Styx. The reverse of Catullus’s “trumpet,” the ice, in turn, 
melts on the poet’s lips and perpetually returns to its source in timelessness.394  
The final image of the poem is dual in its nature, in keeping with the “Orphic tendency to 
a dualist worldview,” and what Terras terms the Orphic “ambivalence of opposing principles.”395 
The poet’s lips with the seal of the silent word upon them represent perpetual liminality, and, to 
use Edward Said’s terminology, “intransitivity.” The hero of the poem seeks a lost object, but 
ends up with no object “other than his own clarification.”396 His initially “transitive” quest 
																																																								
394In the essay “The Dry River and the Black Ice,” Omry Ronen observes that ancient sources 
“describe the water of Styx as cold […] or livid.” He points out that Mandelshtam’s specific 
source for the metonymy of black ice is likely Apuleius. Regarding the “black ice” simile Ronen 
observes, brilliantly: “As so many of Mandelshtam’s similes are, this one, too, is motivated 
metonymically,” and “the “black ice,” an oxymoron and a simile at the level of the text, is, at the 
subtextual level, a metonymy of Mnemosine’s psychron hydor and the Stydian fons ater […]”  
Omry Ronen, “The Dry River and the Black Ice.” Slavica Hierosolymitana I (1977): 177-84, 
184. 
395 Terras, “‘The Black Sun’,” 46. 
396 In his Beginnings: Intention and Method, Edward Said describes two models of a beginning: 
“These two sides of the starting point entail two styles of thought, and of imagination, one 
projective and descriptive, the other tautological and endlessly self-mimetic. The transitive mode 
is always hungering <…> for an object it can never fully catch up with in either space or time. 
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becomes a perpetually “intransitive” one. But while the poem as a whole is a substitute for the 
missing word, it is also its trace, and it invites further attempts to follow the hero in his quest to 
find it.397 The entire cycle of the “Lethean poems” conjures up the image of a lost object.398 The 
poems have the quality of a riddle that resists deciphering, transforming the “transitive” subject-
object relationship into a semantic trap. The reader follows the hero in his Orphic quest for 
knowledge, only to learn that the shadow-image is present because it is not named directly. The 
word is cryptic when treated as an object of knowledge, and lucid when allowed to evoke 
meaning indirectly. Clarity does not preclude obscurity.  
In addition to containing numerous classical allusions ranging from Sophocles’ Antigone 
to Gluck’s opera, the “Lethean poems” reference both Kuzmin’s and Ivanov’s writings. The 
relationship between the cycle and Kuzmin’s aesthetic has been examined, for instance, by Irina 
Kovaleva, who provides an illuminating analysis of Mandelshtam’s use of Kuzmin’s vocabulary 
from his translation of Apuleius’ The Golden Ass in “The Swallow” and “When Psyche-Life 
descends to shades.” The poet utilizes Kuzmin’s specific lexicon from the mise en abyme tale of 
Cupid and Psyche. The scholar also details the well-known circumstances that likely inspired 
Mandelshtam’s writing the poems, and that also associate him with Kuzmin. Olga Arbenina’s 																																																																																																																																																																																		
The intransitive <…> can never have enough of itself—in short, expansion and concentration, or 
words in language, and the Word.” Said also comments that the “intransitive” beginning is one 
that “has no object but its own constant clarification.” Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention 
and Method (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 73.   
397 See for instance Mikhail Gronas, “Just what word did Mandelshtam forget?” in Cognitive 
Poetics and Cultural Memory (New York: Routledge, 2011), 110-116. Gronas suggests that the 
poem “The Swallow” contains the anagram Aid, or Hades, and that this is the word the poet 
forgets.  
398 The poem “Ia v khorovod tenei” references Italian Renaissance painting, and evokes 
especially Botticelli’s “Allegory of Spring,” itself quite mysterious. Considering that the poem 
was written for Arbenina, there is an interesting parallel with Kuzmin’s observation in his 1934 
Diary, that she resembles Simonetta Vespucci, one of Botticelli’s beloved and most iconic 
models, and the prototype for Spring in the aforementioned painting. Kuzmin’s description of 
Simonetta is applicable to his vision of Psyche. M. Kuzmin, Dnevnik 1934 Goda, 40. 
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break with Mandelshtam coincided with Meyerhold’s restaging of Gluck’s opera in St. 
Petersburg; during their relationship the couple likely saw it together. As was mentioned 
previously, Kuzmin had written about Gluck and was associated with the production of his 
opera. Additionally, Arbenina inadvertently united Kuzmin and Mandelshtam in loss: she left 
Mandelshtam to be with Kuzmin’s long-term lover, Yuri Yurkun. Much to Kuzmin’s distress—
eventually muffled and transformed into uneasy acceptance—the relationship became triangular 
and remained so for the rest of Kuzmin’s life. Mandelshtam’s evocation of the older poet’s 
specific aesthetic in telling the Orphic story of loss could have been motivated at least in part by 
the circumstances surrounding the poems’ composition.399  
But while Mandelshtam imbues the imagery and the soundscape of the poems with 
crystalline “Kuzminian” clarity, he emphasizes the obscurity of the situation wherein the heroes 
of the poems find themselves. Unlike Kuzmin’s narrator, who has, figuratively speaking, already 
reached the Elysian fields, Mandelshtam’s Orpheus is barred from entry there.400 The poem “I 
intervened in the circle dance,” for instance, describes the hero’s inability to enter the “circle 
dance” of shades or souls who are associated with spring and happiness. In the last two stanzas 
																																																								
399 Kovaleva, “Psikheiia u Persefony,” 207-208. The scholar notes that Kuzmin’s translation was 
published well after Mandelshtam wrote the “Lethean cycle,” however, the overlap in vocabulary 
leads her to suggest that the poet must have heard Kuzmin read his work prior to its publication, 
and that since Kuzmin makes use of vocabulary that is consistent with his well-established style, 
his choice of words influenced Mandelshtam’s, and not the other way around.  
400 Kuzmin’s 1921 poem “Vot posle rzhavykh l’vov i reva”describes Orpheus’ decent into 
Hades. It is also based on Gluck’s opera and references the Dance of the Blessed Spirits, which 
takes place in the Elysian Fields. The poem is as cryptic as Mandelshtam’s, but Kuzmin’s 
protagonist is accompanied by Eurydice and experiences a state of grace and gratitude. Since the 
two will not seek to return from the Elysian Fields— “Whoever sets his feet here once / Needs 
not think about the return.” [“Ne nado dumat’ o vozvrate/ Tomu, kto raz stupil suda,”]—Hades 
for them is a place of blissful metamorphosis and clarity. This representation of the Orphic 
descent contrasts greatly with both Mandelshtam’s and the Symbolists’ writing on the subject.  
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their circle dance transforms into the hero’s walking in circles as he tries to grasp what eludes 
him.  
A schast’e katitsia, kak obruch zolotoi, 
Chuzhuiu voliu ispolniaia,  
I ty goniaeshsia za legkoiu vesnoi, 
Ladon’iu vozdukh rassekaia. 
 
I tak ustroeno, chto ne vykhodim my 
Iz zakoldovannogo kruga. 
Zemli devicheskoi uprugie kholmy 
Lezhat spelenatye tugo.401  
But happiness like a gold hoop rolls along, 
Fulfilling another's will, 
And you chase after breezy spring, 
Cleaving the air with your palm. 
 
And its so fixed that we don’t leave 
The vicious circle. 
The springy hills of maiden earth 
Are swaddled firmly. 
 
 
The Edenic logos and Psyche as an image of wholeness remain out of reach. In the context of 
Mandelshtam’s comments in “On Contemporary Poetry” (1916) about Kuzmin’s hypothetically 
recalled Psyche, and the poet’s criticism of Kuzmin as artificial, a confrontation with this 
elusive, shade-like aspect of the word is a confrontation with reality.  
Several scholars have also commented on the relationship between the “Lethean poems” 
and Ivanov’s aesthetic philosophy. Taranovsky, for example, analyses the connection between 
the poems and Ivanov’s belief that for the ancient Greeks, spring was closely associated with 
death and Dionysus. He focuses on Mandelshtam’s borrowing of Ivanov’s term “transparent” to 
convey this association.402 Lotman makes the observation that in general Mandelshtam’s 
approach to the relationship between Psyche as the “feminine” aspect of the word, and the Logos 
as knowledge evokes Sophia, or the World Soul, as the Symbolists interpreted her.403 Indeed, as I 
write in the beginning of this chapter, Ivanov understands Orpheus as the theurgic poet who must 
release Eurydice, who is also Sophia, from the grip of the material world. In order to do so, the 																																																								
401 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:118. 
402Kirill Taranovskii and M.L. Gasparov, “Ocherki o poezii O. Mandel’shtama.” O poezii i 
poetike (Moscow: Iazyki Russkoii Kul’tury, 2000), 113, 120 (footnote 14).  
403 Lotman, “Poetika voplochshionnogo slova,” 208-209. 
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poet must avoid direct knowledge of the source whence she springs, the significance of his 
heroic mission, or his own self.404 According to Ivanov, the poet must be able to let go of 
knowing. Since in the “Lethean poems” loss catalyzes speech that is both clear and obscure, and 
evokes the lost object only indirectly, it is possible to view the cycle as a nearly literal fulfillment 
of Ivanov’s poetic instruction. There are several important differences, however. The “path of the 
mysteries” upon which Mandelshtam’s Orpheus finds himself, and the frontier where meaning 
emerges or disappears, is the subjective experience of the speech act.  
The realization of the Symbolist theurgic drama on the grounds of one’s experience of 
language reframes the opposition “clarity—obscurity” that is so dear to Ivanov. Forgetting leads 
Orpheus into Hades as a space of a disembodied, babbling incessancy, rather than fecund 
obscurity. As itself, forgetting does not offer any revelation. But forgetting is interrupted, and the 
word emerges as a substitute for the missing object. Speech addressed to the interlocutor, such as 
Catullus’s verse, or Nedobrovo’s reciting of Tyutchev’s poem, evokes and is “born” of an 
instance of a speech act that belongs to somebody else, and is in that sense “transitive.” But both 
Catullus, whose “clear cities” must be reached by each traveler alone, and Tyutchev, whose 
poem centers upon the idea of the eternal clarity of the alpine snow, gesture toward a point on 
the horizon that can only represent the end of language. This place coincides with the Orphic 
“intransitive” and self-reflexive word. The two models—the chthonic and the “Apollonian”—are 
as opposite as they are inextricable: as the word spoken is the word lost, so the word lost 
engenders the word spoken.  
Mandelshtam represents this double rupture in an enigmatic phrase that Omry Ronen 
interprets in the essay “The Dry River and the Black Ice.” In the essay “Scriabin and 
																																																								
404 See footnote 2 on page 3 for the specific quote from Ivanov’s essay on Scriabin.  
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Christianity” (1915) the poet writes on the composer’s death in the effort to wrest it from 
Ivanov’s interpretation as Orphic sacrifice on the altar of Dionysus. Ronen believes that when 
Mandelshtam states, “To die is to remember, to remember is to die,” he addresses Orpheus’ 
memory recovered in the space of Hades.405 Ronen’s interpretation of Mandelshtam’s aphorism 
saps its complexity.  The statement describes the double interruption—in the fabric of memory, 
and in the fabric of oblivion—that yields poetic meaning. Mandelshtam’s essay addresses 
anamnesis as the non-correspondence of the self and the logos, and at the same time the 
completeness and wholeness of this relationship. The essay, which precedes the “Lethean 
poems” by five years, contains Mandelshtam’s response to the Symbolist debates of 1910-1912, 
provides the background to his writing on clarity in the early 1920s, and helps understand some 
of the transformations of this concept in his later poetry.  
 
Written as a speech on the death of the composer Alexander Scriabin, “Scriabin and 
Christianity” survives only in fragments.406 It clearly disputes Ivanov’s depiction of Scriabin as 
Orpheus in “Scriabin’s Views on Art” [“Vzgliad Skriabina na iskusstvo”], written in the same 
year.407 In his article Ivanov seconds Scriabin’s view of himself as one who has triumphed over 
the individual and the “too human” element, and as both the priest of Dionysus and as a 
Nietzschean übermensch.408 This momentous achievement comes at a price, however: the new 
Orpheus becomes the ritual sacrifice on his own altar.409  
																																																								
405 Ronen, “The Dry River and the Black Ice,” 184. 
406 Mandel’shtam, “Skriabin i khristianstvo” PSS 2:35-41. 
407 Lekmanov and Glukhova, “Osip Mandel’shtam i Viacheslav Ivanov,” 168-174.  
408 Rebecca Mitchell, Nietzsche’s Orphans: Music, Metaphysics, and the Twilight of the Russian 
Empire, 67. 
409 V. Ivanov. “Vzgliad Skriabina na Iskusstvo.” S S 3:172-189.   
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“Scriabin and Christianity” challenges Ivanov’s views on the cultural mission of the 
artist, memory, the notion of a sacrifice, and the relationship between Christianity and 
antiquity.410 In the beginning of his essay, Mandelshtam lists the three fallacies that he believes 
plague his contemporary society: no unity, no personhood, no time. These misperceptions—
conspicuously suggestive of Dionysian aspirations and theosophical experiments in the 
Symbolist circles—prompt the “new Orpheus” to cast his lyre into the sea in despair: his art has 
lost its meaning.411 Mandelshtam outlines his understanding of the relationship between art and 
the concept of personhood in the context of antiquity and Christian culture. The Greeks 
perceived the self as an entity whose integrity constantly had to be protected from the chthonic 
Dionysian forces. They viewed music with suspicion and preferred to contain its destructive 
power with songs or recitation. Like Ivanov, Mandelshtam believes that Scriabin’s music revives 
the aspect of antique Greek culture that the Greeks themselves feared and sought to subdue. But 
unlike Ivanov, he proposes that this revival serves to obliterate the suppressed fear of the ancient 
civilization all over again, in imitation of Christ’s redemptive sacrifice. Disintegration of the self 
is not a menace to the one, whose integrity is already redeemed.  
Mandelshtam insists that Christianity “asks nothing in return” for this sacrifice, and that 
the artist is free to imitate the original creative act creatively, in other words, by means of 
																																																								
410 Like Ivanov, Mandelshtam views Scriabin’s death as a sacrifice. This soaring rhetoric 
contrasts with Kuzmin’s characteristic remark in a diary entry made April 14, 1915: “Skriabin 
died of some kind of pimple.” M. Kuzmin. Dnevnik 1908-1915 (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo 
Ivana Limbakha, 2005), 527. 
411 Mandelshtam writes: “Unity is no more! ‘There are numerous worlds, situated within 
‘spheres’, God rules over God!” What is this: the ravings of madmen or the end of Christianity? 
Personhood is no more! “‘I’— am a temporary state—you have many souls and many lives!” Is 
this the raving of madmen or the end of Christianity? Time is no more! Christian chronology is 
in danger, lost is the fragile count of the years of our era—time rushes backward with clamor and 
hissing like an obstructed stream—and new Orpheus casts his lyre into the seething foam: art is 
no more” Mandel’shtam, “Skriabin i Khristianstvo,” 36.   
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metaphor.412 The “most real fact of redemption” [“real’neishii fakt iskupleniia”] transforms art 
into a game:  
The divine illusion of redemption that resides in Christian art can be viewed as a game 
that the Deity plays allowing us to wander down the pathways of the mysteries, so that 
we may discover redemption for ourselves, and experience catharsis: redemption in art.  
 
 
Like Ivanov’s Orpheus, Mandelshtam’s hero finds himself on the path of the mysteries, where he 
must play the “game” of hide-and-seek with the Deity, who has staged its own disappearance. To 
discover that he is not forsaken, he must first believe that he is. While for Ivanov this “game” is 
undoubtedly associated with the tragedy, the “epic gesture” of Mandelshtam’s poetics strives to 
integrate rather than oppose the tragic.413 In the “Lethean poems” the hero wanders into spaces 
far beyond “beautiful clarity,” and captures them in a “silent” symbol—the opposite of the 
incessant ringing of inarticulacy—that potentially ferries the tragic into the sphere of “epic 																																																								
412 In part I, chapter 5 of Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago, Iura’s uncle, Nikolai Nikolaevich, 
espouses similar views. He believes that Christianity allowed for the idea of “the free 
individual,” “life as a sacrifice,” and history as a dwelling for humanity, and claims that pre-
Christian antiquity had no access to the idea of the soul’s immortality.  Pasternak situates the 
uncle monolog in the year 1903, just before the second generation of the Symbolists begins to 
gain its prominent place in Moscow and St. Petersburg circles, perhaps retrospectively disputing 
their ideas.  
Pasternak’s poem “O znal by ia, chto tak byvaet,” (1932) with its theme of art that kills the artist, 
is another variation on the idea of poetry as a game with a deadly outcome.    
413 In her critique of Viacheslav Ivanov’s Dionis i Pradionisiistvo, Nina Braginskaia points out 
that in Aristotle’s texts the word “katharsis” is associated with ritual purification but once: in the 
Poetics, where it pertains to Orestes’ ritual cleansing after the matricide, and where it is an 
Apollonian, not a Dionysian, rite. Aristotle discusses katharsis as an emotional experience 
caused by ritual music in Politics, reserving it, however, for the spectators among the lower 
classes. Braginskaia argues that Aristotle’s discussion of tragedy in Poetics is consistent not with 
the idea of katharsis as purification, but as understanding and clarity (katharôs gnônai). She 
argues brilliantly, that since the plot of a tragedy was a mimetic representation of an ancient 
myth, recognition of the old legend in the new plot provided “katharsis”—the clarity of 
recognition. N. Braginskaia, “Tragedy and Ritual in Viacheslav Ivanov” in S. Braginskii, G.A. 
Zograf, et al. (eds.), Arkhaicheskii ritual v fol’klornykh i ranneliteraturnykh paniatnikakh 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 319-323.  
It is unlikely, though not impossible, that Mandelshtam researched the issue in the way 
Braginskaia has, and anticipated her theory. He may have simply intuited the idea. In any case, 
his concept of katharsis disputes Ivanov’s and resonates with Braginskaia’s.  
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totality.” The concept of anamnesis as it figures in the essay “Scriabin and Christianity” is 
central in the process of transforming the tragic into the epic.  
A game is motivated by purpose rather than cause. The purpose of the game of art is to 
remember. But: “To die is to remember, to remember is to die… To remember whatever the 
cost! To defeat forgetting—even at the cost of death: this is Scriabin’s motto and the heroic 
motivation of his art.” [“umeret’ znachit vspomnit’, vspomnit’ znachit umeret’… Vspomnit’ vo 
chto by to ni stalo! Poborot’ zabvenie,—khotia by eto stoilo smerti: vot deviz Skriabina, vot 
geroicheskoe ustremlenie ego iskusstva!”]. Two conclusions may be drawn from this statement. 
First, Scriabin’s death catalyzes the rediscovery of the integrity and immortality of the self. Since 
it is a sacrifice, Mandelshtam describes his music as “heroically motivated,” foreshadowing his 
concept of the “heroic era in the life of the word.” Second, the same rediscovery occurs in 
anamnesis, when the self dies and is resurrected: transformed, but intact.  
The “most real act of redemption” absolves not only the person, but the word, rescinding 
any need for Ivanov’s “a realibus ad realiora.” Mandelshtam represents the integrity of the word 
with the help of images that will reemerge in his work in later years, and that I have analyzed 
above. In this essay, however, he explicates how the “clear” sign relates to time: “The mountain 
lake of Christian music formed after the profound transformation that turned Hellas into Europe 
[…]” [“Gornoe ozero khristianskoi muzyki obrazovalos’ posle glubokogo perevorota, 
prevrativshego Elladu v Evropu.”] As a “cross-section of time” and “crystallized eternity,” it is 
bound with the Christian understanding of time: “Christian eternity is a Kantian category, 
bisected with the sword of a seraph.” [“khristianskaia vechnost’ eto kantovskaia kategoriia, 
rassechennaia mechom serafima.”] Embedded in melody, harmony is eternity within sound. The 
same can be said about visual perspective as it figures in “Word and Culture,” Mandelshtam’s 
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“Armenian poems,” or in the aforementioned chapter of “The Noise of Time.” A chorus of 
previous interpretations is present in the speaker’s voice: a verse by Mandelshtam refers to 
Catullus, who refers to the Greeks, or Mandelshtam recalls Nedobrovo, who reads a verse by 
Tyutchev, whose verse culminates in the Alps as the symbolic vanishing point and source of 
clarity. These voices manifest within the single subjective utterance, as harmony or perspective 
in sound and image respectively.  
The “epic gesture” of Mandelshtam’s poetics is based on the idea of anamnesis as the 
metaphoric equivalent of the Christian redemptive sacrifice. Since only a totality can recognize 
the unfamiliar within itself as itself, anamnesis as a metaphor of resurrection is one of the ways 
in which the deity conveys its own indestructible nature. Therefore, spontaneous memory is the 
experiential equivalent of Lukács’ idea that the epic is a form that becomes aware of its own 
totality.  
Mandelshtam’s clarity is a dual phenomenon. As the emblem of a “transitive” logos, it is 
the recurrent original, described in “Word and Culture” as always new, like the first tendrils of 
green grass, yet filled with both the past and the future. It is associated with a spontaneous 
restitution of memory, although Mandelshtam, as an Acmeist, of course does not equate 
spontaneity with effortlessness, to the contrary. The effort of memory yields instances of rupture, 
such as acts of misspeaking or misquoting that individualize what would otherwise be 
impersonal transmission of information. This type of clarity is also associated with Classicism, 
which Mandelshtam understands as a poetic modality that periodically recreates itself. Like the 
“classical” word, the “classical” subject is as partial and specific to its time and place, as it is 
universal and eternal. Mandelshtam references harmony in “Scriabin and Christianity” and 
perspective in “Word and Culture” to represent the individual word as a “thousand-reed pipe” 
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that voices a “glossolalia”: a plural subjectivity that is integrated and articulated by one unifying 
voice. Finally, this kind of clarity pertains to the spoken word and to the interlocutor to whom it 
is directed.  
While Mandelshtam’s Catullus establishes continuity where there is a “sign of rupture,” 
his Orpheus interrupts “primordial” incessancy in order to attain the possibility of articulation. 
Catullus’s “claras urbes” are the recurring origin of the word in the unknown, as well as a 
homecoming to language as this very unknown. If, as Mandelshtam writes in “The Noise of 
Time,” he views his biographical “origin”—his family—as inarticulate, then language is the 
other “origin,” within which he seeks to ground himself. In “Silentium” this “other” referred to 
Florence and the Renaissance, in the passage from “Word and Culture” it refers to an ancient 
Roman. In both instances, the aesthetic of articulation as a “home” is associated with Italy.  
The “Lethean poems” address clarity of a different kind. Their hero enters the space of 
rupture, to discover it as the place where the word “gestates” but can never quite obtain 
materiality: “And slowly it grows, a tent or a temple, / Shoots past itself like a mad Antigone 
[…]” Whereas “transitive” clarity is associated with the speech act, this solitary and 
“intransitive” experience precedes the very possibility of speech, and could be described as a 
descent into the “inner image” of language. The statement “to die is to remember, to remember is 
to die” encapsulates both of these approaches to clarity. Mandelshtam conceptualizes the poetic 
logos as possessing both properties at the same time.  
Mandelshtam’s “Epic Gesture” in the 1930s 
The poet’s writing on clarity before and in the early 1920s abounds in references to 
Classical culture. By the 1930s his poetics reflects a very different aesthetic, yet the issue of 
clarity persists, still in relation to the debates surrounding the crisis of Symbolism. Clarity 
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becomes an emblem of a generational quest for the logos regardless of the specifics of the debate 
itself. Mandelshtam’s poems from the 1930s that mention clarity refer to an archetypal poet who 
represents, even personifies a generation, referencing Bely, Kuzmin, Ivanov and of course 
Mandelshtam himself.  
An example of such synthesis can be gleaned from Mandelshtam’s poem on Bely’s death, 
“The Morning of January 10, 1934.” In this poem clarity appears as a feature of Bely’s physical 
appearance, while his speech is both “direct” and “entangled” or “convoluted”: “Where is that 
bright figure? / Where the directness of his speeches, entangled like honest zigzags […]” [“Gde 
iasnyi stan?/ Gde priamizna rechei, zaputannykh kak chestnye zigzagi …”] Bely believed the 
body got in the way of clarity as he understood it. Ironically, his contemporaries noted that his 
physical presence effused light, while his prose, for all its obvious merits, does not invite similar 
praise.414 Mandelshtam restores Bely to the physicality that he wished to shed, at the exact 
moment when he actually shed it. In the verse immediately following the verse above, the poet 
likens the vigor of Bely’s speech to the ice-skater’s energetic movement as he glides along the 
frozen surface. The imagery of the poem insists on making the poet, as well as the poet’s speech 
a concrete, palpable, physical experience.   
Mandelshtam also depicts Bely as larger-than-life, an equal to Dante or Goethe in literary 
imagination, or to Nietzsche in the manner Bely envisioned him:  
And he bore the branching of European thought 
as only the mighty could: 
Rachel gazed into the mirror of being, 
While Leah sang and wove a wreath. 
I evropeiskoi mysli razvetlen’e 
On perenes, kak lish’ mogushchii mog: 
Rakhil’ gliadela v zerkalo iavlen’ia, 
A Liia pela i plela venok. 
																																																								
414 Nadezhda Mandelshtam observed in her memoirs, translated into English as Hope Against 
Hope: “He seemed to radiate light, and I have never met anyone else who was s literally 
luminous. Whether this effect was produced by his eyes, or by the constant flow of his ideas, it is 
hard to say, but he charged everybody who came near him with a sort of intellectual electricity.” 
Nadezhda Mandelshtam, Hope Against Hope (London: Collins and Harvill Press, 1971), 155.  
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While Mandelshtam portrays both Bely and Dante as geniuses of synthesis, in this verse it is he 
who reconciles antagonists. The last lines of the stanza above refer to Dante’s Purgatorio XVII, 
wherein just before the pilgrim enters Eden, he dreams of Rachel and Leah. The former looks in 
the mirror, while the latter sings and gathers flowers. They are usually interpreted as the 
contemplative and the active tendencies in Western thought, both representing also ways of 
living a righteous life. Deliberately or not, these lines recall Kuzmin’s Wings, whose protagonist, 
Vanya Smurov, also reads Purgatorio. He reads Canto XVIII, where, immediately following his 
dream, the pilgrim enters Terrestrial Paradise and encounters a beautiful woman who also 
gathers flowers on a riverbank and tells him about the two rivers of Eden: Lethe, to wipe away 
memories of sins, and Eunoe, to secure the soul’s memory of its good deeds. She is Matilda, and 
her identity has always puzzled interpreters, and it is therefore appropriate that Vanya, too, is 
stumped. He believes she might represent “active life,” like Leah, about whom he read in the 
previous canto. But his tutor instructs him not to bother with pedantic exegesis. “Understand 
simply and beautifully” [“ponimaite prosto i krasivo”], she says.415 In other words, understand 
clearly, reconciling and deriving meaning from what initially may appear incompatible, the way 
the protagonist in Mandelshtam’s poem understands the rich and conflicted heritage of European 
culture, and the way Mandelshtam reconciles the dispute on clarity.  
The connection with Kuzmin may appear farfetched, but the first stanza of the following 
poem in the cycle is rife with “Kuzminian” prosody and imagery.  
When the soul—so in a rush, so timid— 
is suddenly faced with the depth of events, 
She runs a twisting trail— 
But death for her is an unclear path. 
 
Kogda dushe stol’ toropkoi, stol’ robkoi 
Predstanet vdrug sobytii glubina, 
Ona bezhit viiushcheiusia tropkoi— 
No smerti ei tropina ne iasna.416  
 
 																																																								
415 Kuzmin, PE 1:93. 
416 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:192-193.  
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The image of the soul running along a path unequivocally references Kuzmin even when it 
appears in Mandelshtam’s “When Psyche-Life descends to shades...” Here, Psyche who is also 
presumably Bely’s soul, faces the dilemma she has already confronted in the “Lethean poems”: 
all paths are clear except the paths of dying. Kuzminan overtones end here: the rest of the poem 
addresses sound as Bely’s principle theme and culminates in the image of a mask—reminiscent 
of Pushkin’s death mask with its “enlarged lips” and “fortified affection” [“dlia ukrupnennykh 
gub/ dlia ukreplennoi laski”], and of course Orpheus.417 Bely’s portrait incorporates the features 
of Kuzmin, his longtime antagonist, but transcends them both. It is not by chance that 
Mandelshtam recalls the issue of clarity against the background of the Soviet 1930s. His 
protagonist embodies the old debate as it plumbs new depths: the issue at stake is the writing of 
an alternate history—at once a record of the generational effort to speak and an active enactment 
of this effort amidst calamity. In this context the tension between the spoken and the written 
word comes to the fore in a new light, for it is the spoken, not the written or printed word that 
would necessarily have to embody this alternate history.  
In Mandelshtam’s final body of work poems that address clarity—such as the poems on 
Bely’s death, “Don’t compare, a living being is incomparable…” [“Ne sravnivai, zhivushchii 
nesravnim”], “At the heart of the era I am an unclear path” [“Ia v serdtse veka—put’ neiasen”], 
and especially the late masterpiece “Poem about the Unknown Soldier” –feature a hero who 																																																								
417 There no room here for a separate discussion of this poem, but I would like to note that it is in 
fact a model of the “intransitive” logos, very much in step with “The Swallow.” It describes 
sound, presumably made by the first violin, because it leads, alone, and then turns inward on 
itself, and flows back into the bow. Poignantly, it gushes forth with no apparent origin, or an 
origin unto itself. Beautiful variations on the sound “l” from the Russian verb “to pour” [“lit'sia”] 
and the noun “caress” or “tenderness” [“laska”] deliver this flowing sound to the concluding 
image of the mask as its extension, and as the visual representation of what should be the source 
of the voice, but what instead appears to be its careful creation. The poem is a stunning variation 
on the image of the logos, as it is first described in “Word and Culture” and as it appears at the 
end of “The Swallow.”    
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personifies the past and gives it life in the present. While these poems are profoundly and self-
consciously tragic, their commemorative impulse belongs to the epic. Even as the hero mourns 
the demise of clarity, his singular voice embodies the “glossolalia” of memory. As the “epic 
gesture” emerges on the level of the narrative, it redeems tragedy through anamnesis. A 
metaphoric resurrection becomes a literal, textual resurrection of poets’ voices. In this sense, the 
“Poem about the Unknown Soldier” represents the original epic narrative— not because it is a 
story of genesis, but because its narrator, the “unknown soldier,” exchanges his name for 
collective memory, literally “dying to remember.”  
The poem describes the narrator’s flight away from war-torn Earth. As Omry Ronen 
observed, this flight originates in a book by a nineteenth-century astronomer, Camille 
Flammarion. The protagonist of his popular Astronomie Populaire flies from the Earth faster 
than the speed of light, explaining phenomena of the physical universe as he does so.418 As 
Mandelshtam’s hero does the same, he speeds past visions of the past, witnessing vast panoramas 
of violence from the battles of World War I to Napoleonic campaigns. In fact, the very substance 
of the light beam appears to be the “unknown soldiers’” lives. In the last lines of the poem, the 
hero arrives on the shores of Lethe, to take his place among those of his generation, who already 
wait there.  
Clarity appears in the poem twice, and both times is most immediately associated with 
Bely. Mandelshtam describes the demise of an infantry [pekhota], and then the clatter of wooden 
crutches as they trot the globe. In the following stanza the globe transforms into a skull: 
A skull develops from life 
Across the entire forehead from temple to temple 
He teases himself with the seams' purity 
Razvivaetsia cherep ot zhizni 
Vo ves lob ot viska do viska 
Chistotoi svoikh shvov on draznit sebia 																																																								
418 Ronen, “K Suzhetu ‘Stikhov o Neizvestnom Soldate’ Mandel’shtama,” Slavica 
Hierosolymitana IV, Jerusalem (1979): 214-222.  
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Reminsiscent of a church dome, it shows clear 
It foams with thought—dreams of its own self 
—the cup of cups, the homeland to the homeland 
A cap sewn with a starry stitch— 
A nightcap of happiness—a father of Shakespeare. 
 
Ash tree clarity and sycamore vigilance 
Something reddish races home. 
 
Pominaiushchim kupolom iasnitsia 
Mysl’iu penitsia—sam sebe snitsia 
—Chasha chash i otchizna otchizne 
Zvezdnym rubchikom shityi chepets— 
Chepchik schast’ia—Shekspira otets. 
 
Iasnost’ iasenevaia i zorkost’ iavorovaia 




The skull as a memento mori and a symbol of the world—evoking “poor Yorick” and the head of 
an infant—is reminiscent of Bely’s Notes of the Eccentric, whose protagonist experiences 
metaphoric decapitation in the process of Orphic initiation. As aforementioned, Bely’s narrator 
compares his head to a cupola. The “ash tree clarity” [“iasnost' iasenevaia”] likewise recalls 
Bely, whose Glossolalia features an entry on the word “clarity” [“iasnost'”] and its etymological 
connection to the Russian word “iasen'” or the ash. Boris Gasparov argues that these lines 
pertain to Sergei Esenin’s suicide and the grim fact that he wrote his last poem in his own blood. 
Gasparov suggests that as Mandelshtam’s narrator flies away from the Earth, he encounters the 
dead poet.420 I venture the suggestion that the primary reference here is to Bely, though Esenin is 
present as well. Mandelshtam’s remarkable achievement in this poem is to synthesize numerous 
voices of his generation and create a collective portrait and memorial with numerous allusions 
condensed into just a few words.  
The concluding chapter of Bely’s Glossolalia deserves a closer look in connection to 
Mandelshtam’s verses above.  
Eurythmy carries the imprint of free clarity, bravery, sobriety, new science and dance; the 
fleet-footed dancer is he who clothed train of thought in rhythmical ornaments: he is 
“Zarathustra.” 																																																								
419 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:228-231; 230-231.  
420 B. Gasparov, “Smert’ v Vozdukhe,” Literaturnye Leitmotivy: Ocherki Russkoi Literatury XX 
Veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), 213-240, 232-233.  
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And the fleet-footed thoughts of the gay science come not in the poetic meter of treatises, 
but in a swarm of flyers playing with scarves: 
-I saw them in a white hall worked with carving: beneath a dome glowing turquoise  […] 
they’ve been hammering on oak for years (yes, years!); but, growing younger, they 
poured out their light in a pure swell of planets. Perhaps at that time a hurricane volley of 
shots rumbled; and corpses fell; but these pure hands and the glowing turquoise dome—
took off as prayer—to the throne of He, Who gazes with sadness at the horrors, the 
battles, the floods of curses, millions of tortured dead bodies, tormented by life; and I 
understood the brotherhood of peoples: in the mimicking dance. 
 On the folds of raised arms 
 The builder sound erects churches. 
   S. Esenin. 
 
[…] Let there be indeed the brotherhood of peoples: the language of languages will tear 
languages to pieces; and—the second coming of the Word will be accomplished. 
 
Na evritmii pechat’ volnoi iasnosti, smelosti, trezvosti, novoi nauki i tantsa; pliasun 
legkonogii est’ tot, kto oblek khody mysli v ornament ritma: on est’ “Zaratustra.” 
I legkonogie mysli veseloi nauki griadut ne stropoiu traktatov, a poem letunii, 
igraiushchikh sharfami: 
-videl ia ikh v belom zale reznom: pod biriuzeiushchim kupolom […] stuchat molotkami 
po dubu oni uzhe goda (da, goda!!); no, iuneia, oni izlivali svoi svet v chistoi zybi planet. 
Mozhet byt’, v to vremia gremeli ogni uragannogo zalpa; i padali trupy; no eti chistye 
ruki i biriuzeiushchii kupol—vzletali molitvoi—k prestolu Togo, Kto s pechal’iu vziraet 
na uzhasy, boiniu, potopy klevet, million istrezannykh trupov, zamuchennykh zhiznei; i 
bratstvo narodov ia ponial: v mimicheskom tantse. 
Na krepkikh sgibakh vozdetykh ruk 
Vozvodit tserkvi stroitel’ zvuk. 
S. Esenin. 
 
[…] Da budet zhe bratstvo narodov: iazyk iazykov razorvet iazyki; i—sovershitsia vtoroe 
prishestvie Slova.421 
 
Here, Nietzsche (who according to Gasparov is important for the “Poem about the Unknown 
Soldier”), images of World War I, the cupola of Steiner’s theosophic temple in Switzerland, a 
quote by Esenin, and, of course, clarity all play their part. The final stanzas of Mandelshtam's 
poem contain most of the imagery in this paragraph, but the minor details are most telling. For 
example, both poets use the verb “to hammer” [stuchat’]: Bely—to describe the hammering of 
the builders of the temple, Mandelshtam—to create the remarkable image of a “tribe” of destitute 																																																								
421 Belyi, Glossolalia, 120-121.  
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war invalids who trot the globe on crutches. Bely’s lofty vision is undone: instead of building the 
movement the vision is of dissipation. Similarly, Bely uses the tautological “iazyk iazykov” to 
describe the second advent of the Logos, while Mandelshtam employs tautology to describe its 
undoing. For example, obviously tautological—and an obvious echo of the argument on 
clarity— is the image of the skull as the world. “Iasnost' iasenevaia,” pertaining to the same 
argument, is here not a quality of phenomenal appearance, the way Ivanov would have it, but the 
light of the word, the way both Bely and Kuzmin interpreted it: it is vision as being and being as 
vision, synonymous with the life of things. In addition to referencing Bely’s magical dictionary 
definition of clarity, it recalls also Mandelshtam’s own “Word and Culture,” where the poet 
describes the impending destruction of the old world: “Stop? What for? Who will stop the sun, 
when it races in its sparrow traces to the paternal house, shod with a thirst for return?”422 
Mandelshtam’s tautology conveys the idea of being as it undoes itself. The skull as the world 
that dreams itself [“sam sebe snitsia”], and is its own “cup of cups, and the homeland to the 
homeland” [“chasha chash i otchizna otchizne”], transforms into the terrifying head that 
consumes itself: “Is it I who with no choice drink this brew, / eat my own head under fire.” This 
image reverses the Symbolist understanding of the word as a metonymic extension and icon of 
the invisible origin, and undoes Kuzmin's clarity as individual perspective based on love as the 
ultimate “prototype.”  
In his An Approach to Mandelshtam, Omry Ronen describes the “Poem about the 
Unknown Soldier” as reminiscent of Viacheslav Ivanov’s concept of the tragedy. The scholar 
likens the poem to “a choral dithyramb” and a “funerary oration with its closing vision of 
sacrifice, the immortal record of light, and the Heraclitan judgment of centuries by all-embracing 
																																																								
422 Mandel’shtam, PSS 2:49. 
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fire.” According to Ronen, this poem realizes Ivanov’s call for “the dirge of the self-abnegating 
but not yet realized spirit.”423 Ronen quotes from Ivanov’s “Crisis of Individualism” (1905) in 
which the poet proclaims the end of the age of the epic as the “Apolline” genre, associated with 
individualism, and enthusiastically invites the age of the “choral dithyramb.”424 Ronen’s point is 
well-made: the ending of the poem, wherein the pilgrim arrives on the shores of Lethe, takes his 
place among those already waiting there—presumably, all the dead poets of the past, or perhaps 
those of his great contemporaries, who were dead by 1937. As the centuries encircle him in fire, 
he responds to the roll call with “bloodless” lips, pronouncing the year of his birth, but, 
poignantly, not his name.425 Ronen’s point appears to be self-evident: this is, indeed, a lament, “a 
vision of sacrifice,” both Orphic and Christian. But in fact the central theme of the poem is not 
sacrifice for its own sake, and certainly not for the sake of shedding one’s individuality to 
embrace its alternative. The Unknown Soldier commemorates innumerable lost lives and allows 
them entry into history. His death creates an alternative history: a record of the many voices that 
would otherwise be lost. He becomes the unknown, so as to verbalize collective memory. If in 
the “Lethean poems,” Orpheus follows the forgotten word—the “unknown” object— into the 
space of forgetting, he now loses his individual name in order to be able to become the “flesh” of 
memory. This is why in the final lines of the poem his lips are “bloodless”: the words, not the 
body, are now his “flesh.”  
																																																								
423 Ronen, An Approach to Mandelstam, 198-199. 
424 This may be a far-fetched connection, however it is worth noting that Ivanov’s insistence on 
the end of the age of the epic is a reference to Lermontov’s ironic “The age of epic poems has 
passed” [“Umchalsya vek epicheskikh poem”] from his Detskaia skazka. Lermontov’s presence is 
important to the poem, he is clearly one of Mandelshtam’s “unknown soldiers.” Perhaps the epic 
gesture of this poem is meant as a response not only to Ivanov, but Lermontov as well.  
425 Gasparov, “Smert’ v Vozdukhe”, 237. 
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While the poem refers to Ivanov’s ideas, Mandelshtam never anticipates, let alone 
welcomes the “Dionysian” disintegration of the individual in the collective ecstasy of 
destruction. Nor is it correct to read his poetry as a “chorus” in Ivanov’s sense of the word. In his 
writing, the multitude obtains voice only as it is “interpreted” by the individual. As early as his 
“classical” period of the late 1910s and early 1920s, such representations of wholeness as the 
“virgin forest” or the “virgin soil of time,” or a distinctly classical “Psyche”— refer to a plurality 
of voices as they emerge in individual memory. This also applies to the “Poem to the Unknown 
Soldier,” with the difference that now the integration of numerous previous poetic instances, as 
well as the verbalization of the unspeakable witnessed by the narrator as he collides with the 
past, come at the price of his extinction. The “epic” author is not one whose name has been 
simply lost to history, but one who has exchanged the literal for the metaphoric, and the personal 
for the universal. Only this action can give voice to the collective. Whereas in “Scriabin and 
Christianity” the poet offered a retrospective meditation on the meaning of Scriabin’s—and also 
Pushkin’s— death, and a metaphysical approach to anamnesis as the creative act at the heart of 
the art-making process, in the “Unknown Soldier” he writes about a conscious decision. This is 
an imitation of Christ in earnest. Consequently, the outcome is the preservation of wholeness 
rather than disintegration.  
The poem combines the notions of “intransitive” and “transitive” clarity. As the narrator 
flies away from the Earth, he collides with powerful images of war, as light itself appears to be 
saturated with them. This colliding motion of image and sound—the narrator’s verbalizing his 
vision—is an emblem of intransitivity that requires endless clarification. The image of the poet’s 




Incorruptible, trenched sky— 
Sky of massive wholesale deaths— 
After you, away from you—in your entirety 
My lips sweep me along in the dark. 
 
Nepodkupnoe nebo okopnoe— 
Nebo krupnykh optovykh smertei— 
Za toboi, ot tebia—tselokupnoe 
Ia gubami nesus’ v temnote.426 
 
The word cannot catch up with the meaning: the very idea of movement has lost meaning. Yet 
this implosion enables memory. The hero personifies it: Mandelshtam’s Orpheus is a tribute to 
the argument on clarity as the specific relationship between “self” and “world.” The figure of 
Orpheus becomes the needle that threads into the 1930s a conversation from the 1920s, the 
1910s, and the period 1904-1905. Presented as a calamitous ending of this debate, in fact it is a 
recapitulation and extension into the future. The final words of the poem are addressed to an 
invisible interlocutor, one who is real in so far as the words spoken by the narrator are real, 
because “only a reality calls forth another reality.”   
In conclusion, I would like to revisit my thesis that for Mandelshtam clarity is inseparable 
from the spoken word, and that it is therefore inseparable from the body as a physical reality. 
The “epic gesture” of his poetics always emphasizes the effort to verbalize, and therefore implies 
both sound and body, and their relationship as the frontier whereupon culture in the broadest 
sense of the word is formed. In this way the poet always engages and challenges Bely’s approach 
to the logos. It is not by chance that the final lines of the “Poem to the Unknown Soldier” refer to 
the speaker’s lips and his whisper. As Orpheus who stands on the brink of forgetting—and so 
again upon the liminal “path of the mysteries”—he insists on the spoken word as the 
embodiment of memory. The speaker’s lips are bloodless because the spoken word is now the 
body of memory. Unlike Bely, who appeared to his contemporaries as a luminous embodiment 
of thought, and believed in earnest that the body must be made subject to the invisible, 																																																								
426 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:229.  
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Mandelshtam seeks to make the word physical. Bely disparaged the body as the site of the 
“thoughts of the world,” while for Mandelshtam, like for Kuzmin, it is the source of clarity and 
coherence. Earlier, in 1936, he writes a poem that begins with the following verse:   
Not as a powdery white butterfly 
will I return my borrowed remains to the earth— 
I want the thinking body 
to be turned into a street, a country... 
 
Ne muchnistoi babochkoiu beloi 
V zemliu ia zaemnyi prakh vernu— 
ia khochu, chtob mysliashchee telo 




The poem concludes with a vision of infantrymen that march by carrying the “exclamation 
marks” of the rifles, and the following lines:  
Comrades from the latest call-up 
walked in their work in harsh skies, 
The infantry went silently by, 
exclamations of rifles on their shoulders. 
 
And thousands of anti-aircraft guns— 
Whether eyes were brown or blue— 
they went in disorder—people, people, people,-- 
Who, then, will continue for them? 
 
Shli tovarishchi poslednego prizyva 
Po rabote v zhestkikh nebesakh, 
Pronesla pekhota molchalivo 
Vosklitsan’ia ruzhei na plechakh. 
 
I zenitnikh tysiachi orudii— 
Karikh to zrachkov il’ golubykh— 
Shli nestroino—liudi, liudi, liudi,— 




The image of the  “thinking body” in the first stanza responds to Bely’s desire to eliminate it. It 
is a perfect metaphor for the “epic gesture” of Mandelshtam’s poetics, complete with the 
statement of the desire to “incarnate” collective experience, rather than a claim of having 
achieved it. The verses where the narrator witnesses thousands of nameless soldiers marching to 
war presage the “Poem to the Unknown Soldier,” where in the final verses of the poem the 
narrator lines up with them all on the shores of Lethe. Metonymy as the idea of extension and 
continuation is operative in both poems. The question “who will continue for them” [“kto budet 
prodolzhat’ za nikh?”] finds its answer in the later poem. Mandelshtam will have earned his 
																																																								
427 Mandel’shtam, PSS 1:207. 
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rightful place among those who have made their solitary passage into silence so as to give their 







In his Poets of Divine Love, Alessandro Vettori observes that the idiom of prevarication 
originates in the Garden of Eden, in the first instance of Adam’s speech after the Fall. He writes: 
“There is no direct correlation between Yahweh’s question: “Where are you?” and Adam’s 
reply: “I heard the sound of you in the garden…I was afraid because I was naked, so I hid.”428 
Ashamed of his nudity, Adam doesn’t just cover his body but cloaks his speech in ambiguity, 
thereby forfeiting the primordial bond between being and language. It is at this moment that 
Eden is lost: the subsequent physical expulsion is merely a confirmation of this fact. The 
language of postlapsarian exile is defined by two conflicting drives: for the clarity, originally 
possessed but relinquished by Adam, and for the wisdom that he now seeks perpetually. In 
accordance with Said’s concept of an “intransitive” and a “transitive” beginning, the former turns 
inward in the effort to remember the forgotten idiom, while the latter looks toward the horizon in 
order to uncover the secrets of being and convey them in accordance with their clarity.429 But 
while both strive to bridge the separation between being and the word, both cannot escape 
equivocation.   
During the 1910 polemic on the “crisis of Symbolism” Mikhail Kuzmin’s essay “On 
Beautiful Clarity,” followed by Viacheslav Ivanov’s explicit definition of clarity as empirical 
intelligibility, brought into play three distinct versions of the poetic word, formulated according 
to the core principles of the participants’ respective poetics and the philosophical and aesthetic 
views that informed them. Each of the three models of clarity represents a “beginning” either in 
the word as an expression and conduit of being, in being as an object located beyond the word’s 
immediate grasp, or, in the case of Osip Mandelshtam, a synthesis of the two approaches. Yet the 																																																								428	Vettori, Poets of Divine Love: Franciscan Mystical Poetry of the Thirteenth Century, xvii.	429	Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method.73.  	
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major implications of the debate were not immediately apparent to the participants themselves. 
While the concept of clarity as a specific model of the “creative form” implicitly informed each 
of their views, it evaded explicit definition. 
The notion of clarity figured in Kuzmin’s and Ivanov’s writing years before “On 
Beautiful Clarity” appeared in print. Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century 
Kuzmin’s letters and Ivanov’s essays and diary entries made references to clarity not only as the 
idea of “transparency of meaning” or the “French” clarté, but also as a kind of “mood” or state of 
mind. These references evoked a specific set of issues and associations that came to the fore and 
became contentious when in “The Precepts of Symbolism” Ivanov posed the question about the 
word’s sufficiency and adequacy to reason. The problem of clarity as it was discussed after 
Kuzmin’s essay appeared in Apollon and during the later polemic on the pages of Works and 
Days pertained to the basic relationship between the self and the word, and to the relationship 
between the word and the image. When the same set of issues reemerged in Mandelshtam’s 
response to the polemic in the 1920s and again in the late 1930s, the poet added the juxtaposition 
between the sound of the word and the image as its semantic content. For Ivanov, Kuzmin and 
Mandelshtam these relationships play out across a wide array of aesthetic, cultural and historical 
associations. But as their individual interests and tastes changed over time, their understanding of 
how these relationships are structured did not. Even as it evolved, the poetic identity of each 
author was entwined with these more or less unchanging structures.   
Ivanov, Kuzmin and Mandelshtam associated clarity with Classicism in a variety of its 
interpretations in the West. Among these the Enlightenment concept of clarity as an attribute and 
measure of reason was important. Rejection, modification, or acceptance of this idea helped the 
poets formulate their individual definitions of clarity. Ivanov’s utter rejection of the “clarté” as 
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the word’s “communicability” and “adequacy to reason” was rooted in his skeptical view of 
nineteenth century rationalism, which he held accountable for the decadence and disarray of his 
contemporary society. Ivanov placed his faith in the power of language to recall its spiritual 
foundations, and in the idea that philology as the history of a language held the answer to the 
religious dilemmas of his day. The poetics of insight that resulted from his endeavor to “invent 
the new and inherit the old” needed the concept of clarté to provide the necessary tension as 
something against which to struggle. As an Enlightenment concept, clarity signified the 
distinction between the subject and the ultimately unknowable “thing-in-itself.” For Ivanov, it 
came to represent individuation, which he understood as alienation of the self from the world, 
and the artist from his means of expression. This was the limitation that Ivanov’s “identity 
poetics” perpetually strove to overcome. To this end, Ivanov superimposed the Classical 
distinction between the subject and the object on the Nietzschean dichotomy between Apollo and 
Dionysus, and interpreted this dialectical relationship in religious terms. Apollonian “clarity,” 
which Ivanov associated as much with the visible reality as he did with logic, was now the 
“veil,” but also the self-sacrifice and self-abnegation of the invisible and unknowable “original” 
Dionysian principle.  
Ivanov not only believed he had discovered the Dionysian origins of Western culture as a 
historical fact, but also thought he had received mystical experience of this divine principle. The 
“identity poetics” that resulted from this experience intended to lift the “veil” of image and 
suggest a collapse of the distinction between the subject and the object, yet this poetics was 
predicated upon the very idea it critiqued: a subjective claim to knowledge. Only now the 
signifier of the unknowable and ineffable replaced the signifier of the world as an image. 
Ivanov’s theurgic idiom originates in a revelation of being, marked as the “locus” of undisclosed 
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insight. Contrary to Ivanov’s own statement about the word’s non-correspondence to meaning, 
his poetry assumes that between the self and the word, and between the word and the image, 
there is not only a correspondence, but a continuity. For this reason, the protagonist in so many 
of Ivanov’s texts is a traveler, who makes his way to the site of revelation and returns not only 
transformed but himself an agent of transformation.430 Predicated upon the idea of knowledge, 
Ivanov’s poetics insinuates a metonymic relationship between the presumed site of revelation 
and the word that conveys this revelation.  
Mikhail Kuzmin’s interest in the notion of clarity predated his appearance on the literary 
arena. Rather, it emerged in the context of his religious pursuits when, as a young man, he was 
still in the process of defining himself. He formulated his concept of clarity in response to St. 
Paul’s idea, articulated in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, that complete grasp of the truth 
must be deferred to the afterlife. St. Paul’s iconic reference to vision as a “dark glass” inspired 
Kuzmin to want to reveal, in the present, the clear surface beneath layers of debris. Unlike for 
Ivanov, for Kuzmin the notion of clarity always pertained to a specific image rather an abstract 
concept. The image of a clear surface signified the kind of wholeness of vision that emerges in 
the process of individuation and so implies separation.  
During the period of Kuzmin’s affiliation with the World of Art artists, as well as in the 
later years of the “crisis of Symbolism,” he associated the concept of clarity with the aesthetic of 
Classicism as he interpreted it. The image that emerged out of his disagreement with St. Paul 
remained a constant in his texts, but obtained the function of a magical device that aids in the 
transformation of a copy into an original. In the context of this “magical” Classicism, clarity has 
several roles. In its capacity as an image it functions as a narrative device that propels the action. 																																																								430	In my dissertation: the Pont du Gard fragments, the essays on Goethe and Orpheus, the poem 
“Beauty” among others.	
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In Wings, for example, a series of windows and mirrors leads Vanya toward liberation and 
attainment of a new self. Additionally, the image of clarity as a surface transforms itself into the 
faux superficiality and nonchalance of Kuzmin’s narrative voice. This “gliding” narrative style 
reflects the “Apollonian” aesthetic of the World of Art, as much as it is informed by Kuzmin’s 
personal tastes and preferences for “lucid” writers ranging from Apuleius, to Pushkin, to Anatole 
France. Kuzmin puts this quality at the service of stylization so that the text itself becomes a 
“mirror” of a previous original. Not only is writing a kind of magical space that allows the 
protagonist to make his way toward a transformation into the original, but it is itself such an 
original, “reflected” in its antecedent. Finally, clarity is also that “French” attribute of good style 
that Ivanov understood as “transparency of meaning” and believed to be duplicitous. In fact, all 
of Kuzmin’s interpretations of clarity engage with this definition: even his initial response to St. 
Paul’s Epistle could be read as an appeal to reason. Yet the Enlightenment clarté interested 
Kuzmin as an artistic rather than a philosophical phenomenon. In his later essays he made sure to 
point out the local, individual character of the French “universalist” aesthetic, and it is in the 
capacity of a specific style that it appealed to him.    
Kuzmin’s “beautiful clarity” does indeed dissimulate, though in a way that differs from 
Ivanov’s understanding of this idea. The secondary and tertiary “concealed” meanings of 
Kuzmin’s texts, their complexity and richness do not in some ultimate analysis reveal the word’s 
inadequacy, as Ivanov would have it, quite to the contrary. Kuzmin’s “metaphysics of 
transparency” is predicated upon an understanding of difference and even “otherness” that is 
completely foreign to Ivanov’s poetics. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of Kuzmin’s clarity as a 
kind of conceptual and visual representation of the otherwise elusive notion of differentiation. 
For characters such as Vanya Smurov, clarity is the ability to distinguish between the initial self, 
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predetermined by his biographical narrative, and the free “original” identity that he attains with 
the help of a series of magical mirrors. The implications of the idea that mimesis is an instrument 
of differentiation, that metaphor yields difference, is that language itself only appears to 
reproduce a primary reality, when in fact it creates it. Trust in the transformative, liberating 
power of language is the antidote to St. Paul’s devaluation of the present. Once the word is free 
of the obligation to be adequate to a fixed concept, even if this concept signifies “being,” the 
relationship between the word and the “image” ceases to be causative, and it is then that it 
actually becomes “adequate” in the poetic sense. Instead, the image and the word relate to each 
other in the same way as the narrator of the “Histoire édifiante” relates to his protagonist, or 
Vanya relates to his reflection in the mirror: spontaneously and metaphorically: as similar in their 
difference, and different in their similarity.  
For Mandelshtam the concept of clarity was inextricably linked to a retrospective 
reconsideration of Ivanov’s and Kuzmin’s polemic in 1910 and 1912. His contribution to the 
debate during the actual “crisis of Symbolism,” however, did set the tone for his later 
reconsideration of this theme. In the poem “Silentium,” published at the height of the polemic, 
Mandelshtam countered Ivanov’s appeal to the ineffable by suggesting that separation from 
primordial unity is irrevocable. His poem, however, evoked an image of this primordial unity—
Venus—without ever mentioning her directly. Although the poem declares her as yet “unborn,” 
it clearly yields her image. It therefore contradicts itself: the origin is lost, yet there it is, born 
from the verses. Moreover, since the poem alludes to an Italian Renaissance painting, this image 
appeals to Classical European heritage.  
Henceforth, Mandelshtam’s poetic voice inhabits the space between the “origins” from 
which the poet has been severed—not only “primordial unity,” but also his Jewish roots from 
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which he willfully detached himself—and the tradition in which he sought to “originate.” In the 
essays “Word and Culture” and “On the Nature of the Word” Mandelshtam writes of 
“remembering” the Classical tradition on native soil. While the effort to remember is conscious, 
the remembrance itself is spontaneous. Mandelshtam mentions Ovid, Pushkin and Catullus as yet 
to be born, through anamnesis, in Russian poetry. They are the “clear cities” toward which he, 
like Catullus, directs his steps. Clarity is the horizon—both cultural and semantic—toward which 
the poet travels, but which appears in his own poetry by virtue of being in the distance. Desire of 
what has yet to come into existence brings this object into existence: the absence of this object is 
the condition of its rebirth. Anamnesis as the spontaneous restitution of the “old” as “new” 
compensates for the tragic separation, be it from one’s roots, from a literary tradition, from the 
native tongue, etc. Spontaneous memory allows for an alternative kind of continuity, one that 
originates in one’s trust that the unknown will yield the right word. Reason is made 
spontaneously.  
This idea of clarity engages polemically with both Ivanov and Kuzmin. Mandelshtam 
removes the notion of an a priori “being” or “original principle” that, according to Ivanov, 
language must address. But he also makes his poetry confront the unknown in a way that 
Kuzmin’s poetry never does. In Mandelshtam’s writing “Kuzminian” playful spontaneity of the 
word collides with a destructive Dionysian force and discovers the former as a poetically 
intelligible reality. Moreover, since “logic is the kingdom of the unexpected” (according to the 
“Morning of Acmeism”), the word spontaneously reveals new “frontiers” of being. Mandelshtam 
interprets the mimetic function of the word as open, inclusive, and able to accommodate multiple 
variations and interpretations, and to engender continuity. The structure of the word itself is 
based in this dynamic. As Mandelshtam writes in “Word and Culture,” the word’s semantic 
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content and its sound are two elements that engender one another, and so form a unity, precisely 
because they are separate and distinct. In “On the Nature of the Word” Mandelshtam describes 
the word as already an image. Yet he also implies that the space between the word and the image 
enlivens language by allowing in a number of associations and potential meanings. His model of 
clarity as a “creative form” has the structure of a metaphor whose elements are not fixed in their 
place, but long to be reborn in each other, to co-create each other, to transform and multiply each 
other.  
Notions of separation and anamnesis also define Mandelshtam’s understanding of the 
relationship between the poet and language. Separation from European culture, Classicism, and 
its ideal of wholeness and integrity is ultimately secondary to Mandelshtam’s implicit anxiety 
that the word itself is alien to the poet, and that he must strive to be reborn in it. But just as the 
relationship between the image and the word is open to a multitude of meanings, so the desire to 
be reborn in the word concerns more than Mandelshtam’s individual narrative. The “epic 
gesture” of his poetics comes to the fore in the 1930s, when the imperative to preserve one’s 
humanity as such prevails over the task of recreating European Classicism on native soil. But it 
is at this time, as Mandelshtam consciously gives voice to a multitude, that his Classicism 
reaches new heights. The very concept of humanity to which his work refers in poems such as 
the “Poem about the Unknown Soldier,” pertains to the Classical ideal as Mandelshtam’s 
understands it. The concept of clarity as it figures in this poem not only alludes to the polemic of 
the Silver Age, but, in the manner of the eighteenth century Classicism, it personifies humanity 
specifically in its capacity to reason. Unconcerned with the specifics of the debate on clarity, 
Mandelshtam represents it as a chapter in the history of Humanism.  
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The polemic about the word’s adequacy to reason inspired Ivanov, Kuzmin and 
Mandelshtam to consider what an intelligible poetics might represent. The discussion proceeded 
in the form of several heated exchanges on the pages of Apollon and Works and Days in 1910 
and again in 1912. But Ivanov’s and Kuzmin’s interest in this idea predated the debate itself, and 
persisted after it was over. Mandelshtam returned to clarity as late as the 1930s. The poets’ 
preoccupation with this concept was driven by a self-reflexive interest in their individual 
versions of poetic intelligibility. Since the problem of origins permeates the polemic and is also 
present in the poets’ individual reflections on the subject of clarity, the quest for intelligibility is 
really an effort to remember one’s primary relationship with language. As a beginning, clarity is 
a topos: a place where sense is made, and where there is no contradiction between being and the 
word. All three poets associated this topos with specific geographical locations and historical 
periods, all of which were beyond one’s immediate reach. Clarity was associated with those 
periods of European history that either did not affect Russia directly—such as Greek and Roman 
antiquity, or the Renaissance—or that were delayed in their arrival and stunted in their 
development, like the Enlightenment. Even Pushkin’s poetics represented a paradigm of clarity 
in part because of its singularity and, in a sense, its foreignness to the Russian tradition. For 
Ivanov, Kuzmin and Mandelshtam Italy, in particular, was a signifier of Edenic beginning.  
But beyond these specific cultural, historical and even geographic associations, clarity is 
also a structural topos: a primary figure of intelligibility from which their individual poetics 
proceeds. These are specific structures in the relationship between the poet and the word, the 
word and the image, and meaning and sound. For Ivanov, who sought the original idiom in 
being, clarity was structured metonymically, as the idea of connection between the word and its 
primordial origin. For Kuzmin the primary vehicle of intelligibility is a metaphor, the figure of 
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identity and difference. For him, clarity is spontaneous differentiation that occurs by means of 
language. Finally, for Mandelshtam clarity also originates in the word, and combines both 
figures. Since the relationship between the poet and the word, and the word and the image is that 
of dynamic transformation and rebirth as something else, it is structurally metaphoric. But 
Mandelshtam’s preoccupation with memory, and so with continuity and contiguity, also renders 
it structurally metonymic.  
These figures of intelligibility define some of the central images and concepts in 
Ivanov’s, Kuzmin’s and Mandelshtam’s texts. Yet the poets themselves never addressed them 
directly. While these primary starting points are implicitly present in their work, they escaped 
their definition. Clarity as the topos of an Edenic beginning is always self-contained, in other 
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